search for: casignaturealgorithm

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3577 Bug ID: 3577 Summary: CASignatureAlgorithms supports -cert alogrithms Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 9.3p1 Hardware: amd64 OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P5 Component: ssh Assignee: unassigned-bugs at mindrot.org...

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3675 Bug ID: 3675 Summary: CASignatureAlgorithms should be verified before verifying signatures Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 9.7p1 Hardware: Other OS: All Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: sshd Assi...

...RLs. All OpenSSH tools now ignore KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE sections in KRL files. * All: fix a number of memory leaks and unreachable/harmless integer overflows. * ssh-agent(1), ssh(1): don't truncate strings logged from PKCS#11 modules; GHPR406 * sshd(8), ssh(1): better validate CASignatureAlgorithms in ssh_config and sshd_config. Previously this directive would accept certificate algorithm names, but these were unusable in practice as OpenSSH does not support CA chains. bz3577 * ssh(1): make `ssh -Q CASignatureAlgorithms` only list signature algorithms that are valid for CA sign...

...ow-impact Coverity static analysis findings. * ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): mention that some options are not first-match-wins. * Rework logging for the regression tests. Regression tests will now capture separate logs for each ssh and sshd invocation in a test. * ssh(1): make `ssh -Q CASignatureAlgorithms` work as the manpage says it should; bz3532. * ssh(1): ensure that there is a terminating newline when adding a new entry to known_hosts; bz3529 Portability ----------- * sshd(8): harden Linux seccomp sandbox. Move to an allowlist of mmap(2), madvise(2) and futex(2) flags, removing s...

...ted to the project. More information on donations may be found at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Potentially-incompatible changes ================================ This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing configurations: * ssh(1), sshd(8): the setting of the new CASignatureAlgorithms option (see below) bans the use of DSA keys as certificate authorities. * sshd(8): the authentication success/failure log message has changed format slightly. It now includes the certificate fingerprint (previously it included only key ID and CA key fingerprint). Changes since Op...

...RLs. All OpenSSH tools now ignore KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE sections in KRL files. * All: fix a number of memory leaks and unreachable/harmless integer overflows. * ssh-agent(1), ssh(1): don't truncate strings logged from PKCS#11 modules; GHPR406 * sshd(8), ssh(1): better validate CASignatureAlgorithms in ssh_config and sshd_config. Previously this directive would accept certificate algorithm names, but these were unusable in practice as OpenSSH does not support CA chains. bz3577 * ssh(1): make `ssh -Q CASignatureAlgorithms` only list signature algorithms that are valid for CA sign...

..._SIGNATURE sections in > KRL files. > > * All: fix a number of memory leaks and unreachable/harmless integer > overflows. > > * ssh-agent(1), ssh(1): don't truncate strings logged from PKCS#11 > modules; GHPR406 > > * sshd(8), ssh(1): better validate CASignatureAlgorithms in > ssh_config and sshd_config. Previously this directive would accept > certificate algorithm names, but these were unusable in practice as > OpenSSH does not support CA chains. bz3577 > > * ssh(1): make `ssh -Q CASignatureAlgorithms` only list signature > alg...

I am trying to understand the details of the deprecation notice. Because I am getting people asking me questions. And I don't know the answer. Therefore I am pushing the boulder uphill and asking here. :-) Damien Miller wrote: > Future deprecation notice > ========================= > > It is now possible[1] to perform chosen-prefix attacks against the > SHA-1 algorithm for

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3533 Bug ID: 3533 Summary: tracking bug for openssh-9.3 Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Hardware: All OS: All Status: NEW Keywords: meta Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: Miscellaneous Assignee:

With the upcoming deprecation of ssh-rsa I was trying to see what keys my version of OpenSSH ( 7.8p1 ) supports. I noticed that "ssh -Q key" does not actually list the suggested algorithms to transition to ( rsa-sha2-256 and rsa-sha2-512 ) even though they are supported. Looking through the code, it looks like an issue with the arguments passed to sshkey_alg_list in ssh.c where it should

...These include several reported via bz2687 * ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): mention that some options are not first-match-wins. * Rework logging for the regression tests. Regression tests will now capture separate logs for each ssh and sshd invocation in a test. * ssh(1): make `ssh -Q CASignatureAlgorithms` work as the manpage says it should; bz3532. * ssh(1): ensure that there is a terminating newline when adding a new entry to known_hosts; bz3529 Portability ----------- * sshd(8): harden Linux seccomp sandbox. Move to an allowlist of mmap(2), madvise(2) and futex(2) flags, removing s...

...e PGP Web of Trust" Leurent, G and Peyrin, T (2020) https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf Security ======== * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): this release removes the "ssh-rsa" (RSA/SHA1) algorithm from those accepted for certificate signatures (i.e. the client and server CASignatureAlgorithms option) and will use the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm by default when the ssh-keygen(1) CA signs new certificates. Certificates are at special risk to the aforementioned SHA1 collision vulnerability as an attacker has effectively unlimited time in which to craft a collision tha...

...e PGP Web of Trust" Leurent, G and Peyrin, T (2020) https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf Security ======== * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): this release removes the "ssh-rsa" (RSA/SHA1) algorithm from those accepted for certificate signatures (i.e. the client and server CASignatureAlgorithms option) and will use the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm by default when the ssh-keygen(1) CA signs new certificates. Certificates are at special risk to the aforementioned SHA1 collision vulnerability as an attacker has effectively unlimited time in which to craft a collision tha...

...e PGP Web of Trust" Leurent, G and Peyrin, T (2020) https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf Security ======== * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): this release removes the "ssh-rsa" (RSA/SHA1) algorithm from those accepted for certificate signatures (i.e. the client and server CASignatureAlgorithms option) and will use the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm by default when the ssh-keygen(1) CA signs new certificates. Certificates are at special risk to the aforementioned SHA1 collision vulnerability as an attacker has effectively unlimited time in which to craft a collision tha...

...ChangeLog in the portable OpenSSH tarballs. Thanks to the many people who contributed to this release. Potentially-incompatible changes ================================ This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing configurations: * ssh(1), sshd(8): the setting of the new CASignatureAlgorithms option (see below) bans the use of DSA keys as certificate authorities. * sshd(8): the authentication success/failure log message has changed format slightly. It now includes the certificate fingerprint (previously it included only key ID and CA key fingerprint). Changes since Op...

Hi, sifting through my system's logs, I noticed many break-in attempts by rogue ssh clients trying long lists of common passwords. For some time now I pondered different approaches to counter these, but could not come up with a solution that really satisfied me. I finally reached the conclusion that any countermeasures required support in sshd itself, and created the attached patch. If

...e PGP Web of Trust" Leurent, G and Peyrin, T (2020) https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf Security ======== * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): this release removes the "ssh-rsa" (RSA/SHA1) algorithm from those accepted for certificate signatures (i.e. the client and server CASignatureAlgorithms option) and will use the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm by default when the ssh-keygen(1) CA signs new certificates. Certificates are at special risk to the aforementioned SHA1 collision vulnerability as an attacker has effectively unlimited time in which to craft a collision tha...

Hi Damien, On Nov 14, 2019, at 3:26 PM, Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org> wrote: > On Fri, 1 Nov 2019, Damien Miller wrote: >> As of this morning, OpenSSH now has experimental U2F/FIDO support, with >> U2F being added as a new key type "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 at openssh.com" >> or "ecdsa-sk" for short (the "sk" stands for "security

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3162 Bug ID: 3162 Summary: Tracking bug for 8.4 release Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Hardware: Other OS: All Status: NEW Keywords: meta Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: Miscellaneous Assignee: