search for: buffer_clear

--- src/gallium/drivers/nouveau/nvc0/nvc0_surface.c | 171 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 171 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/gallium/drivers/nouveau/nvc0/nvc0_surface.c b/src/gallium/drivers/nouveau/nvc0/nvc0_surface.c index 6b7c30c..987b6c4 100644 --- a/src/gallium/drivers/nouveau/nvc0/nvc0_surface.c +++ b/src/gallium/drivers/nouveau/nvc0/nvc0_surface.c @@ -345,6 +345,176 @@

Hi, please review the following patch! Thanks, Tobias Klausmann

Hi all, currently I am considering writing a patch for OpenSSH that will allow portforwarding using the control_master unix domain socket. The idea is to introduce an extra SSHMUX command, SSHMUX_COMMAND_SOCKS, which will then pass control to the normal socks functions used for dynamic forwarding. The main reason for me to write this patch are: - some more control over who gets to connect to

...append in buffer_append_space in buffer_append in buffer_append_space in buffer_ptr in buffer_free list_hostkey_types: ssh-rsa,ssh-dss ?in kex_setup in buffer_init in buffer_init ?before kex_send_kexinit in buffer_len kex_send_kexinit: kex proposal too short ?len=0 in buffer_ptr packet_start[20] in buffer_clear in buffer_append in buffer_append_space in buffer_ptr in buffer_len in buffer_append in buffer_append_space in buffer_ptr in buffer_ptr in buffer_len in buffer_append_space in buffer_len in buffer_ptr in buffer_len in buffer_append_space in buffer_ptr in buffer_len ?in cipher_crypt ?cipher_crypt...

Folks, I've noticed poor performance using sftp. If anyone has any advice on how to improve performance, I'd like to hear it. Test simply involved transferring a single 143MB MP3 file using defaults for all the program configs. The opensshd 3.0.2p1 server is used in all tests. Software: openssh suite 3.0.2p1 psftp (putty sftp client) latest dev snapshot pscp (putty scp client) latest

...append in buffer_append_space in buffer_append in buffer_append_space in buffer_ptr in buffer_free list_hostkey_types: ssh-rsa,ssh-dss in kex_setup in buffer_init in buffer_init before kex_send_kexinit in buffer_len kex_send_kexinit: kex proposal too short len=0 in buffer_ptr packet_start[20] in buffer_clear in buffer_append in buffer_append_space in buffer_ptr in buffer_len in buffer_append in buffer_append_space in buffer_ptr in buffer_ptr in buffer_len in buffer_append_space in buffer_len in buffer_ptr in buffer_len in buffer_append_space in buffer_ptr in buffer_len in cipher_crypt cipher_crypt...

...debug("Command '%s' disabled (badness %d)", diff -u openssh-2.1.1p1.orig/packet.c openssh-2.1.1p1/packet.c --- openssh-2.1.1p1.orig/packet.c Wed May 17 08:53:35 2000 +++ openssh-2.1.1p1/packet.c Tue Jun 20 16:39:00 2000 @@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ char buf[9]; buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet); - memset(buf, 0, 8); + memset(buf, 0, 9); buf[8] = type; buffer_append(&outgoing_packet, buf, 9); }

...---- next part -------------- --- authfile.c.orig 2012-12-19 17:11:06.537523347 -0800 +++ authfile.c 2012-12-19 17:12:03.999868720 -0800 @@ -349,17 +349,17 @@ __func__, filename == NULL ? "" : filename, filename == NULL ? "" : " ", strerror(errno)); buffer_clear(blob); - bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); return 0; } buffer_append(blob, buf, len); if (buffer_len(blob) > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) { buffer_clear(blob); - bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));...

...i; +} + +static void +remove_request(struct request *rq, int *num, int i) +{ + memmove(rq + i, rq + i + 1, (*num - i - 1) * sizeof(struct request)); + --*num; +} + +static void +send_request(int fd, const char *handle, u_int handle_len, int type, + const struct request *rq, Buffer *m) +{ + buffer_clear(m); + buffer_put_char(m, SSH2_FXP_READ); + buffer_put_int(m, rq->id); + buffer_put_string(m, handle, handle_len); + buffer_put_int64(m, rq->offset); + buffer_put_int(m, rq->len); + send_msg(fd, m); + debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_READ I:%d O:%llu S:%u", +...

...re_mux_client(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && + buffer_check_alloc(&c->input, CHAN_RBUF)) + FD_SET(c->rfd, readset); + if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { + /* clear buffer immediately - partial packet */ + buffer_clear(&c->input); + chan_ibuf_empty(c); + } + if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN || + c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { + if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) + FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset); + else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) + chan_obuf_empty(c); + } +} +...

...17:11:06.537523347 -0800 +++ authfile.c 2012-12-19 17:12:03.999868720 -0800 @@ -349,17 +349,17 @@ __func__, filename == NULL ? "" : filename, filename == NULL ? "" : " ", strerror(errno)); buffer_clear(blob); - bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); return 0; } buffer_append(blob, buf, len); if (buffer_len(blob) > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) { buf...

Hi, 1. I think you should apply the attached patch to openssh-2.9p1, otherwise ssh-keyscan on linux boxes with glibc-2.1 will experience enormous timeout delays. 2. Is there a program like ssh-keyscan for the Version2 (dsa and rsa) keys?? regards Peter Breitenlohner <peb at mppmu.mpg.de> -------------- next part -------------- diff -ur openssh-2.9p1.orig/ssh-keyscan.c

...if that buffer already contains an old peer proposal, the new one will be appended but the old one will be silently used instead. The code is currently: ptr = packet_get_raw(&dlen); buffer_append(&kex->peer, ptr, dlen); but should be: ptr = packet_get_raw(&dlen); buffer_clear(&kex->peer); buffer_append(&kex->peer, ptr, dlen); -- Configure bugmail: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/userprefs.cgi?tab=email ------- You are receiving this mail because: ------- You are watching the assignee of the bug.

...("not a valid request"); - xfree(data); xfree(host); found = 0; @@ -208,6 +207,7 @@ if (key_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen) != 0) fatal("key_sign failed"); + xfree(data); /* send reply */ buffer_clear(&b); ------- You are receiving this mail because: ------- You are the assignee for the bug, or are watching the assignee.

Hello ml, i've set up a ssh server with public-key authentication. But soon i realized that wrong pubkey authentications are not shown in the logs. So i wrote a small patch for monitor.c included as attachement. patch against 3.8.1p1 $ patch -p0 < /path/to/keyauth-loggin.patch Kindly regards, Jan Gehring

...->m_pid == -1) fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { - debug2("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); + verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); buffer_clear(&loginmsg); monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 185 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/attachments/20051121/1...

...d failed"); else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { - debug2("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); + verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); buffer_clear(&loginmsg); monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 185 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/attachme...

...tor->m_log_recvfd); + pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1; + return -1; + } + fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + } + len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg); + if (len <= 4 || len > 8192) + fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len); + buffer_clear(&logmsg); + buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len); + if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, + buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) + fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg); +...

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1087 djm at mindrot.org changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Group|Portable OpenSSH | ------- You are receiving this mail because: ------- You are the assignee for the bug, or are watching the assignee.

...er_append(&msg, c->c_data, c->c_plen); + buffer_consume(&msg, 8 - (c->c_plen & 7)); /* padding */ if (buffer_get_char(&msg) != (int) SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) { - error("%s: invalid packet type", host); + error("%s: invalid packet type", c->c_name); buffer_clear(&msg); - return; + return NULL; } buffer_consume(&msg, 8); /* cookie */ @@ -270,10 +292,70 @@ (void) buffer_get_int(&msg); buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->e); buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->n); + buffer_clear(&msg); + + return (rsa); +} + +s...