search for: authorized_keys_files

...* -authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw) +authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw, int n) { - return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file, pw); -} - -char * -authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw) -{ - return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw); + if (n >= options.num_authorized_keys_files) + return NULL; + return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_files[n], pw); } /* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */ Index: auth.h =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/openssh/auth.h,v retrieving revision 1.27 diff -u -r1.27 auth....

This patch adds a new option to sshd, chroot_users. It has the effect of chroot()ing incoming ssh users to their home directory. Note: this option does not work if UsePrivilegeSeparation is enabled. Patch is based on OpenSSH 3.4p1. *** servconf.h@@\main\1 Tue Oct 1 17:25:32 2002 --- servconf.h Wed Oct 2 06:17:48 2002 *************** *** 131,136 **** --- 131,137 ---- char

The following is a patch I've been working on to support a "ChrootUser" option in the sshd_config file. I was looking for a way to offer sftp access and at the same time restict interactive shell access. This patch is a necessary first step (IMO). It applies clean with 'patch -l'. Also attached is a shell script that helps to build a chrooted home dir on a RedHat 7.2

This patch is against 3.0.2p1. It produces output like the first line in the example below for both v1 and v2 logins. Logging is turned on by sticking ``LogFingerprint yes'' in sshd_conf. It would be nice if something like this would make it into OpenSSH. Dec 4 14:21:09 lizzy.bugworks.com sshd[7774]: [ID 800047 auth.info] Found matching RSA1 key:

Hi, I'm unable to get Kerberos4 authentication working with openssh-3.4p1. I'm getting a message that privsep is not available on my platform (Irix 6.5.15) and another message stating that compression and privsep are mutually exclusive. But, ssh decided to turn off compression, I think because of servconf.c. I think it would be more usefull to have compression enabled and disable privsep

Hello there! I have made a patch against OpenSSH 3.0.2p1 which allows the fingerprint of the accepted key to be printed in the log message. It works with SSH1-RSA and SSH2 pubkey (DSA+RSA) authentication. This feature is controllable by the LogKeyFingerprint config option (turned off by default). Michal Kara -------------- next part -------------- diff -u5

Could people please test -current? We will be making a release fairly soon. -d -- | By convention there is color, \\ Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org> | By convention sweetness, By convention bitterness, \\ www.mindrot.org | But in reality there are atoms and space - Democritus (c. 400 BCE)

Damien, I've filed a bug for this on mindrot as requested, https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1348. Patch attached in case that helps reviewing. Comments welcome, Rob -- Rob Holland <rob at inversepath.com> http://www.inversepath.com - Chief R & D Engineer Inverse Path Ltd, 63 Park Road, Peterborough, PE1 2TN, UK Registered in England: 5555973 -------------- next

Hello, Currently OpenSSH has a fixed order on how the key authenticates the user: at first it tries to authenticate against TrustedUserCAKeys, afterwards it does it against the output keys from the AuthorizedKeysCommand and finally against the files as set in AuthorizedKeysFile. I have an use-case where this order is not ideal. This is because in my case the command fetches keys from the cloud

By the way, I noticed in the previous IdentityFile patch I forgot to expand tilde. I fixed this by making the change in ssh.c instead of readconf.c, which is probably where it belongs, as far as the existing code is concerned: diff -ur openssh-3.0.2p1/auth.c openssh-3.0.2p1I/auth.c --- openssh-3.0.2p1/auth.c Sun Nov 11 17:06:07 2001 +++ openssh-3.0.2p1I/auth.c Sun Jan 27 12:05:14 2002 @@ -44,7

Hello again! Since there was some resistance against adding TCP_NODELAY uncontionally, I've made another patch. The new patch contains the following: * Added a NoDelay yes/no (default no) config option to ssh and sshd * Added -oNoDelay=yes to the ssh command line for sftp. * Changed the sshd subsystem config option syntax from Subsystem name path to Subsystem name options path

Hi, during our usual work I found it anoying that one can not easily see who logged in using public key authentication. In newer versions of SSH the fingerprint of the public key gets logged, but who can tell which key belongs to whom from his head? So I wrote a little ad-hoc patch (vs. 3.5.p1) so that the comment field on the keys in the authorized_keys[2] files get logged to make life

Here is a patch to allow private key files to be placed system wide (for all users) in a secure (non-NFS) mounted location on systems where home directories are NFS mounted. This is especially important for users who use blank passphrases rather than ssh-agent (a good example of where this is necessary is for tunnelling lpd through ssh on systems that run lpd as user lp). IdentityFile now accepts

While I was updating our ssh-servers, I rewrote my old patch that adds idletimeout (just like in old ssh1) parameter to openssh. Since reapplying the patch for all new versions of openssh is not fun at all, I would like to have it included in the official openssh, if you consider the patch worthy. Unlike ClientAlive, idletimeout works for both protocol versions. It also works together with

Hello! Please consider including the attached patch in the next release. It allows one to drop privilege separation code while building openssh by using '--disable-privsep' switch of configure script. If one doesn't use privilege separation at all, why don't simply allow him to drop privilege separation support completely? -- Sincerely Your, Dan. -------------- next part

Here is the user-dependent IdentityFile patch for openssh3.5 (BSD version), which allows private key files to be placed system wide (for all users) in a secure (non-NFS) mounted location. This addresses an important security hole on systems where home directories are NFS mounted, particularly if there are users who use blank passphrases (or when lpd is tunneled through ssh on systems running lpd

Hello, I came across an interoperability problem in OpenSSH 3.0p1 and 3.0.1p1 concerning the AFS token forwarding. That means that the new versions are not able to exchange AFS tokens (and Kerberos TGTs) with older OpenSSH releases (including 2.9p2) and with the old SSH 1.2.2x. In my opinion this problem already existed in Openssh 2.9.9p1, but I have never used this version (I only looked at the

I've been trying to cut down the size of openssh so I can run it on my Nokia 770. One thing which helps a fair amount (and will help even more when I get '-ffunction-sections -fdata-sections --gc-sections' working) is to have the option of compiling out privilege separation... Is it worth me tidying this up and trying to make it apply properly to the OpenBSD version? Does the openbsd

I'm reading this fine article on O'Reilly: http://linux.oreillynet.com/lpt/a//linux/2001/11/08/ssh_keystroke.html <quote> The paper concludes that the keystroke timing data observable from today's SSH implementations reveals a dangerously significant amount of information about user terminal sessions--enough to locate typed passwords in the session data stream and reduce the

...6 @@ user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) return success; for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) { + int j; + glob_t glob_result; file = expand_authorized_keys( options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw); - success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file); + glob(file, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &glob_result); + for (j = 0; !success && j < glob_result.gl_pathc; j++) { + char *f = glob_result.gl_pathv[j]; +...