search for: __page_aligned_data

...--- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data dbg_idts[] = { #endif /* Must be page-aligned because the real IDT is used in a fixmap. */ -gate_desc idt_table[IDT_ENTRIES] __page_aligned_bss; +gate_desc idt_table[IDT_ENTRIES] __page_aligned_data; struct desc_ptr idt_descr __ro_after_init = { .size = (IDT_ENTRIES * 2 * sizeof(unsigned long)) - 1, -- 2.17.1

...l/idt.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data apic_idts[] = { }; /* Must be page-aligned because the real IDT is used in the cpu entry area */ -static gate_desc idt_table[IDT_ENTRIES] __page_aligned_bss; +static gate_desc idt_table[IDT_ENTRIES] __page_aligned_data; struct desc_ptr idt_descr __ro_after_init = { .size = IDT_TABLE_SIZE - 1, -- 2.27.0

This fixes various problems that cropped up with the vdso patches. - Patch 1 fixes an information leak to userspace. - Patches 2 and 3 fix the kernel build on gold. - Patches 4 and 5 fix Xen (I hope). Konrad, could you could test these on Xen and run 'test_vsyscall test' [1]? I don't have a usable Xen setup. Also, I'd appreciate a review of patches 4 and 5 from some

This fixes various problems that cropped up with the vdso patches. - Patch 1 fixes an information leak to userspace. - Patches 2 and 3 fix the kernel build on gold. - Patches 4 and 5 fix Xen (I hope). Konrad, could you could test these on Xen and run 'test_vsyscall test' [1]? I don't have a usable Xen setup. Also, I'd appreciate a review of patches 4 and 5 from some

This fixes various problems that cropped up with the vdso patches. - Patch 1 fixes an information leak to userspace. - Patches 2 and 3 fix the kernel build on gold. - Patches 4 and 5 fix Xen (I hope). Konrad, could you could test these on Xen and run 'test_vsyscall test' [1]? I don't have a usable Xen setup. Also, I'd appreciate a review of patches 4 and 5 from some

This fixes various problems that cropped up with the vdso patches. - Patch 1 fixes an information leak to userspace. - Patches 2 and 3 fix the kernel build on gold. - Patches 4 and 5 fix Xen (I hope). - Patch 6 (optional) adds a trace event to vsyscall emulation. It will make it easier to handle performance regression reports :) [1]

This fixes various problems that cropped up with the vdso patches. - Patch 1 fixes an information leak to userspace. - Patches 2 and 3 fix the kernel build on gold. - Patches 4 and 5 fix Xen (I hope). - Patch 6 (optional) adds a trace event to vsyscall emulation. It will make it easier to handle performance regression reports :) [1]

This fixes various problems that cropped up with the vdso patches. - Patch 1 fixes an information leak to userspace. - Patches 2 and 3 fix the kernel build on gold. - Patches 4 and 5 fix Xen (I hope). - Patch 6 (optional) adds a trace event to vsyscall emulation. It will make it easier to handle performance regression reports :) [1]

Hi, here is the first public post of the patch-set to enable Linux to run under SEV-ES enabled hypervisors. The code is mostly feature-complete, but there are still a couple of bugs to fix. Nevertheless, given the size of the patch-set, I think it is about time to ask for initial feedback of the changes that come with it. To better understand the code here is a quick explanation of SEV-ES first.

Hi, here is the first public post of the patch-set to enable Linux to run under SEV-ES enabled hypervisors. The code is mostly feature-complete, but there are still a couple of bugs to fix. Nevertheless, given the size of the patch-set, I think it is about time to ask for initial feedback of the changes that come with it. To better understand the code here is a quick explanation of SEV-ES first.

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a rebased version of the latest SEV-ES patches. They are now based on latest tip/master instead of upstream Linux and include the necessary changes. Changes to v4 are in particular: - Moved early IDT setup code to idt.c, because the idt_descr and the idt_table are now static - This required to make stack protector work early (or

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and rebased the code v5.8-rc5. The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the #VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big pile of entry code changes merged into

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and rebased the code v5.8-rc5. The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the #VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big pile of entry code changes merged into

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the new version of the SEV-ES client enabling patch-set. It is based on the latest tip/master branch and contains the necessary changes. In particular those ar: - Enabling CR4.FSGSBASE early on supported processors so that early #VC exceptions on APs can be handled. - Add another patch (patch 1) to fix a KVM frame-size build

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/ I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the discussions around it. Another important change is that the early IDT

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/ I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the discussions around it. Another important change is that the early IDT

Hi, here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes since the last version. What is SEV-ES ============== SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by

Hi, here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes since the last version. What is SEV-ES ============== SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by