search for: 540,6

...++ > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_dmem.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_dmem.c > index cc9993837508..f6a806ba3caa 100644 > --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_dmem.c > +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_dmem.c > @@ -540,6 +540,12 @@ static unsigned long nouveau_dmem_migrate_copy_one(struct nouveau_drm *drm, > if (!(src & MIGRATE_PFN_MIGRATE)) > goto out; > > + if (spage && is_device_private_page(spage)) { > + paddr = nouveau_dmem_page_addr(spage); > + *dma_addr = DMA_MAPPI...

...etable(cpu, args->arg1); + break; default: /* It should be an architecture-specific hypercall. */ if (lguest_arch_do_hcall(cpu, args)) diff --git a/arch/x86/lguest/boot.c b/arch/x86/lguest/boot.c index 65f0b8a..c3bdf0b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lguest/boot.c +++ b/arch/x86/lguest/boot.c @@ -540,6 +551,13 @@ static void lguest_flush_tlb_kernel(void) lazy_hcall(LHCALL_FLUSH_TLB, 1, 0, 0); } +/* This routine is called when a process exits, and we're throwing away the + * page table. */ +static void lguest_pgd_free(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd) +{ + lazy_hcall(LHCALL_INVALIDATE_P...

...etable(cpu, args->arg1); + break; default: /* It should be an architecture-specific hypercall. */ if (lguest_arch_do_hcall(cpu, args)) diff --git a/arch/x86/lguest/boot.c b/arch/x86/lguest/boot.c index 65f0b8a..c3bdf0b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lguest/boot.c +++ b/arch/x86/lguest/boot.c @@ -540,6 +551,13 @@ static void lguest_flush_tlb_kernel(void) lazy_hcall(LHCALL_FLUSH_TLB, 1, 0, 0); } +/* This routine is called when a process exits, and we're throwing away the + * page table. */ +static void lguest_pgd_free(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd) +{ + lazy_hcall(LHCALL_INVALIDATE_P...

...rm/nouveau/nouveau_dmem.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_dmem.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_dmem.c index cc9993837508..f6a806ba3caa 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_dmem.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_dmem.c @@ -540,6 +540,12 @@ static unsigned long nouveau_dmem_migrate_copy_one(struct nouveau_drm *drm, if (!(src & MIGRATE_PFN_MIGRATE)) goto out; + if (spage && is_device_private_page(spage)) { + paddr = nouveau_dmem_page_addr(spage); + *dma_addr = DMA_MAPPING_ERROR; + goto done; + } + d...

..._HOTPLUG_CPU */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP +static void __init sev_es_setup_play_dead(void) +{ + smp_ops.play_dead = sev_es_play_dead; +} +#else +static inline void sev_es_setup_play_dead(void) { } +#endif + static void __init sev_es_alloc_runtime_data(int cpu) { struct sev_es_runtime_data *data; @@ -540,6 +596,8 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) sev_es_setup_vc_stack(cpu); } + sev_es_setup_play_dead(); + xa_init_flags(&sev_es_cpuid_cache, XA_FLAGS_LOCK_IRQ); sev_es_cpuid_cache_initialized = true; -- 2.17.1

...k - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) { diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c index e2b0e2ac07bb..68d75379e06a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c @@ -540,6 +540,9 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) if (!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED)) return; + /* Save SEV_STATUS to avoid reading MSR again */ + sev_status = msr; + /* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */ sme_me_mask = me_mask; sev_enabled =...

...); } /* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c index e2b0e2ac07bb..68d75379e06a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c @@ -540,6 +540,9 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) if (!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED)) return; + /* Save SEV_STATUS to avoid reading MSR again */ + sev_status = msr; + /* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */ sme_me_mask = me_mask; sev_enabled =...

...D; } /* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c index e2b0e2ac07bb..68d75379e06a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c @@ -540,6 +540,9 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) if (!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED)) return; + /* Save SEV_STATUS to avoid reading MSR again */ + sev_status = msr; + /* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */ sme_me_mask = me_mask; sev_enabled =...

...); } /* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c index e2b0e2ac07bb..68d75379e06a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c @@ -540,6 +540,9 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) if (!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED)) return; + /* Save SEV_STATUS to avoid reading MSR again */ + sev_status = msr; + /* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */ sme_me_mask = me_mask; sev_enabled =...

These are based on 5.8.0-rc2 and intended for Ben Skeggs' nouveau tree. I believe the changes can be queued for 5.8-rcX after being reviewed. These were part of a larger series but I'm resending them separately as suggested by Jason Gunthorpe. https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200619215649.32297-1-rcampbell at nvidia.com/ Note that in order to exercise/test patch 2 here, you will need a

...rintf(F," -n, --dry-run perform a trial run with no changes made\n"); rprintf(F," -W, --whole-file copy files whole (without delta-xfer algorithm)\n"); rprintf(F," -x, --one-file-system don't cross filesystem boundaries\n"); @@ -540,6 +542,7 @@ static struct poptOption long_options[] = { {"sparse", 'S', POPT_ARG_VAL, &sparse_files, 1, 0, 0 }, {"no-sparse", 0, POPT_ARG_VAL, &sparse_files, 0, 0, 0 }, {"no-S", 0, POPT_ARG_VAL, &spars...

...gt;vcpu, &rpl, &rpl_size); + + err = kvmi_msg_vcpu_reply(job, msg, ec, rpl, rpl_size); + kvmi_msg_free(rpl); + return err; +} + /* * These commands are executed on the vCPU thread. The receiving thread * passes the messages using a newly allocated 'struct kvmi_vcpu_cmd_job' @@ -540,6 +556,7 @@ static int(*const msg_vcpu[])(const struct kvmi_vcpu_cmd_job *, [KVMI_VCPU_GET_CPUID] = handle_get_cpuid, [KVMI_VCPU_GET_INFO] = handle_get_vcpu_info, [KVMI_VCPU_GET_REGISTERS] = handle_get_registers, + [KVMI_VCPU_GET_XSAVE] = handle_vcpu_get_xsave, [KVM...

...struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = &nvq->vq; > int ret; > > - ret = vhost_net_tx_get_vq_desc(net, nvq, out, in, busyloop_intr); > + ret = vhost_net_tx_get_vq_desc(net, nvq, out, in, msg, busyloop_intr); > > if (ret < 0 || ret == vq->num) > return ret; > @@ -540,6 +574,83 @@ static bool tx_can_batch(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, size_t total_len) > !vhost_vq_avail_empty(vq->dev, vq); > } > > +#define VHOST_NET_RX_PAD (NET_IP_ALIGN + NET_SKB_PAD) I wonder whether NET_IP_ALIGN make sense for XDP. > + > +static int vhost_net_b...

...struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = &nvq->vq; > int ret; > > - ret = vhost_net_tx_get_vq_desc(net, nvq, out, in, busyloop_intr); > + ret = vhost_net_tx_get_vq_desc(net, nvq, out, in, msg, busyloop_intr); > > if (ret < 0 || ret == vq->num) > return ret; > @@ -540,6 +574,83 @@ static bool tx_can_batch(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, size_t total_len) > !vhost_vq_avail_empty(vq->dev, vq); > } > > +#define VHOST_NET_RX_PAD (NET_IP_ALIGN + NET_SKB_PAD) I wonder whether NET_IP_ALIGN make sense for XDP. > + > +static int vhost_net_b...

...(&drm_gem_object.resv). > + * (&drm_gem_object.resv) or a custom lock if one is provided. > */ > struct { > struct list_head list; > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP > + struct lockdep_map *lock_dep_map; > +#endif > } gpuva; > > /** > @@ -540,6 +544,26 @@ unsigned long drm_gem_lru_scan(struct drm_gem_lru *lru, > > int drm_gem_evict(struct drm_gem_object *obj); > > +#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP > +/* > + * drm_gem_gpuva_set_lock() - Set the lock protecting accesses to the gpuva list. > + * @obj: the &drm_gem_obj...

...temptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd }, { "uselogin", sUseLogin }, + { "usechroot", sUseChroot }, + { "chrootgroup", sChrootGroup }, { "randomseed", sRandomSeedFile }, { "keepalive", sKeepAlives }, { "allowusers", sAllowUsers }, @@ -540,6 +549,14 @@ case sUseLogin: intptr = &options->use_login; goto parse_flag; + + case sUseChroot: + intptr = &options->use_chroot; + goto parse_flag; + + case sChrootGroup: + intptr = &options->chroot_group; + goto parse_int; case sGatewayPorts: int...

...nt get_tx_bufs(struct vhost_net *net, struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = &nvq->vq; int ret; - ret = vhost_net_tx_get_vq_desc(net, nvq, out, in, busyloop_intr); + ret = vhost_net_tx_get_vq_desc(net, nvq, out, in, msg, busyloop_intr); if (ret < 0 || ret == vq->num) return ret; @@ -540,6 +574,83 @@ static bool tx_can_batch(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, size_t total_len) !vhost_vq_avail_empty(vq->dev, vq); } +#define VHOST_NET_RX_PAD (NET_IP_ALIGN + NET_SKB_PAD) + +static int vhost_net_build_xdp(struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq, + struct iov_iter *from) +{ + s...

...nt get_tx_bufs(struct vhost_net *net, struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = &nvq->vq; int ret; - ret = vhost_net_tx_get_vq_desc(net, nvq, out, in, busyloop_intr); + ret = vhost_net_tx_get_vq_desc(net, nvq, out, in, msg, busyloop_intr); if (ret < 0 || ret == vq->num) return ret; @@ -540,6 +577,80 @@ static bool tx_can_batch(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, size_t total_len) !vhost_vq_avail_empty(vq->dev, vq); } +#define VHOST_NET_RX_PAD (NET_IP_ALIGN + NET_SKB_PAD) + +static int vhost_net_build_xdp(struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq, + struct iov_iter *from) +{ + s...

...->vq; >> int ret; >> >> - ret = vhost_net_tx_get_vq_desc(net, nvq, out, in, busyloop_intr); >> + ret = vhost_net_tx_get_vq_desc(net, nvq, out, in, msg, busyloop_intr); >> >> if (ret < 0 || ret == vq->num) >> return ret; >> @@ -540,6 +574,83 @@ static bool tx_can_batch(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, size_t total_len) >> !vhost_vq_avail_empty(vq->dev, vq); >> } >> >> +#define VHOST_NET_RX_PAD (NET_IP_ALIGN + NET_SKB_PAD) > I wonder whether NET_IP_ALIGN make sense for XDP. XDP is not t...

...rned was not the real resource's data, this needs to transfer the * data back to the resource. * - * Also marks vbo/cb dirty if the buffer's binding + * Also marks vbo dirty based on the buffer's binding */ static void nouveau_buffer_transfer_unmap(struct pipe_context *pipe, @@ -540,8 +540,6 @@ nouveau_buffer_transfer_unmap(struct pipe_context *pipe, /* make sure we invalidate dedicated caches */ if (bind & (PIPE_BIND_VERTEX_BUFFER | PIPE_BIND_INDEX_BUFFER)) nv->vbo_dirty = TRUE; - if (bind & (PIPE_BIND_CONSTANT_BUFFER)) -...