search for: 4096bit

...il 13312bit burst 1732b cburst 5Kb class htb 1:20 root prio 7 rate 12bit ceil 12bit burst 1599b cburst 1599b class htb 1:5 root prio 2 rate 13312bit ceil 13312bit burst 1732b cburst 1732b class htb 1:6 root prio 3 rate 13312bit ceil 13312bit burst 1732b cburst 1732b class htb 1:7 root prio 4 rate 4096bit ceil 4096bit burst 1639b cburst 5Kb class htb 1:8 root prio 5 rate 3072bit ceil 9216bit burst 1629b cburst 1691b class htb 1:9 root prio 6 rate 3072bit ceil 9216bit burst 1629b cburst 1691b root class: 1:0 siblings: 1:5, 1:6, 1:7, 1:8, 1:9, 1:20 SMTP outgoing traffic goes out 1:8 1:20 is the de...

Dear All, I just tried to use 8192bit keypair for Tinc VPN connection. The connection is unable to build up. After reduce the bit of keypair from 8192bit to 4096bit. Everything is resumed to normal. How large of public/private RSA keypair can support for TINC VPN 1.0.22 on Windows platform? Regards, ERIC P Please consider your environmental responsibility. Before printing this e-mail message, ask yourself whether you really need a hard copy. --------...

Hi, I need to sign a bunch of RPM packages that have interdepencies: build #1, sign #1, install #1, build #2, sign #2, install #2 etc. Based on the info in bz436812 [1] I have created the key (RSA sign only, 4096bit, no sub keys) and put this in .rpmmacros: %_signature gpg %_gpg_path ~/.gnupg %_gpg_name <KEY_ID> %__gpg_sign_cmd %{__gpg} gpg --force-v3-sigs \ --digest-algo=sha1 --batch --no-verbose --no-armor \ --passphrase-fd 3 --no-secmem-warning -u "%{_gpg_name}" \ -sbo %{__signat...

...rlimits 0) period 31304 work 7533852 bytes level 1 class hfsc 1:10 parent 1:1 sc m1 1024bit d 8.0ms m2 100000bit ul m1 0bit d 0us m2 220000bit Sent 6892869 bytes 33300 pkts (dropped 0, overlimits 0) period 32750 work 6892869 bytes rtwork 6725586 bytes level 0 class hfsc 1:20 parent 1:1 sc m1 4096bit d 100.0ms m2 75000bit ul m1 0bit d 0us m2 220000bit Sent 0 bytes 0 pkts (dropped 0, overlimits 0) period 0 level 0 class hfsc 1:30 parent 1:1 sc m1 8200bit d 200.0ms m2 30000bit ul m1 0bit d 0us m2 220000bit Sent 640821 bytes 636 pkts (dropped 0, overlimits 0) period 277 work 640821 bytes rtw...

...cate makes sense from an administrative standpoint. One wants to fail safe. But modifying certificates on sealed servers?. Really, unless one has evidence of penetration and theft of the key store, what possible benefit accrues from changing secured device keys on a frequent basis? We mainly use 4096bit keys which will be secure from brute force until the advent of Quantum computing. At which point brute force attacks will become a pointless worry. Not because the existing RSA certificates and keys will withstand those attacks but because the encryption process itself will move onto quantum devic...

...Really, unless one has evidence of penetration and theft of the key store, what possible benefit accrues from changing secured device keys on a frequent basis? My point exactly. Only I usually try to say it in so short way, that my point fails to propagate to readers ;-( > > We mainly use 4096bit keys which will be secure from brute force until the advent of Quantum computing. At which point brute force attacks will become a pointless worry. Not because the existing RSA > certificates and keys will withstand those attacks but because the encryption process itself will move onto quantum...