I've fixed the known failure and kindly ask to rerun the GitHub CI for
https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/325 and approve the PR in
general.
On Thu, Jun 16, 2022 at 9:31 AM Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs at redhat.com>
wrote:
>
>
> On Wed, Jun 15, 2022 at 5:33 AM James Ralston <ralston at pobox.com>
wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Jun 13, 2022 at 4:34 AM Jochen Bern <Jochen.Bern at
binect.de>
>> wrote:
>>
>> > On 10.06.22 16:50, Dmitry Belyavskiy wrote:
>> >
>> > > There is a need to increase RSA key requirements to make the
>> > > installations more secure. Just updating the default
compiled-in
>> > > value isn't an option because it may significantly break
legacy
>> > > systems compatibility. This PR [1] introduces a new
configuration
>> > > option MinRSABits to be managed for security's sake.
>> > >
>> > > If this approach is OK for upstream, please let me know and I
will
>> > > improve this PR according to the feedback.
>> >
>> > I realize that with the *current* selection of algorithms
available
>> > in OpenSSH, fine-grained control of minimum key size almost(!) is
an
>> > RSA-only topic, but nonetheless I wonder whether newly-defined
>> > config syntax thereto should be aimed at extensibility to other
>> > cryptalgorithms ...
>>
>> That ship sailed long ago:
>>
>> $ grep SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE sshkey.h
>> #define SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE 1024
>>
>> It?s not worth it to attempt to refactor this approach, as with both
>> the ecdsa family and ed25519, the cipher name specifies the security
>> strength.
>>
>> Dmitry?s merge request both defaults MinRSABits to
>> SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE, and prohibits setting MinRSABits to
>> anything less than SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE. So unless the
>> administrator specifically sets MinRSABits to something greater than
>> 1024, it will not change the behavior of OpenSSH. It also documents
>> MinRSABits in the man pages, and includes MinRSABits in ?ssh -G?
>> output. All of this seems perfectly reasonable.
>>
>
> I also need to adjust tests.
>
>
>> NIST Special Publication 800-131A (1) prohibits the use of RSA keys
>> with len(n) < 2048 for all uses but legacy digital signature
>> verification, and an increasing number of sites (including ours) must
>> comply with NIST SP 800-131A. Having the MinRSABits option would make
>> our lives easier with respect to compliance.
>>
>> (1) https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2
>
>
> Yes, and this was a part of my (unwritten) rationale :)
>
> --
> Dmitry Belyavskiy
>
--
Dmitry Belyavskiy