Hi all,
I'm interested in having X448 protocol available as an option, as it
gives a larger security margin over X25519. For anyone unfamiliar, it
is an Diffie-Hellman elliptic curve key exchange using Curve448 (defined
in RFC7748: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7748). Furthermore, it is
included in the new TLS 1.3 specification (RFC8846:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446).
A few questions:
1. What has been OpenSSH's involvement in this related IETF draft,
if any?: https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-curves-08.html
2. Has there been any (even informal) plans for including X448?
3. Has anyone begun an implementation yet?
I've got some experience with OpenSSH development, so I wouldn't
mind writing a first draft of a patch. I just don't want to duplicate
efforts if its already ongoing, nor make a lone-wolf diff with no chance
of merging.
Thanks,
- Joe
--
Joseph S. Testa II
Founder & Principle Security Consultant
Positron Security
On Thu, 13 Sep 2018, Joseph S. Testa II wrote:> Hi all, > > I'm interested in having X448 protocol available as an option, as it gives > a larger security margin over X25519. For anyone unfamiliar, it is an > Diffie-Hellman elliptic curve key exchange using Curve448 (defined in RFC7748: > https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7748). Furthermore, it is included in the new > TLS 1.3 specification (RFC8846: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446). > > A few questions: > > 1. What has been OpenSSH's involvement in this related IETF draft, if > any?: https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-curves-08.html > > 2. Has there been any (even informal) plans for including X448? > > 3. Has anyone begun an implementation yet?We have any plans to add more crypto options to OpenSSH without a strong justification, and I don't see one for X448-SHA512 ATM. It's hard to imagine a world where X25519-SHA256 is broken but X448-SHA512 is unaffected. AFAIK The most likely ways that X25519-SHA256 could fail are: 1) discovery of weaknesses in prime field EC crypto. This would almost certainly affect both X25519/X448. 2) working quantum computers. Exciting times, everything breaks. 3) a weakness in SHA256. Online key agreement protocols like SSH KEX are the last thing affected by collisions, because the attacker has such a limited window in which to generate one and limited degrees of freedom to manipulate the colliding data. Personally, I'm more interested in a post-quantum KEX than another of the same species... -d
On 09/13/2018 08:18 PM, Damien Miller wrote:> We have any plans to add more crypto options to OpenSSH without a strong > justification, and I don't see one for X448-SHA512 ATM.What I like about it is that it offers ~224 bit security level, whereas X25519 offers ~128 bits (according to RFC7748). Hence, pairing X448 with AES256 would provide a full chain of security in the ~224 bit level, no? It also provides an alternative to the NIST P-curves (like P-521), which some people suspect are back-doored by the NSA. P-521 in ECDSA has been supported by OpenSSH for awhile now.> It's hard to imagine a world where X25519-SHA256 is broken but > X448-SHA512 is unaffected.Ok, but still... X448 provides a higher security margin that pairs well with AES256. That's a benefit users can enjoy immediately.> AFAIK The most likely ways that X25519-SHA256 > could fail are: > > 1) discovery of weaknesses in prime field EC crypto. This would almost > certainly affect both X25519/X448.The same could happen with the NIST P-curves, which OpenSSH already supports.> 2) working quantum computers. Exciting times, everything breaks. > > 3) a weakness in SHA256. Online key agreement protocols like SSH KEX are > the last thing affected by collisions, because the attacker has such a > limited window in which to generate one and limited degrees of freedom > to manipulate the colliding data.(Did you mean SHA-512 here?) Again, this can happen with the P-curves/SHA-256/384/512/ECDSA that is already supported. While we're daydreaming about this, what about SHA3-512? (note the "3")> Personally, I'm more interested in a post-quantum KEX than another of the > same species...I'm very interested in this too. They're not exclusive to each other, however. I haven't stayed on top of post-quantum crypto lately, but isn't that still years away? X448, on the other hand, is fully defined and was recently put into TLS 1.3. It wouldn't be hard to convince me that X448 is still a little too new; perhaps we could wait a year and see how well it does with the new scrutiny it gets from being in the TLS spec. If it survives its field-testing, then we could move forward. And/or we make X448 a last-priority KEX for a year or two and patiently see what happens. Again, if this gets the green light, I'll be happy to write the initial implementation. Thanks, - Joe -- Joseph S. Testa II Founder & Principle Security Consultant Positron Security