openssh unix dev - Oct 2005 - Possible security problem in hostbased user authentication?

In auth2-hostbased.c, line #146

    if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0)
                                       ^^^^^

shouldn't this be

    if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, ipaddr) == 0)
                                       ^^^^^^

The code was found in 4.2.

Best regards,
Choung S.Park

Choung S. Park / Choung Networks wrote:
> In auth2-hostbased.c, line #146
> 
>     if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0)
>                                        ^^^^^
> 
> shouldn't this be
> 
>     if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, ipaddr) == 0)
>                                        ^^^^^^
I don't think so.  The surrounding code is:
         if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) {
                 if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0)
                         return 0;
                 lookup = chost;

It's the implementation of the HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly 
sshd_config option.  If you look at the authmethod code (in 
userauth_hostbased() above) you'll see that the host must also be able 
to prove possession of the private key corresponding to that host 
identifier to be allowed access.

So the host can claim to be whatever it wants, but it won't get very far 
unless the server has a public key for that host, and the client has the 
matching private key.

On a related note, it appears that HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly is 
missing from sshd_config(5).

-- 
Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip.com.au)
GPG key 8FF4FA69 / D9A3 86E9 7EEE AF4B B2D4  37C9 C982 80C7 8FF4 FA69
     Good judgement comes with experience. Unfortunately, the experience
usually comes from bad judgement.