What is everyone's opinion on reverting back to the OpenBSD's auth-skey.c which uses S/Key's sha1.h and libskey.a instead of OpenSSL. Personally it does not matter to me. I would perfer to revert back myself to reduce the differences between the two code trees. (Or if OpenBSD could pick up the changes. Either way.) I've already sent a patch to the person doing the portable OpenBSD S/Key library with a few minor corrects and a request to expose sha1.h since I know a few other projects that would use it. Either way it won't really matter since it's only used to generate the false S/Key response (But they do actually give different OTP outputs). - Ben
Hi, On Thu, Nov 09, 2000 at 08:15:38PM -0600, Ben Lindstrom wrote:> What is everyone's opinion on reverting back to the OpenBSD's auth-skey.c > which uses S/Key's sha1.h and libskey.a instead of OpenSSL.I like the idea - why have two different SHA implementations in the same binary? It's just more code size to carry around. (Whether they create the same "fake" OTP or not doesn't matter much to me) gert -- USENET is *not* the non-clickable part of WWW! //www.muc.de/~gert/ Gert Doering - Munich, Germany gert at greenie.muc.de fax: +49-89-35655025 gert.doering at physik.tu-muenchen.de