James Y Knight via llvm-dev
2019-Nov-18 21:51 UTC
[llvm-dev] [RFC] LLVM Security Group and Process
I think it's great to make a policy for reporting security bugs. But first, yes, we need to be clear as to what sorts of things we consider as "security bugs", and what we do not. We need to be clear on this, both for users to know what they should depend on, and for LLVM contributors to know when they should be raising a flag, if they discover or fix something themselves. We could just keep on doing our usual development process, and respond only to *externally-reported* issues with the security-response routine. But I don't think that would be a good idea. Creating a process whereby anyone outside the project can report security issues, and for which we'll coordinate disclosure and create backports and such is all well and good...but if we don't then also do (or at least *try* to do!) the same for issues discovered and fixed within the community, is there even a point? So, if we're going to expand what we consider a security bug beyond the present "effectively nothing", I think it is really important to be a bit more precise about what it's being expanded to. For example, I think it should generally be agreed that a bug in Clang which allows arbitrary-code-execution in the compiler, given a specially crafted source-file, should not be considered a security issue. A bug, yes, but not a security issue, because we do not consider the use-case of running the compiler in privileged context to be a supported operation. But also the same for parsing a source-file into a clang AST -- which might even happen automatically with editor integration. Seems less obviously correct, but, still, the reality today. And, IMO, the same stance should also apply to feeding arbitrary bitcode into LLVM. (And I get the unfortunate feeling that last statement might not find universal agreement.) Given the current architecture and state of the project, I think it would be rather unwise to pretend that any of those are secure operations, or to try to support them as such with a security response process. Many compiler crashes seem likely to be security bugs, if someone is trying hard enough. If every time such a bug was fixed, it got a full security-response triggered, with embargos, CVEs, backports, etc...that just seems unsustainable. Maybe it would be *nice* to support this, but I think we're a long way from there currently. However, all that said -- based on timing and recent events, perhaps your primary goal here is to establish a process for discussing LLVM patches to workaround not-yet-public CPU errata, and issues of that nature. In that case, the need for the security response group is primarily to allow developing quality LLVM patches based on not-yet-public information about other people's products. That seems like a very useful thing to formalize, indeed, and doesn't need any changes in llvm developers' thinking. So if that's what we're talking about, let's be clear about it. On Mon, Nov 18, 2019 at 2:43 PM Chris Bieneman via llvm-dev < llvm-dev at lists.llvm.org> wrote:> Hey JF, > > Thanks for putting this RFC together. LLVM security issues are very > important, and I'm really glad someone is focusing attention here. > > I'm generally in agreement with much of what you have proposed. I do have > a few thoughts I'd like to bring up. > > Having the group appointed by the board seems a bit odd to me. > Historically the board has not involved itself technical processes. I'm > curious what the board's thoughts are relating to this level of involvement > in project direction (I know you wanted proposal feedback on Phabricator, > but I think the role of the board is something worth discussing here). > > My other meta thought is about focus and direction for the group. How do > you define security issues? > > To give you where I'm coming from. One of the big concerns I have at the > moment is about running LLVM in secure execution contexts, where we care > about bugs in the compiler that could influence code generation, not just > the code generation itself. Historically, I believe, the security focus of > LLVM has primarily been on generated code, do you see this group tackling > both sides of the problem? > > Thanks, > -Chris > > On Nov 15, 2019, at 10:58 AM, JF Bastien via llvm-dev < > llvm-dev at lists.llvm.org> wrote: > > Hello compiler enthusiasts, > > The Apple LLVM team would like to propose that a new a security process > and an associated private LLVM Security Group be created under the umbrella > of the LLVM project. > > A draft proposal for how we could organize such a group and what its > process could be is available on Phabricator > <https://reviews.llvm.org/D70326>. The proposal starts with a list of > goals for the process and Security Group, repeated here: > > The LLVM Security Group has the following goals: > > 1. Allow LLVM contributors and security researchers to disclose > security-related issues affecting the LLVM project to members of the LLVM > community. > 2. Organize fixes, code reviews, and release management for said > issues. > 3. Allow distributors time to investigate and deploy fixes before wide > dissemination of vulnerabilities or mitigation shortcomings. > 4. Ensure timely notification and release to vendors who package and > distribute LLVM-based toolchains and projects. > 5. Ensure timely notification to users of LLVM-based toolchains whose > compiled code is security-sensitive, through the CVE process > <https://cve.mitre.org/>. > > > We’re looking for answers to the following questions: > > 1. *On this list*: Should we create a security group and process? > 2. *On this list*: Do you agree with the goals listed in the proposal? > 3. *On this list*: at a high-level, what do you think should be done > differently, and what do you think is exactly right in the draft proposal? > 4. *On the Phabricator code review*: going into specific details, what > do you think should be done differently, and what do you think is exactly > right in the draft proposal? > 5. *On this list*: to help understand where you’re coming from with > your feedback, it would be helpful to state how you personally approach > this issue: > 1. Are you an LLVM contributor (individual or representing a > company)? > 2. Are you involved with security aspects of LLVM (if so, which)? > 3. Do you maintain significant downstream LLVM changes? > 4. Do you package and deploy LLVM for others to use (if so, to how > many people)? > 5. Is your LLVM distribution based on the open-source releases? > 6. How often do you usually deploy LLVM? > 7. How fast can you deploy an update? > 8. Does your LLVM distribution handle untrusted inputs, and what > kind? > 9. What’s the threat model for your LLVM distribution? > > > Other open-source projects have security-related groups and processes. > They structure their group very differently from one another. This proposal > borrows from some of these projects’ processes. A few examples: > > - https://webkit.org/security-policy/ > - > https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/lkgr/docs/security/faq.md > - https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security > - https://www.openbsd.org/security.html > - https://security-team.debian.org/security_tracker.html > - https://www.python.org/news/security/ > > When providing feedback, it would be great to hear if you’ve dealt with > these or other projects’ processes, what works well, and what can be done > better. > > > I’ll go first in answering my own questions above: > > 1. Yes! We should create a security group and process. > 2. We agree with the goals listed. > 3. We think the proposal is exactly right, but would like to hear the > community’s opinions. > 4. Here’s how we approach the security of LLVM: > 1. I contribute to LLVM as an Apple employee. > 2. I’ve been involved in a variety of LLVM security issues, from > automatic variable initialization to security-related diagnostics, as well > as deploying these mitigations to internal codebases. > 3. We maintain significant downstream changes. > 4. We package and deploy LLVM, both internally and externally, for > a variety of purposes, including the clang, Swift, and mobile GPU shader > compilers. > 5. Our LLVM distribution is not directly derived from the > open-source release. In all cases, all non-upstream public patches for our > releases are available in repository branches at > https://github.com/apple. > 6. We have many deployments of LLVM whose release schedules vary > significantly. The LLVM build deployed as part of Xcode historically has > one major release per year, followed by roughly one minor release every 2 > months. Other releases of LLVM are also security-sensitive and don’t follow > the same schedule. > 7. This depends on which release of LLVM is affected. > 8. Yes, our distribution sometimes handles untrusted input. > 9. The threat model is highly variable depending on the particular > language front-ends being considered. > > Apple is involved with a variety of open-source projects and their > disclosures. For example, we frequently work with the WebKit community to > handle security issues through their process. > > > Thanks, > > JF > > _______________________________________________ > LLVM Developers mailing list > llvm-dev at lists.llvm.org > https://lists.llvm.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/llvm-dev > > > _______________________________________________ > LLVM Developers mailing list > llvm-dev at lists.llvm.org > https://lists.llvm.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/llvm-dev >-------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/attachments/20191118/6b6c3f90/attachment.html>
Robinson, Paul via llvm-dev
2019-Nov-18 22:31 UTC
[llvm-dev] [RFC] LLVM Security Group and Process
One problem with defining away “arbitrary code execution in Clang” as “not
security relevant” is that you are inevitably making probably-wrong assumptions
about the set of all possible execution contexts.
Case in point: Sony, being on the security-sensitive side these days, has an
internal mandate that we incorporate CVE fixes into open-source products that we
deliver. As it happens, we deliver some GNU Binutils tools with our PS4
toolchain. There are CVEs against Binutils, so we were mandated to incorporate
these patches. “?” I said, wondering how some simple command-line tool could
have a CVE. Well, it turns out, lots of the Binutils code is packaged in
libraries, and some of those libraries can be used by (apparently) web servers,
so through some chain of events it would be possible for a web client to induce
Bad Stuff on a server (hopefully no worse than a DoS, but that’s still a
security issue). Ergo, security-relevant patch in GNU Binutils.
For *my* product’s delivery, the CVEs would be irrelevant. (Who cares if some
command-line tool can crash if you feed it a bogus PE file; clearly not a
security issue.) But, for someone else’s product, it would be a security issue.
You can be sure that the people responsible for Binutils dealt with it as a
security issue.
So, yeah, arbitrary code-execution in Clang, or more obviously in the JIT, is a
potential security issue. Clangd probably should worry about this kind of stuff
too. And we should be ready to handle it that way.
--paulr
From: llvm-dev <llvm-dev-bounces at lists.llvm.org> On Behalf Of James Y
Knight via llvm-dev
Sent: Monday, November 18, 2019 4:51 PM
To: Chris Bieneman <chris.bieneman at me.com>
Cc: llvm-dev <llvm-dev at lists.llvm.org>
Subject: Re: [llvm-dev] [RFC] LLVM Security Group and Process
I think it's great to make a policy for reporting security bugs.
But first, yes, we need to be clear as to what sorts of things we consider as
"security bugs", and what we do not. We need to be clear on this, both
for users to know what they should depend on, and for LLVM contributors to know
when they should be raising a flag, if they discover or fix something
themselves.
We could just keep on doing our usual development process, and respond only to
externally-reported issues with the security-response routine. But I don't
think that would be a good idea. Creating a process whereby anyone outside the
project can report security issues, and for which we'll coordinate
disclosure and create backports and such is all well and good...but if we
don't then also do (or at least try to do!) the same for issues discovered
and fixed within the community, is there even a point?
So, if we're going to expand what we consider a security bug beyond the
present "effectively nothing", I think it is really important to be a
bit more precise about what it's being expanded to.
For example, I think it should generally be agreed that a bug in Clang which
allows arbitrary-code-execution in the compiler, given a specially crafted
source-file, should not be considered a security issue. A bug, yes, but not a
security issue, because we do not consider the use-case of running the compiler
in privileged context to be a supported operation. But also the same for parsing
a source-file into a clang AST -- which might even happen automatically with
editor integration. Seems less obviously correct, but, still, the reality today.
And, IMO, the same stance should also apply to feeding arbitrary bitcode into
LLVM. (And I get the unfortunate feeling that last statement might not find
universal agreement.)
Given the current architecture and state of the project, I think it would be
rather unwise to pretend that any of those are secure operations, or to try to
support them as such with a security response process. Many compiler crashes
seem likely to be security bugs, if someone is trying hard enough. If every time
such a bug was fixed, it got a full security-response triggered, with embargos,
CVEs, backports, etc...that just seems unsustainable. Maybe it would be nice to
support this, but I think we're a long way from there currently.
However, all that said -- based on timing and recent events, perhaps your
primary goal here is to establish a process for discussing LLVM patches to
workaround not-yet-public CPU errata, and issues of that nature. In that case,
the need for the security response group is primarily to allow developing
quality LLVM patches based on not-yet-public information about other
people's products. That seems like a very useful thing to formalize, indeed,
and doesn't need any changes in llvm developers' thinking. So if
that's what we're talking about, let's be clear about it.
On Mon, Nov 18, 2019 at 2:43 PM Chris Bieneman via llvm-dev <llvm-dev at
lists.llvm.org<mailto:llvm-dev at lists.llvm.org>> wrote:
Hey JF,
Thanks for putting this RFC together. LLVM security issues are very important,
and I'm really glad someone is focusing attention here.
I'm generally in agreement with much of what you have proposed. I do have a
few thoughts I'd like to bring up.
Having the group appointed by the board seems a bit odd to me. Historically the
board has not involved itself technical processes. I'm curious what the
board's thoughts are relating to this level of involvement in project
direction (I know you wanted proposal feedback on Phabricator, but I think the
role of the board is something worth discussing here).
My other meta thought is about focus and direction for the group. How do you
define security issues?
To give you where I'm coming from. One of the big concerns I have at the
moment is about running LLVM in secure execution contexts, where we care about
bugs in the compiler that could influence code generation, not just the code
generation itself. Historically, I believe, the security focus of LLVM has
primarily been on generated code, do you see this group tackling both sides of
the problem?
Thanks,
-Chris
On Nov 15, 2019, at 10:58 AM, JF Bastien via llvm-dev <llvm-dev at
lists.llvm.org<mailto:llvm-dev at lists.llvm.org>> wrote:
Hello compiler enthusiasts,
The Apple LLVM team would like to propose that a new a security process and an
associated private LLVM Security Group be created under the umbrella of the LLVM
project.
A draft proposal for how we could organize such a group and what its process
could be is available on Phabricator<https://reviews.llvm.org/D70326>. The
proposal starts with a list of goals for the process and Security Group,
repeated here:
The LLVM Security Group has the following goals:
1. Allow LLVM contributors and security researchers to disclose
security-related issues affecting the LLVM project to members of the LLVM
community.
2. Organize fixes, code reviews, and release management for said issues.
3. Allow distributors time to investigate and deploy fixes before wide
dissemination of vulnerabilities or mitigation shortcomings.
4. Ensure timely notification and release to vendors who package and
distribute LLVM-based toolchains and projects.
5. Ensure timely notification to users of LLVM-based toolchains whose
compiled code is security-sensitive, through the CVE
process<https://cve.mitre.org/>.
We’re looking for answers to the following questions:
1. On this list: Should we create a security group and process?
2. On this list: Do you agree with the goals listed in the proposal?
3. On this list: at a high-level, what do you think should be done
differently, and what do you think is exactly right in the draft proposal?
4. On the Phabricator code review: going into specific details, what do you
think should be done differently, and what do you think is exactly right in the
draft proposal?
5. On this list: to help understand where you’re coming from with your
feedback, it would be helpful to state how you personally approach this issue:
* Are you an LLVM contributor (individual or representing a company)?
* Are you involved with security aspects of LLVM (if so, which)?
* Do you maintain significant downstream LLVM changes?
* Do you package and deploy LLVM for others to use (if so, to how many
people)?
* Is your LLVM distribution based on the open-source releases?
* How often do you usually deploy LLVM?
* How fast can you deploy an update?
* Does your LLVM distribution handle untrusted inputs, and what kind?
* What’s the threat model for your LLVM distribution?
Other open-source projects have security-related groups and processes. They
structure their group very differently from one another. This proposal borrows
from some of these projects’ processes. A few examples:
* https://webkit.org/security-policy/
* https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/lkgr/docs/security/faq.md
* https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security
* https://www.openbsd.org/security.html
* https://security-team.debian.org/security_tracker.html
* https://www.python.org/news/security/
When providing feedback, it would be great to hear if you’ve dealt with these or
other projects’ processes, what works well, and what can be done better.
I’ll go first in answering my own questions above:
1. Yes! We should create a security group and process.
2. We agree with the goals listed.
3. We think the proposal is exactly right, but would like to hear the
community’s opinions.
4. Here’s how we approach the security of LLVM:
* I contribute to LLVM as an Apple employee.
* I’ve been involved in a variety of LLVM security issues, from automatic
variable initialization to security-related diagnostics, as well as deploying
these mitigations to internal codebases.
* We maintain significant downstream changes.
* We package and deploy LLVM, both internally and externally, for a
variety of purposes, including the clang, Swift, and mobile GPU shader
compilers.
* Our LLVM distribution is not directly derived from the open-source
release. In all cases, all non-upstream public patches for our releases are
available in repository branches at https://github.com/apple.
* We have many deployments of LLVM whose release schedules vary
significantly. The LLVM build deployed as part of Xcode historically has one
major release per year, followed by roughly one minor release every 2 months.
Other releases of LLVM are also security-sensitive and don’t follow the same
schedule.
* This depends on which release of LLVM is affected.
* Yes, our distribution sometimes handles untrusted input.
* The threat model is highly variable depending on the particular
language front-ends being considered.
Apple is involved with a variety of open-source projects and their disclosures.
For example, we frequently work with the WebKit community to handle security
issues through their process.
Thanks,
JF
_______________________________________________
LLVM Developers mailing list
llvm-dev at lists.llvm.org<mailto:llvm-dev at lists.llvm.org>
https://lists.llvm.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/llvm-dev
_______________________________________________
LLVM Developers mailing list
llvm-dev at lists.llvm.org<mailto:llvm-dev at lists.llvm.org>
https://lists.llvm.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/llvm-dev
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David Blaikie via llvm-dev
2019-Nov-18 22:42 UTC
[llvm-dev] [RFC] LLVM Security Group and Process
On Mon, Nov 18, 2019 at 2:31 PM Robinson, Paul via llvm-dev < llvm-dev at lists.llvm.org> wrote:> One problem with defining away “arbitrary code execution in Clang” as “not > security relevant” is that you are inevitably making probably-wrong > assumptions about the set of all possible execution contexts. > > > > Case in point: Sony, being on the security-sensitive side these days, has > an internal mandate that we incorporate CVE fixes into open-source products > that we deliver. As it happens, we deliver some GNU Binutils tools with > our PS4 toolchain. There are CVEs against Binutils, so we were mandated to > incorporate these patches. “?” I said, wondering how some simple > command-line tool could have a CVE. Well, it turns out, lots of the > Binutils code is packaged in libraries, and some of those libraries can be > used by (apparently) web servers, so through some chain of events it would > be possible for a web client to induce Bad Stuff on a server (hopefully no > worse than a DoS, but that’s still a security issue). Ergo, > security-relevant patch in GNU Binutils. > > > > For **my** product’s delivery, the CVEs would be irrelevant. (Who cares > if some command-line tool can crash if you feed it a bogus PE file; clearly > not a security issue.) But, for someone *else’s* product, it *would* be > a security issue. You can be sure that the people responsible for Binutils > dealt with it as a security issue. > > > > So, yeah, arbitrary code-execution in Clang, or more obviously in the JIT, > is a potential security issue. Clangd probably should worry about this > kind of stuff too. And we should be ready to handle it that way. >The reality is that clang is a long way from being hardened in that way (pretty much every crash/assertion failure on invalid input is probably a path to arbitrary code execution if someone wanted to try hard enough) & I don't think the core developers are currently able to/interested in/motivated to do the work to meet that kind of need - so I tend to agree with James that it's better that this is clearly specified as a non-goal than suggest some kind of "best effort" behavior here. - Dave> --paulr > > > > *From:* llvm-dev <llvm-dev-bounces at lists.llvm.org> *On Behalf Of *James Y > Knight via llvm-dev > *Sent:* Monday, November 18, 2019 4:51 PM > *To:* Chris Bieneman <chris.bieneman at me.com> > *Cc:* llvm-dev <llvm-dev at lists.llvm.org> > *Subject:* Re: [llvm-dev] [RFC] LLVM Security Group and Process > > > > I think it's great to make a policy for reporting security bugs. > > > > But first, yes, we need to be clear as to what sorts of things we consider > as "security bugs", and what we do not. We need to be clear on this, both > for users to know what they should depend on, and for LLVM contributors to > know when they should be raising a flag, if they discover or fix something > themselves. > > > > We could just keep on doing our usual development process, and respond > only to *externally-reported* issues with the security-response routine. > But I don't think that would be a good idea. Creating a process whereby > anyone outside the project can report security issues, and for which we'll > coordinate disclosure and create backports and such is all well and > good...but if we don't then also do (or at least *try* to do!) the same > for issues discovered and fixed within the community, is there even a point? > > > > So, if we're going to expand what we consider a security bug beyond the > present "effectively nothing", I think it is really important to be a bit > more precise about what it's being expanded to. > > > > For example, I think it should generally be agreed that a bug in Clang > which allows arbitrary-code-execution in the compiler, given a specially > crafted source-file, should not be considered a security issue. A bug, yes, > but not a security issue, because we do not consider the use-case of > running the compiler in privileged context to be a supported operation. But > also the same for parsing a source-file into a clang AST -- which might > even happen automatically with editor integration. Seems less obviously > correct, but, still, the reality today. And, IMO, the same stance should > also apply to feeding arbitrary bitcode into LLVM. (And I get the > unfortunate feeling that last statement might not find universal agreement.) > > > > Given the current architecture and state of the project, I think it would > be rather unwise to pretend that any of those are secure operations, or to > try to support them as such with a security response process. Many compiler > crashes seem likely to be security bugs, if someone is trying hard enough. > If every time such a bug was fixed, it got a full security-response > triggered, with embargos, CVEs, backports, etc...that just seems > unsustainable. Maybe it would be *nice* to support this, but I think > we're a long way from there currently. > > > > > > However, all that said -- based on timing and recent events, perhaps your > primary goal here is to establish a process for discussing LLVM patches to > workaround not-yet-public CPU errata, and issues of that nature. In that > case, the need for the security response group is primarily to allow > developing quality LLVM patches based on not-yet-public information about > other people's products. That seems like a very useful thing to formalize, > indeed, and doesn't need any changes in llvm developers' thinking. So if > that's what we're talking about, let's be clear about it. > > > > On Mon, Nov 18, 2019 at 2:43 PM Chris Bieneman via llvm-dev < > llvm-dev at lists.llvm.org> wrote: > > Hey JF, > > > > Thanks for putting this RFC together. LLVM security issues are very > important, and I'm really glad someone is focusing attention here. > > > > I'm generally in agreement with much of what you have proposed. I do have > a few thoughts I'd like to bring up. > > > > Having the group appointed by the board seems a bit odd to me. > Historically the board has not involved itself technical processes. I'm > curious what the board's thoughts are relating to this level of involvement > in project direction (I know you wanted proposal feedback on Phabricator, > but I think the role of the board is something worth discussing here). > > > > My other meta thought is about focus and direction for the group. How do > you define security issues? > > > > To give you where I'm coming from. One of the big concerns I have at the > moment is about running LLVM in secure execution contexts, where we care > about bugs in the compiler that could influence code generation, not just > the code generation itself. Historically, I believe, the security focus of > LLVM has primarily been on generated code, do you see this group tackling > both sides of the problem? > > > > Thanks, > > -Chris > > > > On Nov 15, 2019, at 10:58 AM, JF Bastien via llvm-dev < > llvm-dev at lists.llvm.org> wrote: > > > Hello compiler enthusiasts, > > > > The Apple LLVM team would like to propose that a new a security process > and an associated private LLVM Security Group be created under the umbrella > of the LLVM project. > > A draft proposal for how we could organize such a group and what its > process could be is available on Phabricator > <https://reviews.llvm.org/D70326>. The proposal starts with a list of > goals for the process and Security Group, repeated here: > > The LLVM Security Group has the following goals: > > 1. Allow LLVM contributors and security researchers to disclose > security-related issues affecting the LLVM project to members of the LLVM > community. > 2. Organize fixes, code reviews, and release management for said > issues. > 3. Allow distributors time to investigate and deploy fixes before wide > dissemination of vulnerabilities or mitigation shortcomings. > 4. Ensure timely notification and release to vendors who package and > distribute LLVM-based toolchains and projects. > 5. Ensure timely notification to users of LLVM-based toolchains whose > compiled code is security-sensitive, through the CVE process > <https://cve.mitre.org/>. > > > We’re looking for answers to the following questions: > > 1. *On this list*: Should we create a security group and process? > 2. *On this list*: Do you agree with the goals listed in the proposal? > 3. *On this list*: at a high-level, what do you think should be done > differently, and what do you think is exactly right in the draft proposal? > 4. *On the Phabricator code review*: going into specific details, what > do you think should be done differently, and what do you think is exactly > right in the draft proposal? > 5. *On this list*: to help understand where you’re coming from with > your feedback, it would be helpful to state how you personally approach > this issue: > > > 1. Are you an LLVM contributor (individual or representing a company)? > 2. Are you involved with security aspects of LLVM (if so, which)? > 3. Do you maintain significant downstream LLVM changes? > 4. Do you package and deploy LLVM for others to use (if so, to how > many people)? > 5. Is your LLVM distribution based on the open-source releases? > 6. How often do you usually deploy LLVM? > 7. How fast can you deploy an update? > 8. Does your LLVM distribution handle untrusted inputs, and what > kind? > 9. What’s the threat model for your LLVM distribution? > > > Other open-source projects have security-related groups and processes. > They structure their group very differently from one another. This proposal > borrows from some of these projects’ processes. A few examples: > > - https://webkit.org/security-policy/ > - > https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/lkgr/docs/security/faq.md > - https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security > - https://www.openbsd.org/security.html > - https://security-team.debian.org/security_tracker.html > - https://www.python.org/news/security/ > > When providing feedback, it would be great to hear if you’ve dealt with > these or other projects’ processes, what works well, and what can be done > better. > > > I’ll go first in answering my own questions above: > > 1. Yes! We should create a security group and process. > 2. We agree with the goals listed. > 3. We think the proposal is exactly right, but would like to hear the > community’s opinions. > 4. Here’s how we approach the security of LLVM: > > > 1. I contribute to LLVM as an Apple employee. > 2. I’ve been involved in a variety of LLVM security issues, from > automatic variable initialization to security-related diagnostics, as well > as deploying these mitigations to internal codebases. > 3. We maintain significant downstream changes. > 4. We package and deploy LLVM, both internally and externally, for > a variety of purposes, including the clang, Swift, and mobile GPU shader > compilers. > 5. Our LLVM distribution is not directly derived from the > open-source release. In all cases, all non-upstream public patches for our > releases are available in repository branches at > https://github.com/apple. > 6. We have many deployments of LLVM whose release schedules vary > significantly. The LLVM build deployed as part of Xcode historically has > one major release per year, followed by roughly one minor release every 2 > months. Other releases of LLVM are also security-sensitive and don’t follow > the same schedule. > 7. This depends on which release of LLVM is affected. > 8. Yes, our distribution sometimes handles untrusted input. > 9. The threat model is highly variable depending on the particular > language front-ends being considered. > > Apple is involved with a variety of open-source projects and their > disclosures. For example, we frequently work with the WebKit community to > handle security issues through their process. > > > Thanks, > > JF > > > > _______________________________________________ > LLVM Developers mailing list > llvm-dev at lists.llvm.org > https://lists.llvm.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/llvm-dev > > > > _______________________________________________ > LLVM Developers mailing list > llvm-dev at lists.llvm.org > https://lists.llvm.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/llvm-dev > > _______________________________________________ > LLVM Developers mailing list > llvm-dev at lists.llvm.org > https://lists.llvm.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/llvm-dev >-------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... 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