Waiman Long
2020-Jun-16 01:57 UTC
[PATCH v4 0/3] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
v4:
- Break out the memzero_explicit() change as suggested by Dan Carpenter
so that it can be backported to stable.
- Drop the "crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit()" patch for
now as there can be a bit more discussion on what is best. It will be
introduced as a separate patch later on after this one is merged.
This patchset makes a global rename of the kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
to highlight the fact buffer clearing is only needed if the data objects
contain sensitive information like encrpytion key. The fact that kzfree()
uses memset() to do the clearing isn't totally safe either as compiler
may compile out the clearing in their optimizer especially if LTO is
used. Instead, the new kfree_sensitive() uses memzero_explicit() which
won't get compiled out.
Waiman Long (3):
mm/slab: Use memzero_explicit() in kzfree()
mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
btrfs: Use kfree() in btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info()
arch/s390/crypto/prng.c | 4 +--
arch/x86/power/hibernate.c | 2 +-
crypto/adiantum.c | 2 +-
crypto/ahash.c | 4 +--
crypto/api.c | 2 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 4 +--
crypto/deflate.c | 2 +-
crypto/drbg.c | 10 +++---
crypto/ecc.c | 8 ++---
crypto/ecdh.c | 2 +-
crypto/gcm.c | 2 +-
crypto/gf128mul.c | 4 +--
crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c | 2 +-
crypto/rng.c | 2 +-
crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c | 6 ++--
crypto/seqiv.c | 2 +-
crypto/shash.c | 2 +-
crypto/skcipher.c | 2 +-
crypto/testmgr.c | 6 ++--
crypto/zstd.c | 2 +-
.../allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c | 2 +-
.../allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c | 4 +--
drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c | 28 +++++++--------
drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_main.c | 6 ++--
drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_reqmanager.c | 12 +++----
drivers/crypto/cavium/nitrox/nitrox_lib.c | 4 +--
drivers/crypto/cavium/zip/zip_crypto.c | 6 ++--
drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-rsa.c | 6 ++--
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c | 4 +--
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c | 4 +--
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c | 6 ++--
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c | 8 ++---
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_request_mgr.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa/hash.c | 2 +-
.../crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_main.c | 6 ++--
.../marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_reqmgr.h | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c | 4 +--
drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c | 12 +++----
drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c | 2 +-
drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 32 ++++++++---------
drivers/md/dm-integrity.c | 6 ++--
drivers/misc/ibmvmc.c | 6 ++--
.../hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c | 2 +-
.../net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ipsec.c | 6 ++--
drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c | 6 ++--
drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c | 4 +--
drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/rx.c | 2 +-
.../net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx-gen2.c | 6 ++--
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c | 6 ++--
drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/wext.c | 4 +--
drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.h | 4 +--
drivers/staging/ks7010/ks_hostif.c | 2 +-
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c | 2 +-
drivers/staging/wlan-ng/p80211netdev.c | 2 +-
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c | 2 +-
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 2 +-
fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c | 2 +-
fs/cifs/connect.c | 10 +++---
fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c | 2 +-
fs/cifs/misc.c | 8 ++---
fs/crypto/keyring.c | 6 ++--
fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c | 4 +--
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 4 +--
fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c | 2 +-
include/crypto/aead.h | 2 +-
include/crypto/akcipher.h | 2 +-
include/crypto/gf128mul.h | 2 +-
include/crypto/hash.h | 2 +-
include/crypto/internal/acompress.h | 2 +-
include/crypto/kpp.h | 2 +-
include/crypto/skcipher.h | 2 +-
include/linux/slab.h | 2 +-
lib/mpi/mpiutil.c | 6 ++--
lib/test_kasan.c | 6 ++--
mm/slab_common.c | 10 +++---
net/atm/mpoa_caches.c | 4 +--
net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c | 6 ++--
net/bluetooth/smp.c | 24 ++++++-------
net/core/sock.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c | 2 +-
net/mac80211/aead_api.c | 4 +--
net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c | 2 +-
net/mac80211/key.c | 2 +-
net/mac802154/llsec.c | 20 +++++------
net/sctp/auth.c | 2 +-
net/sctp/socket.c | 2 +-
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c | 4 +--
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c | 6 ++--
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c | 2 +-
net/tipc/crypto.c | 10 +++---
net/wireless/core.c | 2 +-
net/wireless/ibss.c | 4 +--
net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_tkip.c | 2 +-
net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_wep.c | 2 +-
net/wireless/nl80211.c | 24 ++++++-------
net/wireless/sme.c | 6 ++--
net/wireless/util.c | 2 +-
net/wireless/wext-sme.c | 2 +-
scripts/coccinelle/free/devm_free.cocci | 4 +--
scripts/coccinelle/free/ifnullfree.cocci | 4 +--
scripts/coccinelle/free/kfree.cocci | 6 ++--
scripts/coccinelle/free/kfreeaddr.cocci | 2 +-
security/apparmor/domain.c | 4 +--
security/apparmor/include/file.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/policy.c | 24 ++++++-------
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c | 6 ++--
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 14 ++++----
security/keys/big_key.c | 6 ++--
security/keys/dh.c | 14 ++++----
security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 14 ++++----
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 34 +++++++++----------
security/keys/user_defined.c | 6 ++--
116 files changed, 322 insertions(+), 322 deletions(-)
--
2.18.1
Waiman Long
2020-Jun-16 01:57 UTC
[PATCH v4 1/3] mm/slab: Use memzero_explicit() in kzfree()
The kzfree() function is normally used to clear some sensitive
information, like encryption keys, in the buffer before freeing it back
to the pool. Memset() is currently used for the buffer clearing. However,
it is entirely possible that the compiler may choose to optimize away the
memory clearing especially if LTO is being used. To make sure that this
optimization will not happen, memzero_explicit(), which is introduced
in v3.18, is now used in kzfree() to do the clearing.
Fixes: 3ef0e5ba4673 ("slab: introduce kzfree()")
Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman at redhat.com>
---
mm/slab_common.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 9e72ba224175..37d48a56431d 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -1726,7 +1726,7 @@ void kzfree(const void *p)
if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(mem)))
return;
ks = ksize(mem);
- memset(mem, 0, ks);
+ memzero_explicit(mem, ks);
kfree(mem);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kzfree);
--
2.18.1
Waiman Long
2020-Jun-16 01:57 UTC
[PATCH v4 2/3] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
As said by Linus:
A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
Otherwise it's actively misleading.
In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what
the
caller wants.
In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even
_relevant_.
The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.
Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the
recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API
more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the
memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.
The renaming is done by using the command sequence:
git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
xargs sed -i 's/\bkzfree\b/kfree_sensitive/'
followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and the
use of memzero_explicit() instead of memset().
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe at perches.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko at suse.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes at cmpxchg.org>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman at redhat.com>
---
arch/s390/crypto/prng.c | 4 +--
arch/x86/power/hibernate.c | 2 +-
crypto/adiantum.c | 2 +-
crypto/ahash.c | 4 +--
crypto/api.c | 2 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 4 +--
crypto/deflate.c | 2 +-
crypto/drbg.c | 10 +++---
crypto/ecc.c | 8 ++---
crypto/ecdh.c | 2 +-
crypto/gcm.c | 2 +-
crypto/gf128mul.c | 4 +--
crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c | 2 +-
crypto/rng.c | 2 +-
crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c | 6 ++--
crypto/seqiv.c | 2 +-
crypto/shash.c | 2 +-
crypto/skcipher.c | 2 +-
crypto/testmgr.c | 6 ++--
crypto/zstd.c | 2 +-
.../allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c | 2 +-
.../allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c | 4 +--
drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c | 28 +++++++--------
drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_main.c | 6 ++--
drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_reqmanager.c | 12 +++----
drivers/crypto/cavium/nitrox/nitrox_lib.c | 4 +--
drivers/crypto/cavium/zip/zip_crypto.c | 6 ++--
drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-rsa.c | 6 ++--
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c | 4 +--
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c | 4 +--
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c | 6 ++--
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c | 8 ++---
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_request_mgr.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa/hash.c | 2 +-
.../crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_main.c | 6 ++--
.../marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_reqmgr.h | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c | 4 +--
drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c | 12 +++----
drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c | 2 +-
drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 32 ++++++++---------
drivers/md/dm-integrity.c | 6 ++--
drivers/misc/ibmvmc.c | 6 ++--
.../hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c | 2 +-
.../net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ipsec.c | 6 ++--
drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c | 6 ++--
drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c | 4 +--
drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/rx.c | 2 +-
.../net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx-gen2.c | 6 ++--
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c | 6 ++--
drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/wext.c | 4 +--
drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.h | 4 +--
drivers/staging/ks7010/ks_hostif.c | 2 +-
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c | 2 +-
drivers/staging/wlan-ng/p80211netdev.c | 2 +-
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c | 2 +-
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 2 +-
fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c | 2 +-
fs/cifs/connect.c | 10 +++---
fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c | 2 +-
fs/cifs/misc.c | 8 ++---
fs/crypto/keyring.c | 6 ++--
fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c | 4 +--
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 4 +--
fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c | 2 +-
include/crypto/aead.h | 2 +-
include/crypto/akcipher.h | 2 +-
include/crypto/gf128mul.h | 2 +-
include/crypto/hash.h | 2 +-
include/crypto/internal/acompress.h | 2 +-
include/crypto/kpp.h | 2 +-
include/crypto/skcipher.h | 2 +-
include/linux/slab.h | 2 +-
lib/mpi/mpiutil.c | 6 ++--
lib/test_kasan.c | 6 ++--
mm/slab_common.c | 8 ++---
net/atm/mpoa_caches.c | 4 +--
net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c | 6 ++--
net/bluetooth/smp.c | 24 ++++++-------
net/core/sock.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c | 2 +-
net/mac80211/aead_api.c | 4 +--
net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c | 2 +-
net/mac80211/key.c | 2 +-
net/mac802154/llsec.c | 20 +++++------
net/sctp/auth.c | 2 +-
net/sctp/socket.c | 2 +-
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c | 4 +--
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c | 6 ++--
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c | 2 +-
net/tipc/crypto.c | 10 +++---
net/wireless/core.c | 2 +-
net/wireless/ibss.c | 4 +--
net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_tkip.c | 2 +-
net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_wep.c | 2 +-
net/wireless/nl80211.c | 24 ++++++-------
net/wireless/sme.c | 6 ++--
net/wireless/util.c | 2 +-
net/wireless/wext-sme.c | 2 +-
scripts/coccinelle/free/devm_free.cocci | 4 +--
scripts/coccinelle/free/ifnullfree.cocci | 4 +--
scripts/coccinelle/free/kfree.cocci | 6 ++--
scripts/coccinelle/free/kfreeaddr.cocci | 2 +-
security/apparmor/domain.c | 4 +--
security/apparmor/include/file.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/policy.c | 24 ++++++-------
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c | 6 ++--
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 14 ++++----
security/keys/big_key.c | 6 ++--
security/keys/dh.c | 14 ++++----
security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 14 ++++----
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 34 +++++++++----------
security/keys/user_defined.c | 6 ++--
116 files changed, 321 insertions(+), 321 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c b/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c
index d977643fa627..04caac037b7a 100644
--- a/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ static void prng_tdes_deinstantiate(void)
{
pr_debug("The prng module stopped "
"after running in triple DES mode\n");
- kzfree(prng_data);
+ kfree_sensitive(prng_data);
}
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static int __init prng_sha512_instantiate(void)
static void prng_sha512_deinstantiate(void)
{
pr_debug("The prng module stopped after running in SHA-512 mode\n");
- kzfree(prng_data);
+ kfree_sensitive(prng_data);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/power/hibernate.c b/arch/x86/power/hibernate.c
index d147f1b2c925..cd3914fc9f3d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/power/hibernate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/power/hibernate.c
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static int get_e820_md5(struct e820_table *table, void *buf)
if (crypto_shash_digest(desc, (u8 *)table, size, buf))
ret = -EINVAL;
- kzfree(desc);
+ kfree_sensitive(desc);
free_tfm:
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
diff --git a/crypto/adiantum.c b/crypto/adiantum.c
index cf2b9f4103dd..b7824e214961 100644
--- a/crypto/adiantum.c
+++ b/crypto/adiantum.c
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static int adiantum_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm,
const u8 *key,
keyp += NHPOLY1305_KEY_SIZE;
WARN_ON(keyp !=
&data->derived_keys[ARRAY_SIZE(data->derived_keys)]);
out:
- kzfree(data);
+ kfree_sensitive(data);
return err;
}
diff --git a/crypto/ahash.c b/crypto/ahash.c
index 68a0f0cb75c4..d9d65d1cc669 100644
--- a/crypto/ahash.c
+++ b/crypto/ahash.c
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static int ahash_setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_ahash *tfm,
const u8 *key,
alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
ret = tfm->setkey(tfm, alignbuffer, keylen);
- kzfree(buffer);
+ kfree_sensitive(buffer);
return ret;
}
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static void ahash_restore_req(struct ahash_request *req, int
err)
req->priv = NULL;
/* Free the req->priv.priv from the ADJUSTED request. */
- kzfree(priv);
+ kfree_sensitive(priv);
}
static void ahash_notify_einprogress(struct ahash_request *req)
diff --git a/crypto/api.c b/crypto/api.c
index edcf690800d4..58f66ba09dac 100644
--- a/crypto/api.c
+++ b/crypto/api.c
@@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ void crypto_destroy_tfm(void *mem, struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
alg->cra_exit(tfm);
crypto_exit_ops(tfm);
crypto_mod_put(alg);
- kzfree(mem);
+ kfree_sensitive(mem);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_destroy_tfm);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
index cc9dbcecaaca..7553ab18db89 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int
pelen,
}
error:
- kzfree(desc);
+ kfree_sensitive(desc);
error_no_desc:
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
kleave(" = %d", ret);
@@ -447,6 +447,6 @@ int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned
pelen,
ret = pefile_digest_pe(pebuf, pelen, &ctx);
error:
- kzfree(ctx.digest);
+ kfree_sensitive(ctx.digest);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/crypto/deflate.c b/crypto/deflate.c
index 4c0e6c9d942a..b2a46f6dc961 100644
--- a/crypto/deflate.c
+++ b/crypto/deflate.c
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static void __deflate_exit(void *ctx)
static void deflate_free_ctx(struct crypto_scomp *tfm, void *ctx)
{
__deflate_exit(ctx);
- kzfree(ctx);
+ kfree_sensitive(ctx);
}
static void deflate_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c
index 37526eb8c5d5..23ce5b55f40b 100644
--- a/crypto/drbg.c
+++ b/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -1218,19 +1218,19 @@ static inline void drbg_dealloc_state(struct drbg_state
*drbg)
{
if (!drbg)
return;
- kzfree(drbg->Vbuf);
+ kfree_sensitive(drbg->Vbuf);
drbg->Vbuf = NULL;
drbg->V = NULL;
- kzfree(drbg->Cbuf);
+ kfree_sensitive(drbg->Cbuf);
drbg->Cbuf = NULL;
drbg->C = NULL;
- kzfree(drbg->scratchpadbuf);
+ kfree_sensitive(drbg->scratchpadbuf);
drbg->scratchpadbuf = NULL;
drbg->reseed_ctr = 0;
drbg->d_ops = NULL;
drbg->core = NULL;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS)) {
- kzfree(drbg->prev);
+ kfree_sensitive(drbg->prev);
drbg->prev = NULL;
drbg->fips_primed = false;
}
@@ -1699,7 +1699,7 @@ static int drbg_fini_hash_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg)
struct sdesc *sdesc = (struct sdesc *)drbg->priv_data;
if (sdesc) {
crypto_free_shash(sdesc->shash.tfm);
- kzfree(sdesc);
+ kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
}
drbg->priv_data = NULL;
return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/ecc.c b/crypto/ecc.c
index 02d35be7702b..37540332c1f3 100644
--- a/crypto/ecc.c
+++ b/crypto/ecc.c
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static u64 *ecc_alloc_digits_space(unsigned int ndigits)
static void ecc_free_digits_space(u64 *space)
{
- kzfree(space);
+ kfree_sensitive(space);
}
static struct ecc_point *ecc_alloc_point(unsigned int ndigits)
@@ -101,9 +101,9 @@ static void ecc_free_point(struct ecc_point *p)
if (!p)
return;
- kzfree(p->x);
- kzfree(p->y);
- kzfree(p);
+ kfree_sensitive(p->x);
+ kfree_sensitive(p->y);
+ kfree_sensitive(p);
}
static void vli_clear(u64 *vli, unsigned int ndigits)
diff --git a/crypto/ecdh.c b/crypto/ecdh.c
index bd599053a8c4..b0232d6ab4ce 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdh.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdh.c
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ static int ecdh_compute_value(struct kpp_request *req)
/* fall through */
free_all:
- kzfree(shared_secret);
+ kfree_sensitive(shared_secret);
free_pubkey:
kfree(public_key);
return ret;
diff --git a/crypto/gcm.c b/crypto/gcm.c
index 0103d28c541e..5c2fbb08be56 100644
--- a/crypto/gcm.c
+++ b/crypto/gcm.c
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static int crypto_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const
u8 *key,
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
err = crypto_ahash_setkey(ghash, (u8 *)&data->hash, sizeof(be128));
out:
- kzfree(data);
+ kfree_sensitive(data);
return err;
}
diff --git a/crypto/gf128mul.c b/crypto/gf128mul.c
index a4b1c026aaee..a69ae3e6c16c 100644
--- a/crypto/gf128mul.c
+++ b/crypto/gf128mul.c
@@ -304,8 +304,8 @@ void gf128mul_free_64k(struct gf128mul_64k *t)
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- kzfree(t->t[i]);
- kzfree(t);
+ kfree_sensitive(t->t[i]);
+ kfree_sensitive(t);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(gf128mul_free_64k);
diff --git a/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c b/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
index b43684c0dade..eb7d1dd506bf 100644
--- a/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
+++ b/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void *jent_zalloc(unsigned int len)
void jent_zfree(void *ptr)
{
- kzfree(ptr);
+ kfree_sensitive(ptr);
}
int jent_fips_enabled(void)
diff --git a/crypto/rng.c b/crypto/rng.c
index 1490d210f1a1..a888d84b524a 100644
--- a/crypto/rng.c
+++ b/crypto/rng.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ int crypto_rng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed,
unsigned int slen)
err = crypto_rng_alg(tfm)->seed(tfm, seed, slen);
crypto_stats_rng_seed(alg, err);
out:
- kzfree(buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(buf);
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_rng_reset);
diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c
index d31031de51bc..6c992eb5c72f 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete(struct
akcipher_request *req, int err)
sg_copy_from_buffer(req->dst,
sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, ctx->key_size),
out_buf, ctx->key_size);
- kzfree(out_buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(out_buf);
out:
req->dst_len = ctx->key_size;
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_decrypt_complete(struct akcipher_request
*req, int err)
out_buf + pos, req->dst_len);
done:
- kzfree(req_ctx->out_buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(req_ctx->out_buf);
return err;
}
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request
*req, int err)
req->dst_len) != 0)
err = -EKEYREJECTED;
done:
- kzfree(req_ctx->out_buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(req_ctx->out_buf);
return err;
}
diff --git a/crypto/seqiv.c b/crypto/seqiv.c
index f124b9b54e15..27b2387bc972 100644
--- a/crypto/seqiv.c
+++ b/crypto/seqiv.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static void seqiv_aead_encrypt_complete2(struct aead_request
*req, int err)
memcpy(req->iv, subreq->iv, crypto_aead_ivsize(geniv));
out:
- kzfree(subreq->iv);
+ kfree_sensitive(subreq->iv);
}
static void seqiv_aead_encrypt_complete(struct crypto_async_request *base,
diff --git a/crypto/shash.c b/crypto/shash.c
index e6a4b5f39b8c..2e3433ad9762 100644
--- a/crypto/shash.c
+++ b/crypto/shash.c
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static int shash_setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_shash *tfm,
const u8 *key,
alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
err = shash->setkey(tfm, alignbuffer, keylen);
- kzfree(buffer);
+ kfree_sensitive(buffer);
return err;
}
diff --git a/crypto/skcipher.c b/crypto/skcipher.c
index 7221def7b9a7..1c4a0d2132c3 100644
--- a/crypto/skcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/skcipher.c
@@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ static int skcipher_setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_skcipher
*tfm,
alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
ret = cipher->setkey(tfm, alignbuffer, keylen);
- kzfree(buffer);
+ kfree_sensitive(buffer);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
index 6863f911fcee..23c27fc96394 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -1744,7 +1744,7 @@ static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *driver,
kfree(vec.plaintext);
kfree(vec.digest);
crypto_free_shash(generic_tfm);
- kzfree(generic_desc);
+ kfree_sensitive(generic_desc);
return err;
}
#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
@@ -3665,7 +3665,7 @@ static int drbg_cavs_test(const struct drbg_testvec *test,
int pr,
if (IS_ERR(drng)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: could not allocate DRNG handle for "
"%s\n", driver);
- kzfree(buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(buf);
return -ENOMEM;
}
@@ -3712,7 +3712,7 @@ static int drbg_cavs_test(const struct drbg_testvec *test,
int pr,
outbuf:
crypto_free_rng(drng);
- kzfree(buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(buf);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/crypto/zstd.c b/crypto/zstd.c
index 5a3ff258d8f7..1a3309f066f7 100644
--- a/crypto/zstd.c
+++ b/crypto/zstd.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static void __zstd_exit(void *ctx)
static void zstd_free_ctx(struct crypto_scomp *tfm, void *ctx)
{
__zstd_exit(ctx);
- kzfree(ctx);
+ kfree_sensitive(ctx);
}
static void zstd_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
index a6abb701bfc6..999a357364d8 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ static int sun8i_ce_cipher(struct skcipher_request *areq)
offset = areq->cryptlen - ivsize;
if (rctx->op_dir & CE_DECRYPTION) {
memcpy(areq->iv, backup_iv, ivsize);
- kzfree(backup_iv);
+ kfree_sensitive(backup_iv);
} else {
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(areq->iv, areq->dst, offset,
ivsize, 0);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
index c89cb2ee2496..a1d175589e18 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ static int sun8i_ss_cipher(struct skcipher_request *areq)
if (rctx->op_dir & SS_DECRYPTION) {
memcpy(areq->iv, backup_iv, ivsize);
memzero_explicit(backup_iv, ivsize);
- kzfree(backup_iv);
+ kfree_sensitive(backup_iv);
} else {
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(areq->iv, areq->dst, offset,
ivsize, 0);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
b/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
index 9819dd50fbad..fd1269900d67 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
@@ -254,8 +254,8 @@ static int meson_cipher(struct skcipher_request *areq)
}
}
theend:
- kzfree(bkeyiv);
- kzfree(backup_iv);
+ kfree_sensitive(bkeyiv);
+ kfree_sensitive(backup_iv);
return err;
}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c b/drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c
index ff02cc05affb..9bd8e5167be3 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static void atmel_ecdh_done(struct atmel_i2c_work_data
*work_data, void *areq,
/* fall through */
free_work_data:
- kzfree(work_data);
+ kfree_sensitive(work_data);
kpp_request_complete(req, status);
}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
index 2e44d685618f..dd5f101e43f8 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
@@ -854,14 +854,14 @@ static int caam_rsa_dec(struct akcipher_request *req)
static void caam_rsa_free_key(struct caam_rsa_key *key)
{
- kzfree(key->d);
- kzfree(key->p);
- kzfree(key->q);
- kzfree(key->dp);
- kzfree(key->dq);
- kzfree(key->qinv);
- kzfree(key->tmp1);
- kzfree(key->tmp2);
+ kfree_sensitive(key->d);
+ kfree_sensitive(key->p);
+ kfree_sensitive(key->q);
+ kfree_sensitive(key->dp);
+ kfree_sensitive(key->dq);
+ kfree_sensitive(key->qinv);
+ kfree_sensitive(key->tmp1);
+ kfree_sensitive(key->tmp2);
kfree(key->e);
kfree(key->n);
memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key));
@@ -1018,17 +1018,17 @@ static void caam_rsa_set_priv_key_form(struct
caam_rsa_ctx *ctx,
return;
free_dq:
- kzfree(rsa_key->dq);
+ kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->dq);
free_dp:
- kzfree(rsa_key->dp);
+ kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->dp);
free_tmp2:
- kzfree(rsa_key->tmp2);
+ kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->tmp2);
free_tmp1:
- kzfree(rsa_key->tmp1);
+ kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->tmp1);
free_q:
- kzfree(rsa_key->q);
+ kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->q);
free_p:
- kzfree(rsa_key->p);
+ kfree_sensitive(rsa_key->p);
}
static int caam_rsa_set_priv_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const void *key,
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_main.c
b/drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_main.c
index 0f72e9abdefe..a15245992cf9 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_main.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_main.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static void cleanup_worker_threads(struct cpt_vf *cptvf)
for (i = 0; i < cptvf->nr_queues; i++)
tasklet_kill(&cwqe_info->vq_wqe[i].twork);
- kzfree(cwqe_info);
+ kfree_sensitive(cwqe_info);
cptvf->wqe_info = NULL;
}
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static void free_pending_queues(struct pending_qinfo *pqinfo)
continue;
/* free single queue */
- kzfree((queue->head));
+ kfree_sensitive((queue->head));
queue->front = 0;
queue->rear = 0;
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ static void free_command_queues(struct cpt_vf *cptvf,
chunk->head = NULL;
chunk->dma_addr = 0;
hlist_del(&chunk->nextchunk);
- kzfree(chunk);
+ kfree_sensitive(chunk);
}
queue->nchunks = 0;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_reqmanager.c
b/drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_reqmanager.c
index 7a24019356b5..472dbc2d7c5c 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_reqmanager.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_reqmanager.c
@@ -305,12 +305,12 @@ static void do_request_cleanup(struct cpt_vf *cptvf,
}
}
- kzfree(info->scatter_components);
- kzfree(info->gather_components);
- kzfree(info->out_buffer);
- kzfree(info->in_buffer);
- kzfree((void *)info->completion_addr);
- kzfree(info);
+ kfree_sensitive(info->scatter_components);
+ kfree_sensitive(info->gather_components);
+ kfree_sensitive(info->out_buffer);
+ kfree_sensitive(info->in_buffer);
+ kfree_sensitive((void *)info->completion_addr);
+ kfree_sensitive(info);
}
static void do_post_process(struct cpt_vf *cptvf, struct cpt_info_buffer *info)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/cavium/nitrox/nitrox_lib.c
b/drivers/crypto/cavium/nitrox/nitrox_lib.c
index 5cbc64b851b9..a5cdc2b48bd6 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/cavium/nitrox/nitrox_lib.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/cavium/nitrox/nitrox_lib.c
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ static void nitrox_free_aqm_queues(struct nitrox_device *ndev)
for (i = 0; i < ndev->nr_queues; i++) {
nitrox_cmdq_cleanup(ndev->aqmq[i]);
- kzfree(ndev->aqmq[i]);
+ kfree_sensitive(ndev->aqmq[i]);
ndev->aqmq[i] = NULL;
}
}
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static int nitrox_alloc_aqm_queues(struct nitrox_device
*ndev)
err = nitrox_cmdq_init(cmdq, AQM_Q_ALIGN_BYTES);
if (err) {
- kzfree(cmdq);
+ kfree_sensitive(cmdq);
goto aqmq_fail;
}
ndev->aqmq[i] = cmdq;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/cavium/zip/zip_crypto.c
b/drivers/crypto/cavium/zip/zip_crypto.c
index 4985bc812b0e..7df71fcebe8f 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/cavium/zip/zip_crypto.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/cavium/zip/zip_crypto.c
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ void *zip_alloc_scomp_ctx_deflate(struct crypto_scomp *tfm)
ret = zip_ctx_init(zip_ctx, 0);
if (ret) {
- kzfree(zip_ctx);
+ kfree_sensitive(zip_ctx);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ void *zip_alloc_scomp_ctx_lzs(struct crypto_scomp *tfm)
ret = zip_ctx_init(zip_ctx, 1);
if (ret) {
- kzfree(zip_ctx);
+ kfree_sensitive(zip_ctx);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ void zip_free_scomp_ctx(struct crypto_scomp *tfm, void *ctx)
struct zip_kernel_ctx *zip_ctx = ctx;
zip_ctx_exit(zip_ctx);
- kzfree(zip_ctx);
+ kfree_sensitive(zip_ctx);
}
int zip_scomp_compress(struct crypto_scomp *tfm,
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-rsa.c
b/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-rsa.c
index 649c91d60401..1223ac70aea2 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-rsa.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-rsa.c
@@ -112,13 +112,13 @@ static int ccp_check_key_length(unsigned int len)
static void ccp_rsa_free_key_bufs(struct ccp_ctx *ctx)
{
/* Clean up old key data */
- kzfree(ctx->u.rsa.e_buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(ctx->u.rsa.e_buf);
ctx->u.rsa.e_buf = NULL;
ctx->u.rsa.e_len = 0;
- kzfree(ctx->u.rsa.n_buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(ctx->u.rsa.n_buf);
ctx->u.rsa.n_buf = NULL;
ctx->u.rsa.n_len = 0;
- kzfree(ctx->u.rsa.d_buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(ctx->u.rsa.d_buf);
ctx->u.rsa.d_buf = NULL;
ctx->u.rsa.d_len = 0;
}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c
index 1cf51edbc4b9..35794c7271fb 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c
@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ static int cc_get_plain_hmac_key(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
const u8 *authkey,
if (dma_mapping_error(dev, key_dma_addr)) {
dev_err(dev, "Mapping key va=0x%p len=%u for DMA failed\n",
key, keylen);
- kzfree(key);
+ kfree_sensitive(key);
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (keylen > blocksize) {
@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ static int cc_get_plain_hmac_key(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
const u8 *authkey,
if (key_dma_addr)
dma_unmap_single(dev, key_dma_addr, keylen, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
- kzfree(key);
+ kfree_sensitive(key);
return rc;
}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c
b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c
index b2bd093e7013..a5e041d9d2cf 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c
@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ void cc_unmap_aead_request(struct device *dev, struct
aead_request *req)
if (areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr) {
dma_unmap_single(dev, areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr,
hw_iv_size, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
- kzfree(areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv);
+ kfree_sensitive(areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv);
}
/* Release pool */
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static int cc_aead_chain_iv(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata,
if (dma_mapping_error(dev, areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr)) {
dev_err(dev, "Mapping iv %u B at va=%pK for DMA failed\n",
hw_iv_size, req->iv);
- kzfree(areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv);
+ kfree_sensitive(areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv);
areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv = NULL;
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto chain_iv_exit;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c
index 872ea3ff1c6b..110456e06c5e 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_cipher.c
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ static void cc_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
&ctx_p->user.key_dma_addr);
/* Free key buffer in context */
- kzfree(ctx_p->user.key);
+ kfree_sensitive(ctx_p->user.key);
dev_dbg(dev, "Free key buffer in context. key=@%p\n",
ctx_p->user.key);
}
@@ -825,7 +825,7 @@ static void cc_cipher_complete(struct device *dev, void
*cc_req, int err)
/* Not a BACKLOG notification */
cc_unmap_cipher_request(dev, req_ctx, ivsize, src, dst);
memcpy(req->iv, req_ctx->iv, ivsize);
- kzfree(req_ctx->iv);
+ kfree_sensitive(req_ctx->iv);
}
skcipher_request_complete(req, err);
@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ static int cc_cipher_process(struct skcipher_request *req,
exit_process:
if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && rc != -EBUSY) {
- kzfree(req_ctx->iv);
+ kfree_sensitive(req_ctx->iv);
}
return rc;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c
index d5310783af15..683c9a430e11 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c
@@ -764,7 +764,7 @@ static int cc_hash_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *ahash, const
u8 *key,
if (dma_mapping_error(dev, ctx->key_params.key_dma_addr)) {
dev_err(dev, "Mapping key va=0x%p len=%u for DMA failed\n",
ctx->key_params.key, keylen);
- kzfree(ctx->key_params.key);
+ kfree_sensitive(ctx->key_params.key);
return -ENOMEM;
}
dev_dbg(dev, "mapping key-buffer: key_dma_addr=%pad keylen=%u\n",
@@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ static int cc_hash_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *ahash, const
u8 *key,
&ctx->key_params.key_dma_addr, ctx->key_params.keylen);
}
- kzfree(ctx->key_params.key);
+ kfree_sensitive(ctx->key_params.key);
return rc;
}
@@ -950,7 +950,7 @@ static int cc_xcbc_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *ahash,
if (dma_mapping_error(dev, ctx->key_params.key_dma_addr)) {
dev_err(dev, "Mapping key va=0x%p len=%u for DMA failed\n",
key, keylen);
- kzfree(ctx->key_params.key);
+ kfree_sensitive(ctx->key_params.key);
return -ENOMEM;
}
dev_dbg(dev, "mapping key-buffer: key_dma_addr=%pad keylen=%u\n",
@@ -999,7 +999,7 @@ static int cc_xcbc_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *ahash,
dev_dbg(dev, "Unmapped key-buffer: key_dma_addr=%pad keylen=%u\n",
&ctx->key_params.key_dma_addr, ctx->key_params.keylen);
- kzfree(ctx->key_params.key);
+ kfree_sensitive(ctx->key_params.key);
return rc;
}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_request_mgr.c
b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_request_mgr.c
index 1d7649ecf44e..33fb27745d52 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_request_mgr.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_request_mgr.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ void cc_req_mgr_fini(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata)
/* Kill tasklet */
tasklet_kill(&req_mgr_h->comptask);
#endif
- kzfree(req_mgr_h);
+ kfree_sensitive(req_mgr_h);
drvdata->request_mgr_handle = NULL;
}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa/hash.c
b/drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa/hash.c
index b971284332b6..2fdd3d55ed08 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa/hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa/hash.c
@@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@ static int mv_cesa_ahmac_pad_init(struct ahash_request
*req,
}
/* Set the memory region to 0 to avoid any leak. */
- kzfree(keydup);
+ kfree_sensitive(keydup);
if (ret)
return ret;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_main.c
b/drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_main.c
index ce3168327a39..228fe8e47e0e 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_main.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_main.c
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static void cleanup_worker_threads(struct otx_cptvf *cptvf)
for (i = 0; i < cptvf->num_queues; i++)
tasklet_kill(&cwqe_info->vq_wqe[i].twork);
- kzfree(cwqe_info);
+ kfree_sensitive(cwqe_info);
cptvf->wqe_info = NULL;
}
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static void free_pending_queues(struct otx_cpt_pending_qinfo
*pqinfo)
continue;
/* free single queue */
- kzfree((queue->head));
+ kfree_sensitive((queue->head));
queue->front = 0;
queue->rear = 0;
queue->qlen = 0;
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static void free_command_queues(struct otx_cptvf *cptvf,
chunk->head = NULL;
chunk->dma_addr = 0;
list_del(&chunk->nextchunk);
- kzfree(chunk);
+ kfree_sensitive(chunk);
}
queue->num_chunks = 0;
queue->idx = 0;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_reqmgr.h
b/drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_reqmgr.h
index a4c9ff730b13..cfaaf8e2f9c2 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_reqmgr.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_reqmgr.h
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static inline void do_request_cleanup(struct pci_dev *pdev,
DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
}
}
- kzfree(info);
+ kfree_sensitive(info);
}
struct otx_cptvf_wqe;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c
b/drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c
index 78d660d963e2..5c71f85da7e2 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/mediatek/mtk-aes.c
@@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ static int mtk_aes_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead,
const u8 *key,
mtk_aes_write_state_be(ctx->key + ctx->keylen, data->hash,
AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
out:
- kzfree(data);
+ kfree_sensitive(data);
return err;
}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c
index f03c238f5a31..40882d6d52c1 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c
@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ void nx_crypto_ctx_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
- kzfree(nx_ctx->kmem);
+ kfree_sensitive(nx_ctx->kmem);
nx_ctx->csbcpb = NULL;
nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead = NULL;
nx_ctx->in_sg = NULL;
@@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ void nx_crypto_ctx_aead_exit(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
{
struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
- kzfree(nx_ctx->kmem);
+ kfree_sensitive(nx_ctx->kmem);
}
static int nx_probe(struct vio_dev *viodev, const struct vio_device_id *id)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c
b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c
index cb8a6ea2a4bc..930fc802d399 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static int virtio_crypto_alg_skcipher_init_session(
num_in, vcrypto, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (err < 0) {
spin_unlock(&vcrypto->ctrl_lock);
- kzfree(cipher_key);
+ kfree_sensitive(cipher_key);
return err;
}
virtqueue_kick(vcrypto->ctrl_vq);
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ static int virtio_crypto_alg_skcipher_init_session(
spin_unlock(&vcrypto->ctrl_lock);
pr_err("virtio_crypto: Create session failed status: %u\n",
le32_to_cpu(vcrypto->input.status));
- kzfree(cipher_key);
+ kfree_sensitive(cipher_key);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static int virtio_crypto_alg_skcipher_init_session(
spin_unlock(&vcrypto->ctrl_lock);
- kzfree(cipher_key);
+ kfree_sensitive(cipher_key);
return 0;
}
@@ -472,9 +472,9 @@ __virtio_crypto_skcipher_do_req(struct
virtio_crypto_sym_request *vc_sym_req,
return 0;
free_iv:
- kzfree(iv);
+ kfree_sensitive(iv);
free:
- kzfree(req_data);
+ kfree_sensitive(req_data);
kfree(sgs);
return err;
}
@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ static void virtio_crypto_skcipher_finalize_req(
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->iv, req->dst,
req->cryptlen - AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
AES_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
- kzfree(vc_sym_req->iv);
+ kfree_sensitive(vc_sym_req->iv);
virtcrypto_clear_request(&vc_sym_req->base);
crypto_finalize_skcipher_request(vc_sym_req->base.dataq->engine,
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
index c8a962c62663..ba8a19c72391 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ void
virtcrypto_clear_request(struct virtio_crypto_request *vc_req)
{
if (vc_req) {
- kzfree(vc_req->req_data);
+ kfree_sensitive(vc_req->req_data);
kfree(vc_req->sgs);
}
}
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index 000ddfab5ba0..5799df0c6643 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ static void crypt_iv_lmk_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
crypto_free_shash(lmk->hash_tfm);
lmk->hash_tfm = NULL;
- kzfree(lmk->seed);
+ kfree_sensitive(lmk->seed);
lmk->seed = NULL;
}
@@ -558,9 +558,9 @@ static void crypt_iv_tcw_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
{
struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw;
- kzfree(tcw->iv_seed);
+ kfree_sensitive(tcw->iv_seed);
tcw->iv_seed = NULL;
- kzfree(tcw->whitening);
+ kfree_sensitive(tcw->whitening);
tcw->whitening = NULL;
if (tcw->crc32_tfm && !IS_ERR(tcw->crc32_tfm))
@@ -994,8 +994,8 @@ static int crypt_iv_elephant(struct crypt_config *cc, struct
dm_crypt_request *d
kunmap_atomic(data);
out:
- kzfree(ks);
- kzfree(es);
+ kfree_sensitive(ks);
+ kfree_sensitive(es);
skcipher_request_free(req);
return r;
}
@@ -2294,7 +2294,7 @@ static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc,
const char *key_string
key = request_key(type, key_desc + 1, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
- kzfree(new_key_string);
+ kfree_sensitive(new_key_string);
return PTR_ERR(key);
}
@@ -2304,7 +2304,7 @@ static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc,
const char *key_string
if (ret < 0) {
up_read(&key->sem);
key_put(key);
- kzfree(new_key_string);
+ kfree_sensitive(new_key_string);
return ret;
}
@@ -2318,10 +2318,10 @@ static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config
*cc, const char *key_string
if (!ret) {
set_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags);
- kzfree(cc->key_string);
+ kfree_sensitive(cc->key_string);
cc->key_string = new_key_string;
} else
- kzfree(new_key_string);
+ kfree_sensitive(new_key_string);
return ret;
}
@@ -2382,7 +2382,7 @@ static int crypt_set_key(struct crypt_config *cc, char
*key)
clear_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags);
/* wipe references to any kernel keyring key */
- kzfree(cc->key_string);
+ kfree_sensitive(cc->key_string);
cc->key_string = NULL;
/* Decode key from its hex representation. */
@@ -2414,7 +2414,7 @@ static int crypt_wipe_key(struct crypt_config *cc)
return r;
}
- kzfree(cc->key_string);
+ kfree_sensitive(cc->key_string);
cc->key_string = NULL;
r = crypt_setkey(cc);
memset(&cc->key, 0, cc->key_size * sizeof(u8));
@@ -2493,15 +2493,15 @@ static void crypt_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)
if (cc->dev)
dm_put_device(ti, cc->dev);
- kzfree(cc->cipher_string);
- kzfree(cc->key_string);
- kzfree(cc->cipher_auth);
- kzfree(cc->authenc_key);
+ kfree_sensitive(cc->cipher_string);
+ kfree_sensitive(cc->key_string);
+ kfree_sensitive(cc->cipher_auth);
+ kfree_sensitive(cc->authenc_key);
mutex_destroy(&cc->bio_alloc_lock);
/* Must zero key material before freeing */
- kzfree(cc);
+ kfree_sensitive(cc);
spin_lock(&dm_crypt_clients_lock);
WARN_ON(!dm_crypt_clients_n);
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
index 81dc5ff08909..cb4a3c569802 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
@@ -3405,8 +3405,8 @@ static struct scatterlist
**dm_integrity_alloc_journal_scatterlist(struct dm_int
static void free_alg(struct alg_spec *a)
{
- kzfree(a->alg_string);
- kzfree(a->key);
+ kfree_sensitive(a->alg_string);
+ kfree_sensitive(a->key);
memset(a, 0, sizeof *a);
}
@@ -4337,7 +4337,7 @@ static void dm_integrity_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)
for (i = 0; i < ic->journal_sections; i++) {
struct skcipher_request *req = ic->sk_requests[i];
if (req) {
- kzfree(req->iv);
+ kfree_sensitive(req->iv);
skcipher_request_free(req);
}
}
diff --git a/drivers/misc/ibmvmc.c b/drivers/misc/ibmvmc.c
index 2ed23c99f59f..beda69075a97 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/ibmvmc.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/ibmvmc.c
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static void *alloc_dma_buffer(struct vio_dev *vdev, size_t
size,
if (dma_mapping_error(&vdev->dev, *dma_handle)) {
*dma_handle = 0;
- kzfree(buffer);
+ kfree_sensitive(buffer);
return NULL;
}
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ static void free_dma_buffer(struct vio_dev *vdev, size_t
size, void *vaddr,
dma_unmap_single(&vdev->dev, dma_handle, size, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
/* deallocate memory */
- kzfree(vaddr);
+ kfree_sensitive(vaddr);
}
/**
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ static int ibmvmc_close(struct inode *inode, struct file
*file)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hmc->lock, flags);
}
- kzfree(session);
+ kfree_sensitive(session);
return rc;
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c
b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c
index 0874ae47cb03..3ab6db2588d3 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static void hclge_free_vector_ring_chain(struct
hnae3_ring_chain_node *head)
while (chain) {
chain_tmp = chain->next;
- kzfree(chain);
+ kfree_sensitive(chain);
chain = chain_tmp;
}
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ipsec.c
b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ipsec.c
index 113f6087c7c9..e567f4ab8a79 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ipsec.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ipsec.c
@@ -960,9 +960,9 @@ int ixgbe_ipsec_vf_add_sa(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter, u32
*msgbuf, u32 vf)
return 0;
err_aead:
- kzfree(xs->aead);
+ kfree_sensitive(xs->aead);
err_xs:
- kzfree(xs);
+ kfree_sensitive(xs);
err_out:
msgbuf[1] = err;
return err;
@@ -1047,7 +1047,7 @@ int ixgbe_ipsec_vf_del_sa(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter,
u32 *msgbuf, u32 vf)
ixgbe_ipsec_del_sa(xs);
/* remove the xs that was made-up in the add request */
- kzfree(xs);
+ kfree_sensitive(xs);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c
index de3b57d09d0c..208f6e24f37c 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static void *mppe_alloc(unsigned char *options, int optlen)
kfree(state->sha1_digest);
if (state->sha1) {
crypto_free_shash(state->sha1->tfm);
- kzfree(state->sha1);
+ kfree_sensitive(state->sha1);
}
kfree(state);
out:
@@ -238,8 +238,8 @@ static void mppe_free(void *arg)
if (state) {
kfree(state->sha1_digest);
crypto_free_shash(state->sha1->tfm);
- kzfree(state->sha1);
- kzfree(state);
+ kfree_sensitive(state->sha1);
+ kfree_sensitive(state);
}
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
index 626433690abb..4687e3d35d55 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static struct noise_keypair *keypair_create(struct wg_peer
*peer)
static void keypair_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
- kzfree(container_of(rcu, struct noise_keypair, rcu));
+ kfree_sensitive(container_of(rcu, struct noise_keypair, rcu));
}
static void keypair_free_kref(struct kref *kref)
@@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ bool wg_noise_handshake_begin_session(struct noise_handshake
*handshake,
handshake->entry.peer->device->index_hashtable,
&handshake->entry, &new_keypair->entry);
} else {
- kzfree(new_keypair);
+ kfree_sensitive(new_keypair);
}
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c b/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c
index 1d634bd3038f..b3b6370e6b95 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/peer.c
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ static void rcu_release(struct rcu_head *rcu)
/* The final zeroing takes care of clearing any remaining handshake key
* material and other potentially sensitive information.
*/
- kzfree(peer);
+ kfree_sensitive(peer);
}
static void kref_release(struct kref *refcount)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/rx.c
b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/rx.c
index 24cb1b1f21f0..9463c108aa96 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/rx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/rx.c
@@ -1369,7 +1369,7 @@ static void iwl_pcie_rx_handle_rb(struct iwl_trans *trans,
&rxcb, rxq->id);
if (reclaim) {
- kzfree(txq->entries[cmd_index].free_buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(txq->entries[cmd_index].free_buf);
txq->entries[cmd_index].free_buf = NULL;
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx-gen2.c
b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx-gen2.c
index 7fc7542535d8..606bef2ecc7b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx-gen2.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx-gen2.c
@@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ static int iwl_pcie_gen2_enqueue_hcmd(struct iwl_trans
*trans,
BUILD_BUG_ON(IWL_TFH_NUM_TBS > sizeof(out_meta->tbs) * BITS_PER_BYTE);
out_meta->flags = cmd->flags;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(txq->entries[idx].free_buf))
- kzfree(txq->entries[idx].free_buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(txq->entries[idx].free_buf);
txq->entries[idx].free_buf = dup_buf;
trace_iwlwifi_dev_hcmd(trans->dev, cmd, cmd_size,
&out_cmd->hdr_wide);
@@ -1257,8 +1257,8 @@ static void iwl_pcie_gen2_txq_free(struct iwl_trans
*trans, int txq_id)
/* De-alloc array of command/tx buffers */
if (txq_id == trans->txqs.cmd.q_id)
for (i = 0; i < txq->n_window; i++) {
- kzfree(txq->entries[i].cmd);
- kzfree(txq->entries[i].free_buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(txq->entries[i].cmd);
+ kfree_sensitive(txq->entries[i].free_buf);
}
del_timer_sync(&txq->stuck_timer);
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c
b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c
index 5c6c3fa0d29f..eb396c06b7fb 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c
@@ -721,8 +721,8 @@ static void iwl_pcie_txq_free(struct iwl_trans *trans, int
txq_id)
/* De-alloc array of command/tx buffers */
if (txq_id == trans->txqs.cmd.q_id)
for (i = 0; i < txq->n_window; i++) {
- kzfree(txq->entries[i].cmd);
- kzfree(txq->entries[i].free_buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(txq->entries[i].cmd);
+ kfree_sensitive(txq->entries[i].free_buf);
}
/* De-alloc circular buffer of TFDs */
@@ -1765,7 +1765,7 @@ static int iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd(struct iwl_trans *trans,
BUILD_BUG_ON(IWL_TFH_NUM_TBS > sizeof(out_meta->tbs) * BITS_PER_BYTE);
out_meta->flags = cmd->flags;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(txq->entries[idx].free_buf))
- kzfree(txq->entries[idx].free_buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(txq->entries[idx].free_buf);
txq->entries[idx].free_buf = dup_buf;
trace_iwlwifi_dev_hcmd(trans->dev, cmd, cmd_size,
&out_cmd->hdr_wide);
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/wext.c
b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/wext.c
index 1d4dae422106..7b6c4ae8ddb3 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/wext.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/wext.c
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ static int orinoco_set_key(struct orinoco_private *priv, int
index,
enum orinoco_alg alg, const u8 *key, int key_len,
const u8 *seq, int seq_len)
{
- kzfree(priv->keys[index].key);
- kzfree(priv->keys[index].seq);
+ kfree_sensitive(priv->keys[index].key);
+ kfree_sensitive(priv->keys[index].seq);
if (key_len) {
priv->keys[index].key = kzalloc(key_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.h b/drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.h
index 053cc34d2ca2..823de10479bd 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.h
+++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.h
@@ -218,8 +218,8 @@ static inline void ap_init_message(struct ap_message
*ap_msg)
*/
static inline void ap_release_message(struct ap_message *ap_msg)
{
- kzfree(ap_msg->message);
- kzfree(ap_msg->private);
+ kfree_sensitive(ap_msg->message);
+ kfree_sensitive(ap_msg->private);
}
/*
diff --git a/drivers/staging/ks7010/ks_hostif.c
b/drivers/staging/ks7010/ks_hostif.c
index 2666f9e30c15..d70b671b06aa 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/ks7010/ks_hostif.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/ks7010/ks_hostif.c
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ michael_mic(u8 *key, u8 *data, unsigned int len, u8
priority, u8 *result)
ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, data + 12, len - 12, result);
err_free_desc:
- kzfree(desc);
+ kfree_sensitive(desc);
err_free_tfm:
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
index 0f95009a30b6..ec9122070e58 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c
@@ -2251,7 +2251,7 @@ static void gf_mulx(u8 *pad)
static void aes_encrypt_deinit(void *ctx)
{
- kzfree(ctx);
+ kfree_sensitive(ctx);
}
diff --git a/drivers/staging/wlan-ng/p80211netdev.c
b/drivers/staging/wlan-ng/p80211netdev.c
index b809c0015c0c..7b091c5a2984 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/wlan-ng/p80211netdev.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/wlan-ng/p80211netdev.c
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t p80211knetdev_hard_start_xmit(struct
sk_buff *skb,
failed:
/* Free up the WEP buffer if it's not the same as the skb */
if ((p80211_wep.data) && (p80211_wep.data != skb->data))
- kzfree(p80211_wep.data);
+ kfree_sensitive(p80211_wep.data);
/* we always free the skb here, never in a lower level. */
if (!result)
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
index 0e54627d9aa8..62d912b79c61 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash(
pr_debug("[server] Sending CHAP_R=0x%s\n", response);
auth_ret = 0;
out:
- kzfree(desc);
+ kfree_sensitive(desc);
if (tfm)
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
kfree(initiatorchg);
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
index 168deb8ef68a..f1dd9e4271e9 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
@@ -2692,7 +2692,7 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct file *file,
void __user *argp)
btrfs_put_root(root);
out_free:
btrfs_free_path(path);
- kzfree(subvol_info);
+ kfree_sensitive(subvol_info);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
index 874a551f339c..9daa256f69d4 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ calc_seckey(struct cifs_ses *ses)
ses->auth_key.len = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
memzero_explicit(sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
- kzfree(ctx_arc4);
+ kfree_sensitive(ctx_arc4);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c
index 5fac34f192af..467db43d1e34 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/connect.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c
@@ -2182,7 +2182,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(const char *mountdata, const char
*devname,
tmp_end++;
if (!(tmp_end < end && tmp_end[1] == delim)) {
/* No it is not. Set the password to NULL */
- kzfree(vol->password);
+ kfree_sensitive(vol->password);
vol->password = NULL;
break;
}
@@ -2220,7 +2220,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(const char *mountdata, const char
*devname,
options = end;
}
- kzfree(vol->password);
+ kfree_sensitive(vol->password);
/* Now build new password string */
temp_len = strlen(value);
vol->password = kzalloc(temp_len+1, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -3198,7 +3198,7 @@ cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol, struct cifs_ses
*ses)
rc = -ENOMEM;
kfree(vol->username);
vol->username = NULL;
- kzfree(vol->password);
+ kfree_sensitive(vol->password);
vol->password = NULL;
goto out_key_put;
}
@@ -4219,7 +4219,7 @@ void
cifs_cleanup_volume_info_contents(struct smb_vol *volume_info)
{
kfree(volume_info->username);
- kzfree(volume_info->password);
+ kfree_sensitive(volume_info->password);
kfree(volume_info->UNC);
kfree(volume_info->domainname);
kfree(volume_info->iocharset);
@@ -5343,7 +5343,7 @@ cifs_construct_tcon(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, kuid_t
fsuid)
out:
kfree(vol_info->username);
- kzfree(vol_info->password);
+ kfree_sensitive(vol_info->password);
kfree(vol_info);
return tcon;
diff --git a/fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c b/fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c
index df81c718d2fa..7a8d41493aad 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c
@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ static int dup_vol(struct smb_vol *vol, struct smb_vol
*new)
err_free_unc:
kfree(new->UNC);
err_free_password:
- kzfree(new->password);
+ kfree_sensitive(new->password);
err_free_username:
kfree(new->username);
kfree(new);
diff --git a/fs/cifs/misc.c b/fs/cifs/misc.c
index 56791a692c8b..2393e8aec5c6 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/misc.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/misc.c
@@ -103,12 +103,12 @@ sesInfoFree(struct cifs_ses *buf_to_free)
kfree(buf_to_free->serverOS);
kfree(buf_to_free->serverDomain);
kfree(buf_to_free->serverNOS);
- kzfree(buf_to_free->password);
+ kfree_sensitive(buf_to_free->password);
kfree(buf_to_free->user_name);
kfree(buf_to_free->domainName);
- kzfree(buf_to_free->auth_key.response);
+ kfree_sensitive(buf_to_free->auth_key.response);
kfree(buf_to_free->iface_list);
- kzfree(buf_to_free);
+ kfree_sensitive(buf_to_free);
}
struct cifs_tcon *
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ tconInfoFree(struct cifs_tcon *buf_to_free)
}
atomic_dec(&tconInfoAllocCount);
kfree(buf_to_free->nativeFileSystem);
- kzfree(buf_to_free->password);
+ kfree_sensitive(buf_to_free->password);
kfree(buf_to_free->crfid.fid);
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_DFS_UPCALL
kfree(buf_to_free->dfs_path);
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyring.c b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
index e24eb48bfbe1..484086feea35 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keyring.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keyring.c
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static void free_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
}
key_put(mk->mk_users);
- kzfree(mk);
+ kfree_sensitive(mk);
}
static inline bool valid_key_spec(const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *spec)
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static int fscrypt_provisioning_key_preparse(struct
key_preparsed_payload *prep)
static void fscrypt_provisioning_key_free_preparse(
struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- kzfree(prep->payload.data[0]);
+ kfree_sensitive(prep->payload.data[0]);
}
static void fscrypt_provisioning_key_describe(const struct key *key,
@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ static void fscrypt_provisioning_key_describe(const struct
key *key,
static void fscrypt_provisioning_key_destroy(struct key *key)
{
- kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);
+ kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[0]);
}
static struct key_type key_type_fscrypt_provisioning = {
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c
index 801b48c0cd7f..c8a930f8faf2 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ static void free_direct_key(struct fscrypt_direct_key *dk)
{
if (dk) {
crypto_free_skcipher(dk->dk_ctfm);
- kzfree(dk);
+ kfree_sensitive(dk);
}
}
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ static int setup_v1_file_key_derived(struct fscrypt_info
*ci,
err = fscrypt_set_per_file_enc_key(ci, derived_key);
out:
- kzfree(derived_key);
+ kfree_sensitive(derived_key);
return err;
}
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
index af3eb02bbca1..f6a17d259db7 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
@@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet(char *dest, size_t
*remaining_bytes,
out_release_free_unlock:
crypto_free_shash(s->hash_tfm);
out_free_unlock:
- kzfree(s->block_aligned_filename);
+ kfree_sensitive(s->block_aligned_filename);
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(s->tfm_mutex);
out:
@@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet(char *dest, size_t
*remaining_bytes,
key_put(auth_tok_key);
}
skcipher_request_free(s->skcipher_req);
- kzfree(s->hash_desc);
+ kfree_sensitive(s->hash_desc);
kfree(s);
return rc;
}
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c b/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c
index 8646ba76def3..c0dfd9647627 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int ecryptfs_exorcise_daemon(struct ecryptfs_daemon *daemon)
}
hlist_del(&daemon->euid_chain);
mutex_unlock(&daemon->mux);
- kzfree(daemon);
+ kfree_sensitive(daemon);
out:
return rc;
}
diff --git a/include/crypto/aead.h b/include/crypto/aead.h
index 62c68550aab6..c32a6f5664e9 100644
--- a/include/crypto/aead.h
+++ b/include/crypto/aead.h
@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ static inline struct aead_request *aead_request_alloc(struct
crypto_aead *tfm,
*/
static inline void aead_request_free(struct aead_request *req)
{
- kzfree(req);
+ kfree_sensitive(req);
}
/**
diff --git a/include/crypto/akcipher.h b/include/crypto/akcipher.h
index 6924b091adec..1d3aa252caba 100644
--- a/include/crypto/akcipher.h
+++ b/include/crypto/akcipher.h
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static inline struct akcipher_request
*akcipher_request_alloc(
*/
static inline void akcipher_request_free(struct akcipher_request *req)
{
- kzfree(req);
+ kfree_sensitive(req);
}
/**
diff --git a/include/crypto/gf128mul.h b/include/crypto/gf128mul.h
index fa0a63d298dc..81330c6446f6 100644
--- a/include/crypto/gf128mul.h
+++ b/include/crypto/gf128mul.h
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ void gf128mul_4k_bbe(be128 *a, const struct gf128mul_4k *t);
void gf128mul_x8_ble(le128 *r, const le128 *x);
static inline void gf128mul_free_4k(struct gf128mul_4k *t)
{
- kzfree(t);
+ kfree_sensitive(t);
}
diff --git a/include/crypto/hash.h b/include/crypto/hash.h
index 4829d2367eda..8d036b54cbff 100644
--- a/include/crypto/hash.h
+++ b/include/crypto/hash.h
@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ static inline struct ahash_request *ahash_request_alloc(
*/
static inline void ahash_request_free(struct ahash_request *req)
{
- kzfree(req);
+ kfree_sensitive(req);
}
static inline void ahash_request_zero(struct ahash_request *req)
diff --git a/include/crypto/internal/acompress.h
b/include/crypto/internal/acompress.h
index cf478681b53e..cfc47e18820f 100644
--- a/include/crypto/internal/acompress.h
+++ b/include/crypto/internal/acompress.h
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static inline struct acomp_req *__acomp_request_alloc(struct
crypto_acomp *tfm)
static inline void __acomp_request_free(struct acomp_req *req)
{
- kzfree(req);
+ kfree_sensitive(req);
}
/**
diff --git a/include/crypto/kpp.h b/include/crypto/kpp.h
index cd9a9b500624..88b591215d5c 100644
--- a/include/crypto/kpp.h
+++ b/include/crypto/kpp.h
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static inline struct kpp_request *kpp_request_alloc(struct
crypto_kpp *tfm,
*/
static inline void kpp_request_free(struct kpp_request *req)
{
- kzfree(req);
+ kfree_sensitive(req);
}
/**
diff --git a/include/crypto/skcipher.h b/include/crypto/skcipher.h
index 141e7690f9c3..1013c9cbae69 100644
--- a/include/crypto/skcipher.h
+++ b/include/crypto/skcipher.h
@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ static inline struct skcipher_request
*skcipher_request_alloc(
*/
static inline void skcipher_request_free(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
- kzfree(req);
+ kfree_sensitive(req);
}
static inline void skcipher_request_zero(struct skcipher_request *req)
diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
index 6d454886bcaf..7f2018943997 100644
--- a/include/linux/slab.h
+++ b/include/linux/slab.h
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ void memcg_deactivate_kmem_caches(struct mem_cgroup *,
struct mem_cgroup *);
*/
void * __must_check krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t);
void kfree(const void *);
-void kzfree(const void *);
+void kfree_sensitive(const void *);
size_t __ksize(const void *);
size_t ksize(const void *);
diff --git a/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c b/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c
index 20ed0f766787..4cd2b335cb7f 100644
--- a/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c
+++ b/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ void mpi_free_limb_space(mpi_ptr_t a)
if (!a)
return;
- kzfree(a);
+ kfree_sensitive(a);
}
void mpi_assign_limb_space(MPI a, mpi_ptr_t ap, unsigned nlimbs)
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ int mpi_resize(MPI a, unsigned nlimbs)
if (!p)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(p, a->d, a->alloced * sizeof(mpi_limb_t));
- kzfree(a->d);
+ kfree_sensitive(a->d);
a->d = p;
} else {
a->d = kcalloc(nlimbs, sizeof(mpi_limb_t), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ void mpi_free(MPI a)
return;
if (a->flags & 4)
- kzfree(a->d);
+ kfree_sensitive(a->d);
else
mpi_free_limb_space(a->d);
diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
index dc2c6a51d11a..e4d9a86b174b 100644
--- a/lib/test_kasan.c
+++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
@@ -766,15 +766,15 @@ static noinline void __init kmalloc_double_kzfree(void)
char *ptr;
size_t size = 16;
- pr_info("double-free (kzfree)\n");
+ pr_info("double-free (kfree_sensitive)\n");
ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ptr) {
pr_err("Allocation failed\n");
return;
}
- kzfree(ptr);
- kzfree(ptr);
+ kfree_sensitive(ptr);
+ kfree_sensitive(ptr);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 37d48a56431d..aeedf241e2e6 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -1708,17 +1708,17 @@ void *krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size, gfp_t
flags)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(krealloc);
/**
- * kzfree - like kfree but zero memory
+ * kfree_sensitive - Clear sensitive information in memory before freeing
* @p: object to free memory of
*
* The memory of the object @p points to is zeroed before freed.
- * If @p is %NULL, kzfree() does nothing.
+ * If @p is %NULL, kfree_sensitive() does nothing.
*
* Note: this function zeroes the whole allocated buffer which can be a good
* deal bigger than the requested buffer size passed to kmalloc(). So be
* careful when using this function in performance sensitive code.
*/
-void kzfree(const void *p)
+void kfree_sensitive(const void *p)
{
size_t ks;
void *mem = (void *)p;
@@ -1729,7 +1729,7 @@ void kzfree(const void *p)
memzero_explicit(mem, ks);
kfree(mem);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(kzfree);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kfree_sensitive);
/**
* ksize - get the actual amount of memory allocated for a given object
diff --git a/net/atm/mpoa_caches.c b/net/atm/mpoa_caches.c
index 3286f9d527d3..f7a2f0e41105 100644
--- a/net/atm/mpoa_caches.c
+++ b/net/atm/mpoa_caches.c
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ static int cache_hit(in_cache_entry *entry, struct
mpoa_client *mpc)
static void in_cache_put(in_cache_entry *entry)
{
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&entry->use)) {
- kzfree(entry);
+ kfree_sensitive(entry);
}
}
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ static eg_cache_entry *eg_cache_get_by_src_ip(__be32 ipaddr,
static void eg_cache_put(eg_cache_entry *entry)
{
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&entry->use)) {
- kzfree(entry);
+ kfree_sensitive(entry);
}
}
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
index 2155ce802877..3226fe02e875 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8
public_key[64],
free_all:
kpp_request_free(req);
free_tmp:
- kzfree(tmp);
+ kfree_sensitive(tmp);
return err;
}
@@ -151,9 +151,9 @@ int set_ecdh_privkey(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8
private_key[32])
err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, buf, buf_len);
/* fall through */
free_all:
- kzfree(buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(buf);
free_tmp:
- kzfree(tmp);
+ kfree_sensitive(tmp);
return err;
}
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index c2c5ab05fa7e..684e60e1915c 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -753,9 +753,9 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
- kzfree(smp->csrk);
- kzfree(smp->slave_csrk);
- kzfree(smp->link_key);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp->csrk);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp->slave_csrk);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
@@ -789,7 +789,7 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
}
chan->data = NULL;
- kzfree(smp);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp);
hci_conn_drop(hcon);
}
@@ -1156,7 +1156,7 @@ static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
const u8 salt[16] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, salt, smp->link_key)) {
- kzfree(smp->link_key);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
smp->link_key = NULL;
return;
}
@@ -1165,14 +1165,14 @@ static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
- kzfree(smp->link_key);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
smp->link_key = NULL;
return;
}
}
if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
- kzfree(smp->link_key);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
smp->link_key = NULL;
return;
}
@@ -1407,7 +1407,7 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn
*conn)
free_shash:
crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
zfree_smp:
- kzfree(smp);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp);
return NULL;
}
@@ -3278,7 +3278,7 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev
*hdev, u16 cid)
tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
- kzfree(smp);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp);
return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac);
}
@@ -3286,7 +3286,7 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev
*hdev, u16 cid)
if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
- kzfree(smp);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp);
return ERR_CAST(tfm_ecdh);
}
@@ -3300,7 +3300,7 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev
*hdev, u16 cid)
if (smp) {
crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
- kzfree(smp);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp);
}
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
@@ -3347,7 +3347,7 @@ static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
chan->data = NULL;
crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
- kzfree(smp);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp);
}
l2cap_chan_put(chan);
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index 6c4acf1f0220..8cf1a6a5cc5b 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -2271,7 +2271,7 @@ static inline void __sock_kfree_s(struct sock *sk, void
*mem, int size,
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!mem))
return;
if (nullify)
- kzfree(mem);
+ kfree_sensitive(mem);
else
kfree(mem);
atomic_sub(size, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
index 19ad9586c720..c1a54f3d58f5 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static void tcp_fastopen_ctx_free(struct rcu_head *head)
struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx container_of(head, struct
tcp_fastopen_context, rcu);
- kzfree(ctx);
+ kfree_sensitive(ctx);
}
void tcp_fastopen_destroy_cipher(struct sock *sk)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aead_api.c b/net/mac80211/aead_api.c
index c5fe95e49c68..d7b3d905d535 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aead_api.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/aead_api.c
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ int aead_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
size_t aad_len,
aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length);
crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
- kzfree(aead_req);
+ kfree_sensitive(aead_req);
return 0;
}
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int aead_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
size_t aad_len,
aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length);
err = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
- kzfree(aead_req);
+ kfree_sensitive(aead_req);
return err;
}
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c b/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c
index 16ba09cb5def..6f3b3a0cc10a 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ int ieee80211_aes_gmac(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *aad,
u8 *nonce,
aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, GMAC_AAD_LEN + data_len);
crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
- kzfree(aead_req);
+ kfree_sensitive(aead_req);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c
index 8f403c1bb908..6bb765721862 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.c
@@ -732,7 +732,7 @@ static void ieee80211_key_free_common(struct ieee80211_key
*key)
ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_free(key->u.gcmp.tfm);
break;
}
- kzfree(key);
+ kfree_sensitive(key);
}
static void __ieee80211_key_destroy(struct ieee80211_key *key,
diff --git a/net/mac802154/llsec.c b/net/mac802154/llsec.c
index c079ee69d3d0..585d33144c33 100644
--- a/net/mac802154/llsec.c
+++ b/net/mac802154/llsec.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ void mac802154_llsec_destroy(struct mac802154_llsec *sec)
msl = container_of(sl, struct mac802154_llsec_seclevel, level);
list_del(&sl->list);
- kzfree(msl);
+ kfree_sensitive(msl);
}
list_for_each_entry_safe(dev, dn, &sec->table.devices, list) {
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ void mac802154_llsec_destroy(struct mac802154_llsec *sec)
mkey = container_of(key->key, struct mac802154_llsec_key, key);
list_del(&key->list);
llsec_key_put(mkey);
- kzfree(key);
+ kfree_sensitive(key);
}
}
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ llsec_key_alloc(const struct ieee802154_llsec_key *template)
if (key->tfm[i])
crypto_free_aead(key->tfm[i]);
- kzfree(key);
+ kfree_sensitive(key);
return NULL;
}
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ static void llsec_key_release(struct kref *ref)
crypto_free_aead(key->tfm[i]);
crypto_free_sync_skcipher(key->tfm0);
- kzfree(key);
+ kfree_sensitive(key);
}
static struct mac802154_llsec_key*
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ int mac802154_llsec_key_add(struct mac802154_llsec *sec,
return 0;
fail:
- kzfree(new);
+ kfree_sensitive(new);
return -ENOMEM;
}
@@ -341,10 +341,10 @@ static void llsec_dev_free(struct mac802154_llsec_device
*dev)
devkey);
list_del(&pos->list);
- kzfree(devkey);
+ kfree_sensitive(devkey);
}
- kzfree(dev);
+ kfree_sensitive(dev);
}
int mac802154_llsec_dev_add(struct mac802154_llsec *sec,
@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ llsec_do_encrypt_auth(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct
mac802154_llsec *sec,
rc = crypto_aead_encrypt(req);
- kzfree(req);
+ kfree_sensitive(req);
return rc;
}
@@ -886,7 +886,7 @@ llsec_do_decrypt_auth(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct
mac802154_llsec *sec,
rc = crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
- kzfree(req);
+ kfree_sensitive(req);
skb_trim(skb, skb->len - authlen);
return rc;
@@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ llsec_update_devkey_record(struct mac802154_llsec_device
*dev,
if (!devkey)
list_add_rcu(&next->devkey.list, &dev->dev.keys);
else
- kzfree(next);
+ kfree_sensitive(next);
spin_unlock_bh(&dev->lock);
}
diff --git a/net/sctp/auth.c b/net/sctp/auth.c
index 83e97e8892e0..9e289c770574 100644
--- a/net/sctp/auth.c
+++ b/net/sctp/auth.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ void sctp_auth_key_put(struct sctp_auth_bytes *key)
return;
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&key->refcnt)) {
- kzfree(key);
+ kfree_sensitive(key);
SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_DEC(keys);
}
}
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index d57e1a002ffc..3581ccee34d6 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -3755,7 +3755,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(struct sock *sk,
}
out:
- kzfree(authkey);
+ kfree_sensitive(authkey);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
index e7180da1fc6a..794fb3001880 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
@@ -1003,7 +1003,7 @@ krb5_rc4_setup_seq_key(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
err = 0;
out_err:
- kzfree(desc);
+ kfree_sensitive(desc);
crypto_free_shash(hmac);
dprintk("%s: returning %d\n", __func__, err);
return err;
@@ -1079,7 +1079,7 @@ krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key(struct krb5_ctx *kctx,
err = 0;
out_err:
- kzfree(desc);
+ kfree_sensitive(desc);
crypto_free_shash(hmac);
dprintk("%s: returning %d\n", __func__, err);
return err;
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c
b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c
index 3b7f721c023b..726c076950c0 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_keys.c
@@ -228,11 +228,11 @@ u32 krb5_derive_key(const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
ret = 0;
err_free_raw:
- kzfree(rawkey);
+ kfree_sensitive(rawkey);
err_free_out:
- kzfree(outblockdata);
+ kfree_sensitive(outblockdata);
err_free_in:
- kzfree(inblockdata);
+ kfree_sensitive(inblockdata);
err_free_cipher:
crypto_free_sync_skcipher(cipher);
err_return:
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
index 75b3c2e9e8f8..a84a5b289484 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ context_derive_keys_rc4(struct krb5_ctx *ctx)
desc->tfm = hmac;
err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, sigkeyconstant, slen, ctx->cksum);
- kzfree(desc);
+ kfree_sensitive(desc);
if (err)
goto out_err_free_hmac;
/*
diff --git a/net/tipc/crypto.c b/net/tipc/crypto.c
index c8c47fc72653..001bcb0f2480 100644
--- a/net/tipc/crypto.c
+++ b/net/tipc/crypto.c
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ static int tipc_aead_init(struct tipc_aead **aead, struct
tipc_aead_key *ukey,
/* Allocate per-cpu TFM entry pointer */
tmp->tfm_entry = alloc_percpu(struct tipc_tfm *);
if (!tmp->tfm_entry) {
- kzfree(tmp);
+ kfree_sensitive(tmp);
return -ENOMEM;
}
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static int tipc_aead_init(struct tipc_aead **aead, struct
tipc_aead_key *ukey,
/* Not any TFM is allocated? */
if (!tfm_cnt) {
free_percpu(tmp->tfm_entry);
- kzfree(tmp);
+ kfree_sensitive(tmp);
return err;
}
@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ static int tipc_aead_clone(struct tipc_aead **dst, struct
tipc_aead *src)
aead->tfm_entry = alloc_percpu_gfp(struct tipc_tfm *, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(!aead->tfm_entry)) {
- kzfree(aead);
+ kfree_sensitive(aead);
return -ENOMEM;
}
@@ -1352,7 +1352,7 @@ int tipc_crypto_start(struct tipc_crypto **crypto, struct
net *net,
/* Allocate statistic structure */
c->stats = alloc_percpu_gfp(struct tipc_crypto_stats, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!c->stats) {
- kzfree(c);
+ kfree_sensitive(c);
return -ENOMEM;
}
@@ -1408,7 +1408,7 @@ void tipc_crypto_stop(struct tipc_crypto **crypto)
free_percpu(c->stats);
*crypto = NULL;
- kzfree(c);
+ kfree_sensitive(c);
}
void tipc_crypto_timeout(struct tipc_crypto *rx)
diff --git a/net/wireless/core.c b/net/wireless/core.c
index c623d9bf5096..8e764e170c73 100644
--- a/net/wireless/core.c
+++ b/net/wireless/core.c
@@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@ static void __cfg80211_unregister_wdev(struct wireless_dev
*wdev, bool sync)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_CFG80211_WEXT
- kzfree(wdev->wext.keys);
+ kfree_sensitive(wdev->wext.keys);
wdev->wext.keys = NULL;
#endif
/* only initialized if we have a netdev */
diff --git a/net/wireless/ibss.c b/net/wireless/ibss.c
index ae8fe66a9bb8..a0621bb76d8e 100644
--- a/net/wireless/ibss.c
+++ b/net/wireless/ibss.c
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ int __cfg80211_join_ibss(struct cfg80211_registered_device
*rdev,
return -EINVAL;
if (WARN_ON(wdev->connect_keys))
- kzfree(wdev->connect_keys);
+ kfree_sensitive(wdev->connect_keys);
wdev->connect_keys = connkeys;
wdev->ibss_fixed = params->channel_fixed;
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static void __cfg80211_clear_ibss(struct net_device *dev,
bool nowext)
ASSERT_WDEV_LOCK(wdev);
- kzfree(wdev->connect_keys);
+ kfree_sensitive(wdev->connect_keys);
wdev->connect_keys = NULL;
rdev_set_qos_map(rdev, dev, NULL);
diff --git a/net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_tkip.c
b/net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_tkip.c
index f5e842ba7673..1b4d6c87a5c5 100644
--- a/net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_tkip.c
+++ b/net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_tkip.c
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static void lib80211_tkip_deinit(void *priv)
crypto_free_shash(_priv->tx_tfm_michael);
crypto_free_shash(_priv->rx_tfm_michael);
}
- kzfree(priv);
+ kfree_sensitive(priv);
}
static inline u16 RotR1(u16 val)
diff --git a/net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_wep.c
b/net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_wep.c
index dafc6f3571db..6ab9957b8f96 100644
--- a/net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_wep.c
+++ b/net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_wep.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static void *lib80211_wep_init(int keyidx)
static void lib80211_wep_deinit(void *priv)
{
- kzfree(priv);
+ kfree_sensitive(priv);
}
/* Add WEP IV/key info to a frame that has at least 4 bytes of headroom */
diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
index 263ae395ad44..d30cf356a412 100644
--- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c
+++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
@@ -9829,7 +9829,7 @@ static int nl80211_join_ibss(struct sk_buff *skb, struct
genl_info *info)
if ((ibss.chandef.width != NL80211_CHAN_WIDTH_20_NOHT) &&
no_ht) {
- kzfree(connkeys);
+ kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
@@ -9841,7 +9841,7 @@ static int nl80211_join_ibss(struct sk_buff *skb, struct
genl_info *info)
int r = validate_pae_over_nl80211(rdev, info);
if (r < 0) {
- kzfree(connkeys);
+ kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
return r;
}
@@ -9854,7 +9854,7 @@ static int nl80211_join_ibss(struct sk_buff *skb, struct
genl_info *info)
wdev_lock(dev->ieee80211_ptr);
err = __cfg80211_join_ibss(rdev, dev, &ibss, connkeys);
if (err)
- kzfree(connkeys);
+ kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
else if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SOCKET_OWNER])
dev->ieee80211_ptr->conn_owner_nlportid = info->snd_portid;
wdev_unlock(dev->ieee80211_ptr);
@@ -10282,7 +10282,7 @@ static int nl80211_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct
genl_info *info)
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_HT_CAPABILITY]) {
if (!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_HT_CAPABILITY_MASK]) {
- kzfree(connkeys);
+ kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(&connect.ht_capa,
@@ -10300,7 +10300,7 @@ static int nl80211_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct
genl_info *info)
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_VHT_CAPABILITY]) {
if (!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_VHT_CAPABILITY_MASK]) {
- kzfree(connkeys);
+ kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(&connect.vht_capa,
@@ -10314,7 +10314,7 @@ static int nl80211_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct
genl_info *info)
(rdev->wiphy.features & NL80211_FEATURE_QUIET)) &&
!wiphy_ext_feature_isset(&rdev->wiphy,
NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_RRM)) {
- kzfree(connkeys);
+ kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
return -EINVAL;
}
connect.flags |= ASSOC_REQ_USE_RRM;
@@ -10322,21 +10322,21 @@ static int nl80211_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct
genl_info *info)
connect.pbss = nla_get_flag(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_PBSS]);
if (connect.pbss && !rdev->wiphy.bands[NL80211_BAND_60GHZ]) {
- kzfree(connkeys);
+ kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_BSS_SELECT]) {
/* bss selection makes no sense if bssid is set */
if (connect.bssid) {
- kzfree(connkeys);
+ kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = parse_bss_select(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_BSS_SELECT],
wiphy, &connect.bss_select);
if (err) {
- kzfree(connkeys);
+ kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
return err;
}
}
@@ -10366,13 +10366,13 @@ static int nl80211_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct
genl_info *info)
info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_FILS_ERP_REALM] ||
info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_FILS_ERP_NEXT_SEQ_NUM] ||
info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_FILS_ERP_RRK]) {
- kzfree(connkeys);
+ kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (nla_get_flag(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_EXTERNAL_AUTH_SUPPORT])) {
if (!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SOCKET_OWNER]) {
- kzfree(connkeys);
+ kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
GENL_SET_ERR_MSG(info,
"external auth requires connection ownership");
return -EINVAL;
@@ -10385,7 +10385,7 @@ static int nl80211_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct
genl_info *info)
err = cfg80211_connect(rdev, dev, &connect, connkeys,
connect.prev_bssid);
if (err)
- kzfree(connkeys);
+ kfree_sensitive(connkeys);
if (!err && info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SOCKET_OWNER]) {
dev->ieee80211_ptr->conn_owner_nlportid = info->snd_portid;
diff --git a/net/wireless/sme.c b/net/wireless/sme.c
index 15595cf401de..985f3c23f054 100644
--- a/net/wireless/sme.c
+++ b/net/wireless/sme.c
@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ void __cfg80211_connect_result(struct net_device *dev,
}
if (cr->status != WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
- kzfree(wdev->connect_keys);
+ kfree_sensitive(wdev->connect_keys);
wdev->connect_keys = NULL;
wdev->ssid_len = 0;
wdev->conn_owner_nlportid = 0;
@@ -1098,7 +1098,7 @@ void __cfg80211_disconnected(struct net_device *dev, const
u8 *ie,
wdev->current_bss = NULL;
wdev->ssid_len = 0;
wdev->conn_owner_nlportid = 0;
- kzfree(wdev->connect_keys);
+ kfree_sensitive(wdev->connect_keys);
wdev->connect_keys = NULL;
nl80211_send_disconnected(rdev, dev, reason, ie, ie_len, from_ap);
@@ -1281,7 +1281,7 @@ int cfg80211_disconnect(struct cfg80211_registered_device
*rdev,
ASSERT_WDEV_LOCK(wdev);
- kzfree(wdev->connect_keys);
+ kfree_sensitive(wdev->connect_keys);
wdev->connect_keys = NULL;
wdev->conn_owner_nlportid = 0;
diff --git a/net/wireless/util.c b/net/wireless/util.c
index 4d3b76f94f55..29adb1010c18 100644
--- a/net/wireless/util.c
+++ b/net/wireless/util.c
@@ -863,7 +863,7 @@ void cfg80211_upload_connect_keys(struct wireless_dev *wdev)
}
}
- kzfree(wdev->connect_keys);
+ kfree_sensitive(wdev->connect_keys);
wdev->connect_keys = NULL;
}
diff --git a/net/wireless/wext-sme.c b/net/wireless/wext-sme.c
index 73fd0eae08ca..73df23570d43 100644
--- a/net/wireless/wext-sme.c
+++ b/net/wireless/wext-sme.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ int cfg80211_mgd_wext_connect(struct
cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
err = cfg80211_connect(rdev, wdev->netdev,
&wdev->wext.connect, ck, prev_bssid);
if (err)
- kzfree(ck);
+ kfree_sensitive(ck);
return err;
}
diff --git a/scripts/coccinelle/free/devm_free.cocci
b/scripts/coccinelle/free/devm_free.cocci
index 3357bf4dbd7c..da80050b91ff 100644
--- a/scripts/coccinelle/free/devm_free.cocci
+++ b/scripts/coccinelle/free/devm_free.cocci
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ position p;
(
kfree at p(x)
|
- kzfree at p(x)
+ kfree_sensitive at p(x)
|
krealloc at p(x, ...)
|
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ position p != safe.p;
(
* kfree at p(x)
|
-* kzfree at p(x)
+* kfree_sensitive at p(x)
|
* krealloc at p(x, ...)
|
diff --git a/scripts/coccinelle/free/ifnullfree.cocci
b/scripts/coccinelle/free/ifnullfree.cocci
index b3290c4ee239..2045391e36a0 100644
--- a/scripts/coccinelle/free/ifnullfree.cocci
+++ b/scripts/coccinelle/free/ifnullfree.cocci
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ expression E;
(
kfree(E);
|
- kzfree(E);
+ kfree_sensitive(E);
|
debugfs_remove(E);
|
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ position p;
@@
* if (E != NULL)
-* \(kfree at p\|kzfree at p\|debugfs_remove at p\|debugfs_remove_recursive at
p\|
+* \(kfree at p\|kfree_sensitive at p\|debugfs_remove at
p\|debugfs_remove_recursive at p\|
* usb_free_urb at p\|kmem_cache_destroy at p\|mempool_destroy at p\|
* dma_pool_destroy at p\)(E);
diff --git a/scripts/coccinelle/free/kfree.cocci
b/scripts/coccinelle/free/kfree.cocci
index e9d50e718e46..168568386034 100644
--- a/scripts/coccinelle/free/kfree.cocci
+++ b/scripts/coccinelle/free/kfree.cocci
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ position p1;
(
* kfree at p1(E)
|
-* kzfree at p1(E)
+* kfree_sensitive at p1(E)
)
@print expression@
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ while (1) { ...
(
* kfree at ok(E)
|
-* kzfree at ok(E)
+* kfree_sensitive at ok(E)
)
... when != break;
when != goto l;
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ position free.p1!=loop.ok,p2!={print.p,sz.p};
(
* kfree at p1(E,...)
|
-* kzfree at p1(E,...)
+* kfree_sensitive at p1(E,...)
)
...
(
diff --git a/scripts/coccinelle/free/kfreeaddr.cocci
b/scripts/coccinelle/free/kfreeaddr.cocci
index cfaf308328d8..142af6337a04 100644
--- a/scripts/coccinelle/free/kfreeaddr.cocci
+++ b/scripts/coccinelle/free/kfreeaddr.cocci
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ position p;
(
* kfree at p(&e->f)
|
-* kzfree at p(&e->f)
+* kfree_sensitive at p(&e->f)
)
@script:python depends on org@
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 1c898055a476..7b0e13ce7dc7 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain)
return;
for (i = 0; i < domain->size; i++)
- kzfree(domain->table[i]);
- kzfree(domain->table);
+ kfree_sensitive(domain->table[i]);
+ kfree_sensitive(domain->table);
domain->table = NULL;
}
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
index aff26fc71407..d4f8948517d9 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static inline void aa_free_file_ctx(struct aa_file_ctx *ctx)
{
if (ctx) {
aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label));
- kzfree(ctx);
+ kfree_sensitive(ctx);
}
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index af4f50fda9e3..4c010c9a6af1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -187,9 +187,9 @@ static void aa_free_data(void *ptr, void *arg)
{
struct aa_data *data = ptr;
- kzfree(data->data);
- kzfree(data->key);
- kzfree(data);
+ kfree_sensitive(data->data);
+ kfree_sensitive(data->key);
+ kfree_sensitive(data);
}
/**
@@ -217,19 +217,19 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
aa_put_profile(rcu_access_pointer(profile->parent));
aa_put_ns(profile->ns);
- kzfree(profile->rename);
+ kfree_sensitive(profile->rename);
aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file);
aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
for (i = 0; i < profile->xattr_count; i++)
- kzfree(profile->xattrs[i]);
- kzfree(profile->xattrs);
+ kfree_sensitive(profile->xattrs[i]);
+ kfree_sensitive(profile->xattrs);
for (i = 0; i < profile->secmark_count; i++)
- kzfree(profile->secmark[i].label);
- kzfree(profile->secmark);
- kzfree(profile->dirname);
+ kfree_sensitive(profile->secmark[i].label);
+ kfree_sensitive(profile->secmark);
+ kfree_sensitive(profile->dirname);
aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch);
aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
@@ -237,14 +237,14 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
rht = profile->data;
profile->data = NULL;
rhashtable_free_and_destroy(rht, aa_free_data, NULL);
- kzfree(rht);
+ kfree_sensitive(rht);
}
- kzfree(profile->hash);
+ kfree_sensitive(profile->hash);
aa_put_loaddata(profile->rawdata);
aa_label_destroy(&profile->label);
- kzfree(profile);
+ kfree_sensitive(profile);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
index d7ef540027a5..70921d95fb40 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
@@ -121,9 +121,9 @@ static struct aa_ns *alloc_ns(const char *prefix, const char
*name)
return ns;
fail_unconfined:
- kzfree(ns->base.hname);
+ kfree_sensitive(ns->base.hname);
fail_ns:
- kzfree(ns);
+ kfree_sensitive(ns);
return NULL;
}
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ void aa_free_ns(struct aa_ns *ns)
ns->unconfined->ns = NULL;
aa_free_profile(ns->unconfined);
- kzfree(ns);
+ kfree_sensitive(ns);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index b67322abcc33..dc345ac93205 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -163,10 +163,10 @@ static void do_loaddata_free(struct work_struct *work)
aa_put_ns(ns);
}
- kzfree(d->hash);
- kzfree(d->name);
+ kfree_sensitive(d->hash);
+ kfree_sensitive(d->name);
kvfree(d->data);
- kzfree(d);
+ kfree_sensitive(d);
}
void aa_loaddata_kref(struct kref *kref)
@@ -894,7 +894,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e,
char **ns_name)
while (unpack_strdup(e, &key, NULL)) {
data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data) {
- kzfree(key);
+ kfree_sensitive(key);
goto fail;
}
@@ -902,8 +902,8 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e,
char **ns_name)
data->size = unpack_blob(e, &data->data, NULL);
data->data = kvmemdup(data->data, data->size);
if (data->size && !data->data) {
- kzfree(data->key);
- kzfree(data);
+ kfree_sensitive(data->key);
+ kfree_sensitive(data);
goto fail;
}
@@ -1037,7 +1037,7 @@ void aa_load_ent_free(struct aa_load_ent *ent)
aa_put_profile(ent->old);
aa_put_profile(ent->new);
kfree(ent->ns_name);
- kzfree(ent);
+ kfree_sensitive(ent);
}
}
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index dd708e8f13c0..691347dea3c1 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
err_fput:
fput(file);
err_enckey:
- kzfree(enckey);
+ kfree_sensitive(enckey);
error:
memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
kvfree(buf);
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload
*prep)
path_put(path);
}
- kzfree(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]);
+ kfree_sensitive(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]);
}
/*
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ void big_key_destroy(struct key *key)
path->mnt = NULL;
path->dentry = NULL;
}
- kzfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]);
+ kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[big_key_data]);
key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/dh.c b/security/keys/dh.c
index c4c629bb1c03..1abfa70ed6e1 100644
--- a/security/keys/dh.c
+++ b/security/keys/dh.c
@@ -58,9 +58,9 @@ static ssize_t dh_data_from_key(key_serial_t keyid, void
**data)
static void dh_free_data(struct dh *dh)
{
- kzfree(dh->key);
- kzfree(dh->p);
- kzfree(dh->g);
+ kfree_sensitive(dh->key);
+ kfree_sensitive(dh->p);
+ kfree_sensitive(dh->g);
}
struct dh_completion {
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static void kdf_dealloc(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc)
if (sdesc->shash.tfm)
crypto_free_shash(sdesc->shash.tfm);
- kzfree(sdesc);
+ kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
}
/*
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc,
ret = -EFAULT;
err:
- kzfree(outbuf);
+ kfree_sensitive(outbuf);
return ret;
}
@@ -395,11 +395,11 @@ long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user
*params,
out6:
kpp_request_free(req);
out5:
- kzfree(outbuf);
+ kfree_sensitive(outbuf);
out4:
crypto_free_kpp(tfm);
out3:
- kzfree(secret);
+ kfree_sensitive(secret);
out2:
dh_free_data(&dh_inputs);
out1:
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 14cf81d1a30b..deebbf14eeca 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, enum
derived_key_type key_type,
master_keylen);
ret = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(hash_tfm, derived_buf, derived_buf_len,
derived_key);
- kzfree(derived_buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(derived_buf);
return ret;
}
@@ -812,13 +812,13 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key,
ret = encrypted_init(epayload, key->description, format, master_desc,
decrypted_datalen, hex_encoded_iv);
if (ret < 0) {
- kzfree(epayload);
+ kfree_sensitive(epayload);
goto out;
}
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, epayload);
out:
- kzfree(datablob);
+ kfree_sensitive(datablob);
return ret;
}
@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ static void encrypted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload;
epayload = container_of(rcu, struct encrypted_key_payload, rcu);
- kzfree(epayload);
+ kfree_sensitive(epayload);
}
/*
@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct
key_preparsed_payload *prep)
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_epayload);
call_rcu(&epayload->rcu, encrypted_rcu_free);
out:
- kzfree(buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(buf);
return ret;
}
@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char
*buffer,
memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
memcpy(buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len);
- kzfree(ascii_buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(ascii_buf);
return asciiblob_len;
out:
@@ -961,7 +961,7 @@ static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char
*buffer,
*/
static void encrypted_destroy(struct key *key)
{
- kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);
+ kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[0]);
}
struct key_type key_type_encrypted = {
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index 8001ab07e63b..b9fe02e5f84f 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int
datalen,
}
ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest);
- kzfree(sdesc);
+ kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned
char *key,
if (!ret)
ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest);
out:
- kzfree(sdesc);
+ kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char
*key,
paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1,
TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0);
out:
- kzfree(sdesc);
+ kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_authhmac);
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
ret = -EINVAL;
out:
- kzfree(sdesc);
+ kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_checkhmac1);
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
ret = -EINVAL;
out:
- kzfree(sdesc);
+ kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
return ret;
}
@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
*bloblen = storedsize;
}
out:
- kzfree(td);
+ kfree_sensitive(td);
return ret;
}
@@ -1031,12 +1031,12 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
if (!ret && options->pcrlock)
ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
out:
- kzfree(datablob);
- kzfree(options);
+ kfree_sensitive(datablob);
+ kfree_sensitive(options);
if (!ret)
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);
else
- kzfree(payload);
+ kfree_sensitive(payload);
return ret;
}
@@ -1045,7 +1045,7 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
struct trusted_key_payload *p;
p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);
- kzfree(p);
+ kfree_sensitive(p);
}
/*
@@ -1087,13 +1087,13 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct
key_preparsed_payload *prep)
ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o);
if (ret != Opt_update) {
ret = -EINVAL;
- kzfree(new_p);
+ kfree_sensitive(new_p);
goto out;
}
if (!new_o->keyhandle) {
ret = -EINVAL;
- kzfree(new_p);
+ kfree_sensitive(new_p);
goto out;
}
@@ -1107,22 +1107,22 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct
key_preparsed_payload *prep)
ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
- kzfree(new_p);
+ kfree_sensitive(new_p);
goto out;
}
if (new_o->pcrlock) {
ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
- kzfree(new_p);
+ kfree_sensitive(new_p);
goto out;
}
}
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p);
call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
out:
- kzfree(datablob);
- kzfree(new_o);
+ kfree_sensitive(datablob);
+ kfree_sensitive(new_o);
return ret;
}
@@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char
*buffer,
*/
static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
{
- kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);
+ kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[0]);
}
struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index 07d4287e9084..749e2a4dcb13 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_preparse);
*/
void user_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- kzfree(prep->payload.data[0]);
+ kfree_sensitive(prep->payload.data[0]);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_free_preparse);
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static void user_free_payload_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
struct user_key_payload *payload;
payload = container_of(head, struct user_key_payload, rcu);
- kzfree(payload);
+ kfree_sensitive(payload);
}
/*
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ void user_destroy(struct key *key)
{
struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data[0];
- kzfree(upayload);
+ kfree_sensitive(upayload);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_destroy);
--
2.18.1
Waiman Long
2020-Jun-16 01:57 UTC
[PATCH v4 3/3] btrfs: Use kfree() in btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info()
In btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(), there is a classic case where kzalloc() was incorrectly paired with kzfree(). According to David Sterba, there isn't any sensitive information in the subvol_info that needs to be cleared before freeing. So kfree_sensitive() isn't really needed, use kfree() instead. Reported-by: David Sterba <dsterba at suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman at redhat.com> --- fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c index f1dd9e4271e9..e8f7c5f00894 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c @@ -2692,7 +2692,7 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct file *file, void __user *argp) btrfs_put_root(root); out_free: btrfs_free_path(path); - kfree_sensitive(subvol_info); + kfree(subvol_info); return ret; } -- 2.18.1
Michal Hocko
2020-Jun-16 06:42 UTC
[PATCH v4 1/3] mm/slab: Use memzero_explicit() in kzfree()
On Mon 15-06-20 21:57:16, Waiman Long wrote:> The kzfree() function is normally used to clear some sensitive > information, like encryption keys, in the buffer before freeing it back > to the pool. Memset() is currently used for the buffer clearing. However, > it is entirely possible that the compiler may choose to optimize away the > memory clearing especially if LTO is being used. To make sure that this > optimization will not happen, memzero_explicit(), which is introduced > in v3.18, is now used in kzfree() to do the clearing. > > Fixes: 3ef0e5ba4673 ("slab: introduce kzfree()") > Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman at redhat.com>Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko at suse.com> Although I am not really sure this is a stable material. Is there any known instance where the memset was optimized out from kzfree?> --- > mm/slab_common.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c > index 9e72ba224175..37d48a56431d 100644 > --- a/mm/slab_common.c > +++ b/mm/slab_common.c > @@ -1726,7 +1726,7 @@ void kzfree(const void *p) > if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(mem))) > return; > ks = ksize(mem); > - memset(mem, 0, ks); > + memzero_explicit(mem, ks); > kfree(mem); > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(kzfree); > -- > 2.18.1 >-- Michal Hocko SUSE Labs
Waiman Long
2020-Jun-16 13:05 UTC
[PATCH v4 1/3] mm/slab: Use memzero_explicit() in kzfree()
On 6/15/20 11:30 PM, Eric Biggers wrote:> On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 09:57:16PM -0400, Waiman Long wrote: >> The kzfree() function is normally used to clear some sensitive >> information, like encryption keys, in the buffer before freeing it back >> to the pool. Memset() is currently used for the buffer clearing. However, >> it is entirely possible that the compiler may choose to optimize away the >> memory clearing especially if LTO is being used. To make sure that this >> optimization will not happen, memzero_explicit(), which is introduced >> in v3.18, is now used in kzfree() to do the clearing. >> >> Fixes: 3ef0e5ba4673 ("slab: introduce kzfree()") >> Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org >> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman at redhat.com> >> --- >> mm/slab_common.c | 2 +- >> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) >> >> diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c >> index 9e72ba224175..37d48a56431d 100644 >> --- a/mm/slab_common.c >> +++ b/mm/slab_common.c >> @@ -1726,7 +1726,7 @@ void kzfree(const void *p) >> if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(mem))) >> return; >> ks = ksize(mem); >> - memset(mem, 0, ks); >> + memzero_explicit(mem, ks); >> kfree(mem); >> } >> EXPORT_SYMBOL(kzfree); > This is a good change, but the commit message isn't really accurate. AFAIK, no > one has found any case where this memset() gets optimized out. And even with > LTO, it would be virtually impossible due to all the synchronization and global > data structures that kfree() uses. (Remember that this isn't the C standard > function "free()", so the compiler can't assign it any special meaning.) > Not to mention that LTO support isn't actually upstream yet. > > I still agree with the change, but it might be helpful if the commit message > were honest that this is really a hardening measure and about properly conveying > the intent. As-is this sounds like a critical fix, which might confuse people.Yes, I agree that the commit log may look a bit scary. How about the following: The kzfree() function is normally used to clear some sensitive information, like encryption keys, in the buffer before freeing it back to the pool. Memset() is currently used for buffer clearing. However unlikely, there is still a non-zero probability that the compiler may choose to optimize away the memory clearing especially if LTO is being used in the future. To make sure that this optimization will never happen, memzero_explicit(), which is introduced in v3.18, is now used in kzfree() to future-proof it. Cheers, Longman
Dan Carpenter
2020-Jun-16 14:26 UTC
[PATCH v4 2/3] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
Last time you sent this we couldn't decide which tree it should go through. Either the crypto tree or through Andrew seems like the right thing to me. Also the other issue is that it risks breaking things if people add new kzfree() instances while we are doing the transition. Could you just add a "#define kzfree kfree_sensitive" so that things continue to compile and we can remove it in the next kernel release? regards, dan carpenter
David Sterba
2020-Jun-16 14:48 UTC
[PATCH v4 3/3] btrfs: Use kfree() in btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info()
On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 09:57:18PM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:> In btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(), there is a classic case where kzalloc() > was incorrectly paired with kzfree(). According to David Sterba, there > isn't any sensitive information in the subvol_info that needs to be > cleared before freeing. So kfree_sensitive() isn't really needed, > use kfree() instead. > > Reported-by: David Sterba <dsterba at suse.cz> > Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman at redhat.com> > --- > fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c > index f1dd9e4271e9..e8f7c5f00894 100644 > --- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c > +++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c > @@ -2692,7 +2692,7 @@ static int btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_info(struct file *file, void __user *argp) > btrfs_put_root(root); > out_free: > btrfs_free_path(path); > - kfree_sensitive(subvol_info); > + kfree(subvol_info);I would rather merge a patch doing to kzfree -> kfree instead of doing the middle step to switch it to kfree_sensitive. If it would help integration of your patchset I can push it to the next rc so there are no kzfree left in the btrfs code. Treewide change like that can take time so it would be one less problem to care about for you.
David Howells
2020-Jun-16 15:46 UTC
[PATCH v4 1/3] mm/slab: Use memzero_explicit() in kzfree()
Waiman Long <longman at redhat.com> wrote:> The kzfree() function is normally used to clear some sensitive > information, like encryption keys, in the buffer before freeing it back > to the pool. Memset()"memset()" is all lowercase.> is currently used for buffer clearing. However unlikely, there is still a > non-zero probabilityI'd say "a possibility".> thatand I'd move "in [the] future" here.> the compiler may choose to optimize away the > memory clearing especially if LTO is being used in the future. To make sure > that this optimization will never happen"in these cases"> , memzero_explicit(), which is introduced in v3.18, is now used in"instead of"?> kzfree() to future-proof it.Davod
Joe Perches
2020-Jun-16 18:53 UTC
[PATCH v4 0/3] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
On Mon, 2020-06-15 at 21:57 -0400, Waiman Long wrote:> v4: > - Break out the memzero_explicit() change as suggested by Dan Carpenter > so that it can be backported to stable. > - Drop the "crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit()" patch for > now as there can be a bit more discussion on what is best. It will be > introduced as a separate patch later on after this one is merged.To this larger audience and last week without reply: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/573b3fbd5927c643920e1364230c296b23e7584d.camel at perches.com/ Are there _any_ fastpath uses of kfree or vfree? Many patches have been posted recently to fix mispairings of specific types of alloc and free functions. To eliminate these mispairings at a runtime cost of four comparisons, should the kfree/vfree/kvfree/kfree_const functions be consolidated into a single kfree? Something like the below: void kfree(const void *addr) { if (is_kernel_rodata((unsigned long)addr)) return; if (is_vmalloc_addr(addr)) _vfree(addr); else _kfree(addr); } #define kvfree kfree #define vfree kfree #define kfree_const kfree
Waiman Long
2020-Jun-16 19:43 UTC
[PATCH v4 0/3] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
On 6/16/20 2:53 PM, Joe Perches wrote:> On Mon, 2020-06-15 at 21:57 -0400, Waiman Long wrote: >> v4: >> - Break out the memzero_explicit() change as suggested by Dan Carpenter >> so that it can be backported to stable. >> - Drop the "crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit()" patch for >> now as there can be a bit more discussion on what is best. It will be >> introduced as a separate patch later on after this one is merged. > To this larger audience and last week without reply: > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/573b3fbd5927c643920e1364230c296b23e7584d.camel at perches.com/ > > Are there _any_ fastpath uses of kfree or vfree?I am not sure about that, but both of them can be slow.> > Many patches have been posted recently to fix mispairings > of specific types of alloc and free functions. > > To eliminate these mispairings at a runtime cost of four > comparisons, should the kfree/vfree/kvfree/kfree_const > functions be consolidated into a single kfree? > > Something like the below: > > void kfree(const void *addr) > { > if (is_kernel_rodata((unsigned long)addr)) > return; > > if (is_vmalloc_addr(addr)) > _vfree(addr); > else > _kfree(addr); > } >is_kernel_rodata() is inlined, but is_vmalloc_addr() isn't. So the overhead can be a bit bigger. Cheers, Longman
Waiman Long
2020-Jun-16 20:01 UTC
[PATCH v4 0/3] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
On 6/16/20 2:53 PM, Joe Perches wrote:> On Mon, 2020-06-15 at 21:57 -0400, Waiman Long wrote: >> v4: >> - Break out the memzero_explicit() change as suggested by Dan Carpenter >> so that it can be backported to stable. >> - Drop the "crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit()" patch for >> now as there can be a bit more discussion on what is best. It will be >> introduced as a separate patch later on after this one is merged. > To this larger audience and last week without reply: > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/573b3fbd5927c643920e1364230c296b23e7584d.camel at perches.com/ > > Are there _any_ fastpath uses of kfree or vfree? > > Many patches have been posted recently to fix mispairings > of specific types of alloc and free functions. > > To eliminate these mispairings at a runtime cost of four > comparisons, should the kfree/vfree/kvfree/kfree_const > functions be consolidated into a single kfree? > > Something like the below: > > void kfree(const void *addr) > { > if (is_kernel_rodata((unsigned long)addr)) > return; > > if (is_vmalloc_addr(addr)) > _vfree(addr); > else > _kfree(addr); > } > > #define kvfree kfree > #define vfree kfree > #define kfree_const kfree > >How about adding CONFIG_DEBUG_VM code to check for invalid address ranges in kfree() and vfree()? By doing this, we can catch unmatched pairing in debug mode, but won't have the overhead when debug mode is off. Thought? Cheers, Longman
Matthew Wilcox
2020-Jun-16 21:14 UTC
[PATCH v4 0/3] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
On Tue, Jun 16, 2020 at 11:53:50AM -0700, Joe Perches wrote:> To this larger audience and last week without reply: > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/573b3fbd5927c643920e1364230c296b23e7584d.camel at perches.com/ > > Are there _any_ fastpath uses of kfree or vfree?I worked on adding a 'free' a couple of years ago. That was capable of freeing percpu, vmalloc, kmalloc and alloc_pages memory. I ran into trouble when I tried to free kmem_cache_alloc memory -- it works for slab and slub, but not slob (because slob needs the size from the kmem_cache). My motivation for this was to change kfree_rcu() to just free_rcu().> To eliminate these mispairings at a runtime cost of four > comparisons, should the kfree/vfree/kvfree/kfree_const > functions be consolidated into a single kfree?I would say to leave kfree() alone and just introduce free() as a new default. There's some weird places in the kernel that have a 'free' symbol of their own, but those should be renamed anyway.
David Sterba
2020-Jun-16 23:01 UTC
[PATCH v4 0/3] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
On Tue, Jun 16, 2020 at 11:53:50AM -0700, Joe Perches wrote:> On Mon, 2020-06-15 at 21:57 -0400, Waiman Long wrote: > > v4: > > - Break out the memzero_explicit() change as suggested by Dan Carpenter > > so that it can be backported to stable. > > - Drop the "crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit()" patch for > > now as there can be a bit more discussion on what is best. It will be > > introduced as a separate patch later on after this one is merged. > > To this larger audience and last week without reply: > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/573b3fbd5927c643920e1364230c296b23e7584d.camel at perches.com/ > > Are there _any_ fastpath uses of kfree or vfree?I'd consider kfree performance critical for cases where it is called under locks. If possible the kfree is moved outside of the critical section, but we have rbtrees or lists that get deleted under locks and restructuring the code to do eg. splice and free it outside of the lock is not always possible.
Joe Perches
2020-Jun-17 23:12 UTC
[PATCH v4 0/3] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
On Thu, 2020-06-18 at 00:31 +0300, Denis Efremov wrote:> > On 6/16/20 9:53 PM, Joe Perches wrote: > > On Mon, 2020-06-15 at 21:57 -0400, Waiman Long wrote: > > > v4: > > > - Break out the memzero_explicit() change as suggested by Dan Carpenter > > > so that it can be backported to stable. > > > - Drop the "crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit()" patch for > > > now as there can be a bit more discussion on what is best. It will be > > > introduced as a separate patch later on after this one is merged. > > > > To this larger audience and last week without reply: > > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/573b3fbd5927c643920e1364230c296b23e7584d.camel at perches.com/ > > > > Are there _any_ fastpath uses of kfree or vfree? > > > > Many patches have been posted recently to fix mispairings > > of specific types of alloc and free functions. > > I've prepared a coccinelle script to highlight these mispairings in a function > a couple of days ago: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/6/5/953 > I've listed all the fixes in the commit message. > > Not so many mispairings actually, and most of them are harmless like: > kmalloc(E) -> kvfree(E) > > However, coccinelle script can't detect cross-functions mispairings, i.e. > allocation in one function, free in another funtion.Hey Denis, thanks for those patches. If possible, it's probably better to not require these pairings and use a single standard kfree/free function. Given the existing ifs in kfree in slab/slob/slub, it seems likely that adding a few more wouldn't have much impact.
Maybe Matching Threads
- [PATCH 0/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
- [PATCH v4 0/3] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
- [PATCH v5 0/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
- [PATCH v4 2/3] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
- [PATCH v5 2/2] mm, treewide: Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()