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Ram Pai

2019-Oct-12 01:25 UTC

[PATCH 0/2] virtio: Support encrypted memory on powerpc secure guests

**We would like the patches to be merged through the virtio tree.  Please
 review, and ack merging the DMA mapping change through that tree. Thanks!**

 The memory of powerpc secure guests can't be accessed by the hypervisor /
 virtio device except for a few memory regions designated as 'shared'.
 
 At the moment, Linux uses bounce-buffering to communicate with the
 hypervisor, with a bounce buffer marked as shared. This is how the DMA API
 is implemented on this platform.
 
 In particular, the most convenient way to use virtio on this platform is by
 making virtio use the DMA API: in fact, this is exactly what happens if the
 virtio device exposes the flag VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.  However, bugs in the
 hypervisor on the powerpc platform do not allow setting this flag, with some
 hypervisors already in the field that don't set this flag. At the moment
they
 are forced to use emulated devices when guest is in secure mode; virtio is
 only useful when guest is not secure.
 
 Normally, both device and driver must support VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM:
 if one of them doesn't, the other mustn't assume it for communication
 to work.
 
 However, a guest-side work-around is possible to enable virtio
 for these hypervisors with guest in secure mode: it so happens that on
 powerpc secure platform the DMA address is actually a physical address -
 that of the bounce buffer. For these platforms we can make the virtio
 driver go through the DMA API even though the device itself ignores
 the DMA API.
 
 These patches implement this work around for virtio: we detect that
 - secure guest mode is enabled - so we know that since we don't share
   most memory and Hypervisor has not enabled VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM,
   regular virtio code won't work.
 - DMA API is giving us addresses that are actually also physical
   addresses.
 - Hypervisor has not enabled VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.
 
 and if all conditions are true, we force all data through the bounce
 buffer.
 
 To put it another way, from hypervisor's point of view DMA API is
 not required: hypervisor would be happy to get access to all of guest
 memory. That's why it does not set VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM. However,
 guest decides that it does not trust the hypervisor and wants to force
 a bounce buffer for its own reasons.


Thiago Jung Bauermann (2):
  dma-mapping: Add dma_addr_is_phys_addr()
  virtio_ring: Use DMA API if memory is encrypted

 arch/powerpc/include/asm/dma-mapping.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig |  1 +
 drivers/virtio/virtio.c                | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c           |  8 ++++++++
 include/linux/dma-mapping.h            | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/virtio_config.h          | 14 ++++++++++++++
 kernel/dma/Kconfig                     |  3 +++
 7 files changed, 85 insertions(+)

-- 
1.8.3.1

Ram Pai

2019-Oct-12 01:25 UTC

head link

[PATCH 1/2] dma-mapping: Add dma_addr_is_phys_addr()

From: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>

In order to safely use the DMA API, virtio needs to know whether DMA
addresses are in fact physical addresses and for that purpose,
dma_addr_is_phys_addr() is introduced.

cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh at kernel.crashing.org>
cc: David Gibson <david at gibson.dropbear.id.au>
cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe at ellerman.id.au>
cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus at ozlabs.org>
cc: Michael Roth <mdroth at linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik at linux.ibm.com>
cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton at mips.com>
cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy at arm.com>
cc: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie at samsung.com>
cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski at samsung.com>
cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch at lst.de>
Suggested-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/dma-mapping.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig |  1 +
 include/linux/dma-mapping.h            | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/dma/Kconfig                     |  3 +++
 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/dma-mapping.h
b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/dma-mapping.h
index 565d6f7..f92c0a4b 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/dma-mapping.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/dma-mapping.h
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_DMA_MAPPING_H
 #define _ASM_DMA_MAPPING_H
 
+#include <asm/svm.h>
+
 static inline const struct dma_map_ops *get_arch_dma_ops(struct bus_type *bus)
 {
 	/* We don't handle the NULL dev case for ISA for now. We could
@@ -15,4 +17,23 @@ static inline const struct dma_map_ops
*get_arch_dma_ops(struct bus_type *bus)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_DMA_ADDR_IS_PHYS_ADDR
+/**
+ * dma_addr_is_phys_addr - check whether a device DMA address is a physical
+ *		address
+ * @dev:	device to check
+ *
+ * Returns %true if any DMA address for this device happens to also be a valid
+ * physical address (not necessarily of the same page).
+ */
+static inline bool dma_addr_is_phys_addr(struct device *dev)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Secure guests always use the SWIOTLB, therefore DMA addresses are
+	 * actually the physical address of the bounce buffer.
+	 */
+	return is_secure_guest();
+}
+#endif
+
 #endif	/* _ASM_DMA_MAPPING_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig
b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig
index 9e35cdd..0108150 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig
@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ config PPC_SVM
 	select SWIOTLB
 	select ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
+	select ARCH_HAS_DMA_ADDR_IS_PHYS_ADDR
 	help
 	 There are certain POWER platforms which support secure guests using
 	 the Protected Execution Facility, with the help of an Ultravisor
diff --git a/include/linux/dma-mapping.h b/include/linux/dma-mapping.h
index f7d1eea..6df5664 100644
--- a/include/linux/dma-mapping.h
+++ b/include/linux/dma-mapping.h
@@ -693,6 +693,26 @@ static inline bool dma_addressing_limited(struct device
*dev)
 			    dma_get_required_mask(dev);
 }
 
+#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_DMA_ADDR_IS_PHYS_ADDR
+/**
+ * dma_addr_is_phys_addr - check whether a device DMA address is a physical
+ *		address
+ * @dev:	device to check
+ *
+ * Returns %true if any DMA address for this device happens to also be a valid
+ * physical address (not necessarily of the same page).
+ */
+static inline bool dma_addr_is_phys_addr(struct device *dev)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Except in very specific setups, DMA addresses exist in a different
+	 * address space from CPU physical addresses and cannot be directly used
+	 * to reference system memory.
+	 */
+	return false;
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SETUP_DMA_OPS
 void arch_setup_dma_ops(struct device *dev, u64 dma_base, u64 size,
 		const struct iommu_ops *iommu, bool coherent);
diff --git a/kernel/dma/Kconfig b/kernel/dma/Kconfig
index 9decbba..6209b46 100644
--- a/kernel/dma/Kconfig
+++ b/kernel/dma/Kconfig
@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ config ARCH_HAS_DMA_MMAP_PGPROT
 config ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
 	bool
 
+config ARCH_HAS_DMA_ADDR_IS_PHYS_ADDR
+	bool
+
 config DMA_NONCOHERENT_CACHE_SYNC
 	bool
 
-- 
1.8.3.1

Ram Pai

2019-Oct-12 01:25 UTC

head link

[PATCH 2/2] virtio_ring: Use DMA API if memory is encrypted

From: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>

Normally, virtio enables DMA API with VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM, which must
be set by both device and guest driver. However, as a hack, when DMA API
returns physical addresses, guest driver can use the DMA API; even though
device does not set VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM and just uses physical
addresses.

Doing this works-around POWER secure guests for which only the bounce
buffer is accessible to the device, but which don't set
VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM due to a set of hypervisor and architectural bugs.
To guard against platform changes, breaking any of these assumptions down
the road, we check at probe time and fail if that's not the case.

cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh at kernel.crashing.org>
cc: David Gibson <david at gibson.dropbear.id.au>
cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe at ellerman.id.au>
cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus at ozlabs.org>
cc: Michael Roth <mdroth at linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik at linux.ibm.com>
cc: Jason Wang <jasowang at redhat.com>
cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch at lst.de>
Suggested-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
---
 drivers/virtio/virtio.c       | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c  |  8 ++++++++
 include/linux/virtio_config.h | 14 ++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio.c
index a977e32..77a3baf 100644
--- a/drivers/virtio/virtio.c
+++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 #include <linux/virtio_config.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/idr.h>
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/virtio_ids.h>
 
 /* Unique numbering for virtio devices. */
@@ -245,6 +246,23 @@ static int virtio_dev_probe(struct device *_d)
 	if (err)
 		goto err;
 
+	/*
+	 * If memory is encrypted, but VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM is not set, then
+	 * the device is broken: DMA API is required for these platforms, but
+	 * the only way using the DMA API is going to work at all is if the
+	 * device is ready for it. So we need a flag on the virtio device,
+	 * exposed by the hypervisor (or hardware for hw virtio devices) that
+	 * says: hey, I'm real, don't take a shortcut.
+	 *
+	 * There's one exception where guest can make things work, and that is
+	 * when DMA API is guaranteed to always return physical addresses.
+	 */
+	if (mem_encrypt_active() && !virtio_can_use_dma_api(dev)) {
+		dev_err(_d, "virtio: device unable to access encrypted memory\n");
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
 	err = drv->probe(dev);
 	if (err)
 		goto err;
diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c
index c8be1c4..9c56b61 100644
--- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c
+++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c
@@ -255,6 +255,14 @@ static bool vring_use_dma_api(struct virtio_device *vdev)
 	if (xen_domain())
 		return true;
 
+	/*
+	 * Also, if guest memory is encrypted the host can't access it
+	 * directly. We need to either use an IOMMU or do bounce buffering.
+	 * Both are done via the DMA API.
+	 */
+	if (mem_encrypt_active() && virtio_can_use_dma_api(vdev))
+		return true;
+
 	return false;
 }
 
diff --git a/include/linux/virtio_config.h b/include/linux/virtio_config.h
index bb4cc49..57bc25c 100644
--- a/include/linux/virtio_config.h
+++ b/include/linux/virtio_config.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
 #include <linux/virtio.h>
 #include <linux/virtio_byteorder.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/virtio_config.h>
@@ -174,6 +175,19 @@ static inline bool virtio_has_iommu_quirk(const struct
virtio_device *vdev)
 	return !virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM);
 }
 
+/**
+ * virtio_can_use_dma_api - determine whether the DMA API can be used
+ * @vdev: the device
+ *
+ * The DMA API can be used either when the device doesn't have the IOMMU
quirk,
+ * or when the DMA API is guaranteed to always return physical addresses.
+ */
+static inline bool virtio_can_use_dma_api(const struct virtio_device *vdev)
+{
+	return !virtio_has_iommu_quirk(vdev) ||
+	       dma_addr_is_phys_addr(vdev->dev.parent);
+}
+
 static inline
 struct virtqueue *virtio_find_single_vq(struct virtio_device *vdev,
 					vq_callback_t *c, const char *n)
-- 
1.8.3.1

Ram Pai

2019-Oct-12 01:36 UTC

head link

[PATCH 0/2] virtio: Support encrypted memory on powerpc secure guests

Hmm.. git-send-email forgot to CC  Michael Tsirkin, and Thiago; the
original author, who is on vacation.

Adding them now.
RP

On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 06:25:17PM -0700, Ram Pai wrote:>  **We would like the patches to be merged through the virtio tree.  Please
>  review, and ack merging the DMA mapping change through that tree.
Thanks!**
> 
>  The memory of powerpc secure guests can't be accessed by the
hypervisor /
>  virtio device except for a few memory regions designated as
'shared'.
> 
>  At the moment, Linux uses bounce-buffering to communicate with the
>  hypervisor, with a bounce buffer marked as shared. This is how the DMA API
>  is implemented on this platform.
> 
>  In particular, the most convenient way to use virtio on this platform is
by
>  making virtio use the DMA API: in fact, this is exactly what happens if
the
>  virtio device exposes the flag VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.  However, bugs in
the
>  hypervisor on the powerpc platform do not allow setting this flag, with
some
>  hypervisors already in the field that don't set this flag. At the
moment they
>  are forced to use emulated devices when guest is in secure mode; virtio is
>  only useful when guest is not secure.
> 
>  Normally, both device and driver must support VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM:
>  if one of them doesn't, the other mustn't assume it for
communication
>  to work.
> 
>  However, a guest-side work-around is possible to enable virtio
>  for these hypervisors with guest in secure mode: it so happens that on
>  powerpc secure platform the DMA address is actually a physical address -
>  that of the bounce buffer. For these platforms we can make the virtio
>  driver go through the DMA API even though the device itself ignores
>  the DMA API.
> 
>  These patches implement this work around for virtio: we detect that
>  - secure guest mode is enabled - so we know that since we don't share
>    most memory and Hypervisor has not enabled VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM,
>    regular virtio code won't work.
>  - DMA API is giving us addresses that are actually also physical
>    addresses.
>  - Hypervisor has not enabled VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.
> 
>  and if all conditions are true, we force all data through the bounce
>  buffer.
> 
>  To put it another way, from hypervisor's point of view DMA API is
>  not required: hypervisor would be happy to get access to all of guest
>  memory. That's why it does not set VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM. However,
>  guest decides that it does not trust the hypervisor and wants to force
>  a bounce buffer for its own reasons.
> 
> 
> Thiago Jung Bauermann (2):
>   dma-mapping: Add dma_addr_is_phys_addr()
>   virtio_ring: Use DMA API if memory is encrypted
> 
>  arch/powerpc/include/asm/dma-mapping.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig |  1 +
>  drivers/virtio/virtio.c                | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
>  drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c           |  8 ++++++++
>  include/linux/dma-mapping.h            | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/virtio_config.h          | 14 ++++++++++++++
>  kernel/dma/Kconfig                     |  3 +++
>  7 files changed, 85 insertions(+)
> 
> -- 
> 1.8.3.1
-- 
Ram Pai

David Gibson

2019-Oct-14 04:51 UTC

head link

[PATCH 1/2] dma-mapping: Add dma_addr_is_phys_addr()

On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 06:25:18PM -0700, Ram Pai wrote:> From: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
> 
> In order to safely use the DMA API, virtio needs to know whether DMA
> addresses are in fact physical addresses and for that purpose,
> dma_addr_is_phys_addr() is introduced.
> 
> cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh at kernel.crashing.org>
> cc: David Gibson <david at gibson.dropbear.id.au>
> cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe at ellerman.id.au>
> cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus at ozlabs.org>
> cc: Michael Roth <mdroth at linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik at linux.ibm.com>
> cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton at mips.com>
> cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy at arm.com>
> cc: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie at samsung.com>
> cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski at samsung.com>
> cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch at lst.de>
> Suggested-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst at redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram at us.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com>
The change itself looks ok, so

Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david at gibson.dropbear.id.au>

However, I would like to see the commit message (and maybe the inline
comments) expanded a bit on what the distinction here is about.  Some
of the text from the next patch would be suitable, about DMA addresses
usually being in a different address space but not in the case of
bounce buffering.
> ---
>  arch/powerpc/include/asm/dma-mapping.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig |  1 +
>  include/linux/dma-mapping.h            | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
>  kernel/dma/Kconfig                     |  3 +++
>  4 files changed, 45 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/dma-mapping.h
b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/dma-mapping.h
> index 565d6f7..f92c0a4b 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/dma-mapping.h
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/dma-mapping.h
> @@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
>  #ifndef _ASM_DMA_MAPPING_H
>  #define _ASM_DMA_MAPPING_H
>  
> +#include <asm/svm.h>
> +
>  static inline const struct dma_map_ops *get_arch_dma_ops(struct bus_type
*bus)
>  {
>  	/* We don't handle the NULL dev case for ISA for now. We could
> @@ -15,4 +17,23 @@ static inline const struct dma_map_ops
*get_arch_dma_ops(struct bus_type *bus)
>  	return NULL;
>  }
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_DMA_ADDR_IS_PHYS_ADDR
> +/**
> + * dma_addr_is_phys_addr - check whether a device DMA address is a
physical
> + *		address
> + * @dev:	device to check
> + *
> + * Returns %true if any DMA address for this device happens to also be a
valid
> + * physical address (not necessarily of the same page).
> + */
> +static inline bool dma_addr_is_phys_addr(struct device *dev)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * Secure guests always use the SWIOTLB, therefore DMA addresses are
> +	 * actually the physical address of the bounce buffer.
> +	 */
> +	return is_secure_guest();
> +}
> +#endif
> +
>  #endif	/* _ASM_DMA_MAPPING_H */
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig
b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig
> index 9e35cdd..0108150 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig
> @@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ config PPC_SVM
>  	select SWIOTLB
>  	select ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT
>  	select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
> +	select ARCH_HAS_DMA_ADDR_IS_PHYS_ADDR
>  	help
>  	 There are certain POWER platforms which support secure guests using
>  	 the Protected Execution Facility, with the help of an Ultravisor
> diff --git a/include/linux/dma-mapping.h b/include/linux/dma-mapping.h
> index f7d1eea..6df5664 100644
> --- a/include/linux/dma-mapping.h
> +++ b/include/linux/dma-mapping.h
> @@ -693,6 +693,26 @@ static inline bool dma_addressing_limited(struct
device *dev)
>  			    dma_get_required_mask(dev);
>  }
>  
> +#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_DMA_ADDR_IS_PHYS_ADDR
> +/**
> + * dma_addr_is_phys_addr - check whether a device DMA address is a
physical
> + *		address
> + * @dev:	device to check
> + *
> + * Returns %true if any DMA address for this device happens to also be a
valid
> + * physical address (not necessarily of the same page).
> + */
> +static inline bool dma_addr_is_phys_addr(struct device *dev)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * Except in very specific setups, DMA addresses exist in a different
> +	 * address space from CPU physical addresses and cannot be directly used
> +	 * to reference system memory.
> +	 */
> +	return false;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SETUP_DMA_OPS
>  void arch_setup_dma_ops(struct device *dev, u64 dma_base, u64 size,
>  		const struct iommu_ops *iommu, bool coherent);
> diff --git a/kernel/dma/Kconfig b/kernel/dma/Kconfig
> index 9decbba..6209b46 100644
> --- a/kernel/dma/Kconfig
> +++ b/kernel/dma/Kconfig
> @@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ config ARCH_HAS_DMA_MMAP_PGPROT
>  config ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
>  	bool
>  
> +config ARCH_HAS_DMA_ADDR_IS_PHYS_ADDR
> +	bool
> +
>  config DMA_NONCOHERENT_CACHE_SYNC
>  	bool
>  
-- 
David Gibson			| I'll have my music baroque, and my code
david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au	| minimalist, thank you.  NOT _the_ _other_
				| _way_ _around_!
http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson
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