On 2014-06-13 10:45, Paolo Bonzini wrote:> Il 13/06/2014 08:23, Jan Kiszka ha scritto:
>>>> That would preserve zero-copy capabilities (as long as you can
work
>>>> against the shared mem directly, e.g. doing DMA from a physical
NIC or
>>>> storage device into it) and keep the hypervisor out of the
loop.
>> >
>> > This seems ill thought out. How will you program a NIC via the
virtio
>> > protocol without a hypervisor? And how will you make it safe?
You'll
>> > need an IOMMU. But if you have an IOMMU you don't need shared
memory.
>>
>> Scenarios behind this are things like driver VMs: You pass through the
>> physical hardware to a driver guest that talks to the hardware and
>> relays data via one or more virtual channels to other VMs. This
confines
>> a certain set of security and stability risks to the driver VM.
>
> I think implementing Xen hypercalls in jailhouse for grant table and
> event channels would actually make a lot of sense. The Xen
> implementation is 2.5kLOC and I think it should be possible to compact
> it noticeably, especially if you limit yourself to 64-bit guests.
At least the grant table model seems unsuited for Jailhouse. It allows a
guest to influence the mapping of another guest during runtime. This we
want (or even have) to avoid in Jailhouse.
I'm therefore more in favor of a model where the shared memory region is
defined on cell (guest) creation by adding a virtual device that comes
with such a region.
Jan
>
> It should also be almost enough to run Xen PVH guests as jailhouse
> partitions.
>
> If later Xen starts to support virtio, you will get that for free.
>
> Paolo
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