Stefan Blachmann
2021-Apr-08 02:50 UTC
Security leak: Public disclosure of user data without their consent by installing software via pkg
The answers I got from both "Security Officers" surprised me so much that I had to let that settle a bit to understand the implications. Looking at the FreeBSD Porters' Handbook [https://docs.freebsd.org/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/porters-handbook/pkg-install.html], it describes the purpose of the package pre- and postinstallation scripts as to "set up the package so that it is as ready to use as possible". It explicitly names only a few actions that are forbidden for them to do: "...must not be abused to start services, stop services, or run any other commands that will modify the currently running system." Anything else is apparently deemed ?allowed?. Spying out the machine and its configuration, sending that data to an external entity ? perfectly OK. Not a problem at all. This has been proved by the handling of this last BSDstats security incident, where the FreeBSD ?pkg? utility is being abused to run spyware without the users? pre-knowledge and without his content. This abuse is apparently being considered acceptable by both FreeBSD and HardenedBSD security officers. Instead of taking action, you "security officers" tell the FreeBSD users that it is their own guilt that they got ?pwnd?. Just because they trustingly installed software from the package repo hosted by FreeBSD, without religiously-carefully auditing every and each packages' pre- and postinstallation script before actual install, using the ?pkg -I? option. Indeed, I felt very surprised that the ?Security Officer? of ?Hardened BSD? chimed in, only to publicly demonstrate his lack of competence to recognize obvious security problems. Like two fish caught with a single hook! Are you "Security Officers" aware that you basically are tearing down any trust that conventional, non-big-corporate users without large own IT staff can have in FreeBSD? So, I believe that not only the reasons that made the Wireguard debacle possible need to be discussed. This discussion should not occur in hermetic private circles, but in public places like /r/freebsd, IT news outlets and other competent and independent media. Not only Wireguard needs to be discussed, but also things like the responsibility for software that is not part of the base system, but nevertheless being distributed by the FreeBSD organization. Can it be ethically acceptable to put users at risk, for example by intentionally (?) not setting any limits to what extent installer scripts are allowed to collect sensitive user and system data and disclose them to interested third parties? This should imho be discussed in public, leading to the formulation of rules which might help enabling users to trust FreeBSD. [ Just to note: the porter of the package in question wrote me that it never was the intention to run the scripts without user content. There must have happened something/some action by someone, which led to this behaviour. What actually happened, this can be analyzed. For me, what actually matters is not this particular incident, but the finding that spyware behavior of pre/postinstaller scripts is apparently generally deemed acceptable and not actionable, according to FreeBSD rules. So the problem are these rules, and not this last incident. ] On 4/6/21, Gordon Tetlow <gordon at tetlows.org> wrote:> On Apr 6, 2021, at 7:42 AM, Shawn Webb <shawn.webb at hardenedbsd.org> wrote: >> >> On Tue, Apr 06, 2021 at 04:39:40PM +0200, Miroslav Lachman wrote: >>> On 06/04/2021 16:27, Shawn Webb wrote: >>> >>>> 1. BSDStats isn't run/maintained by the FreeBSD project. File the >>>> report with the BSDStats project, not FreeBSD. >>>> 2. You install a package that is made to submit statistical data. >>>> 3. You're upset that it submits statistical data? >>> >>> The problem here is that it collects and sends data right at the install >>> time. It is really unexpected to run installed package without user >>> consent. >>> If you install Apache, MySQL or any other package the command / daemon is >>> no >>> run by "pkg install" command. >>> This must be avoided. >> >> It's probably easier to submit a patch than it is to write a >> lolwut-type email. All you gotta do is rm the post-install script. >> Also `pkg install` has the -I option. But whatever, let the lolwut >> mentality prevail! > > I had a conversation on the side with the requestor. In short, there is > already a patch to address this issue in > https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=251152 > <https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=251152>. Not sure why it > hasn't been committed yet, but hopefully it gets picked up shortly. > > Gordon >
Chris BeHanna
2021-Apr-08 13:35 UTC
Security leak: Public disclosure of user data without their consent by installing software via pkg
On Apr 7, 2021, at 8:50 PM, Stefan Blachmann <sblachmann at gmail.com> wrote:> > The answers I got from both "Security Officers" surprised me so much > that I had to let that settle a bit to understand the implications. > > Looking at the FreeBSD Porters' Handbook > [https://docs.freebsd.org/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/porters-handbook/pkg-install.html], > it describes the purpose of the package pre- and postinstallation > scripts as to "set up the package so that it is as ready to use as > possible". > > It explicitly names only a few actions that are forbidden for them to > do: "...must not be abused to start services, stop services, or run > any other commands that will modify the currently running system." > > Anything else is apparently deemed ?allowed?. > Spying out the machine and its configuration, sending that data to an > external entity ? perfectly OK. Not a problem at all. > > This has been proved by the handling of this last BSDstats security > incident, where the FreeBSD ?pkg? utility is being abused to run > spyware without the users? pre-knowledge and without his content. > > This abuse is apparently being considered acceptable by both FreeBSD > and HardenedBSD security officers. > Instead of taking action, you "security officers" tell the FreeBSD > users that it is their own guilt that they got ?pwnd?.This is an incredibly dishonest summary of their responses to you. Gordon in particular wrote that it is NOT acceptable; however, rather than smash down the port's maintainer with the Security Officer sledgehammer, he preferred to give the maintainer some time to address the problem. -- Chris BeHanna chris at behanna.org
Shawn Webb
2021-Apr-08 16:24 UTC
Security leak: Public disclosure of user data without their consent by installing software via pkg
On Thu, Apr 08, 2021 at 04:50:17AM +0200, Stefan Blachmann wrote:> The answers I got from both "Security Officers" surprised me so much > that I had to let that settle a bit to understand the implications. > > > Looking at the FreeBSD Porters' Handbook > [https://docs.freebsd.org/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/porters-handbook/pkg-install.html], > it describes the purpose of the package pre- and postinstallation > scripts as to "set up the package so that it is as ready to use as > possible". > > It explicitly names only a few actions that are forbidden for them to > do: "...must not be abused to start services, stop services, or run > any other commands that will modify the currently running system." > > Anything else is apparently deemed ?allowed?. > Spying out the machine and its configuration, sending that data to an > external entity ? perfectly OK. Not a problem at all. > > This has been proved by the handling of this last BSDstats security > incident, where the FreeBSD ?pkg? utility is being abused to run > spyware without the users? pre-knowledge and without his content. > > This abuse is apparently being considered acceptable by both FreeBSD > and HardenedBSD security officers. > Instead of taking action, you "security officers" tell the FreeBSD > users that it is their own guilt that they got ?pwnd?. > Just because they trustingly installed software from the package repo > hosted by FreeBSD, without religiously-carefully auditing every and > each packages' pre- and postinstallation script before actual install, > using the ?pkg -I? option. > > Indeed, I felt very surprised that the ?Security Officer? of ?Hardened > BSD? chimed in, only to publicly demonstrate his lack of competence to > recognize obvious security problems. > Like two fish caught with a single hook!1. Ad hominem much? I understand the underlying problem very well. 2. Your hostility is incredibly annoying. 3. You attribute malice where there is none. 4. This is volunteer work, where volunteers have everyones well-being in mind. 5. Threatening to go to journalists accomplishes... what? What makes you think journalists are NOT paying attention to this list? What makes you think journalists care about you? 6. I really, really, really, really, really hate the "Karen" meme. But it fits incredibly well here. 7. Where can I review your patches that fix the problem? 8. Entitlement mentality much? Sure, the bsdstats package shouldn't submit just on "pkg install." Instead of fixing the problem, you went the hostile route. I'm sure you won't learn anything from this, but I hope you do. To me, it reinforces how random people feel entitled to force their will on others. Thanks, -- Shawn Webb Cofounder / Security Engineer HardenedBSD https://git.hardenedbsd.org/hardenedbsd/pubkeys/-/raw/master/Shawn_Webb/03A4CBEBB82EA5A67D9F3853FF2E67A277F8E1FA.pub.asc -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 833 bytes Desc: not available URL: <http://lists.freebsd.org/pipermail/freebsd-security/attachments/20210408/e13a1dd4/attachment.sig>