For consideration... SVN really may not offer much in the way of native internal self authenticating repo to cryptographic levels of security against bitrot, transit corruption and repo ops, external physical editing, have much signing options, etc. Similar to blockchain and ZFS hash merkle-ization, signing the repo init and later points tags commits, along with full verification toolset, is useful function. https://www.monotone.ca/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotone_(software) https://git-scm.com/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git Maintaining the kernel's web of trust https://lwn.net/Articles/798230/ Distributing kernel developer PGP keys via pgpkeys.git https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/8/30/597 Signing patch flow https://lwn.net/Articles/737093/ Compromised security happens https://lwn.net/Articles/464233/ https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/67920/how-safe-are-signed-git-tags-only-as-safe-as-sha-1-or-somehow-safer https://stackoverflow.com/questions/28792784/why-does-git-use-a-cryptographic-hash-function http://fossil-scm.org/index.html/doc/trunk/www/hashpolicy.wiki https://ericsink.com/vcbe/html/cryptographic_hashes.html https://svn.haxx.se/dev/archive-2015-06/0052.shtml http://git.661346.n2.nabble.com/Verifying-the-whole-repository-td1368311.html https://shattered.io/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G8wQ88d85s4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_degradation https://git-scm.com/docs/git-fsck https://marc.info/?l=git&m=118143549107708 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_version-control_software https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deterministic_compilation https://www.monotone.ca/monotone.html#Trust-Evaluation-Hooks How does one know their entire copy of repo obtained on DVD, "mirror", or elsewhere cryptographically matches the authoritative repo... that any commits were actually signed off on... or that any reproducible builds are even reproducing the main repo... etc... cannot be done without secure crypto infrastructure at the very core. "User also knows that even if someone should break into the shared hosting server and tamper with the database, they won?t be able to inject malicious code into the project, because all revisions are signed by the team members, and he has set his Trust Evaluation Hooks so he doesn?t trust the server key for signing revisions. In monotone, the important trust consideration is on the signed content, rather than on the replication path by which that content arrived in your database." Note also CVS, which some BSD's still use (ahem: Open, Net), is even worse than SVN with zero protection at all in any component regarding this subject. It really time to migrate repo tech to year 2020.
For consideration... SVN really may not offer much in the way of native internal self authenticating repo to cryptographic levels of security against bitrot, transit corruption and repo ops, external physical editing, have much signing options, etc. Similar to blockchain and ZFS hash merkle-ization, signing the repo init and later points tags commits, along with full verification toolset, is useful function. https://www.monotone.ca/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotone_(software) https://git-scm.com/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git Maintaining the kernel's web of trust https://lwn.net/Articles/798230/ Distributing kernel developer PGP keys via pgpkeys.git https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/8/30/597 Signing patch flow https://lwn.net/Articles/737093/ Compromised security happens https://lwn.net/Articles/464233/ https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/67920/how-safe-are-signed-git-tags-only-as-safe-as-sha-1-or-somehow-safer https://stackoverflow.com/questions/28792784/why-does-git-use-a-cryptographic-hash-function http://fossil-scm.org/index.html/doc/trunk/www/hashpolicy.wiki https://ericsink.com/vcbe/html/cryptographic_hashes.html https://svn.haxx.se/dev/archive-2015-06/0052.shtml http://git.661346.n2.nabble.com/Verifying-the-whole-repository-td1368311.html https://shattered.io/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DG8wQ88d85s4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_degradation https://git-scm.com/docs/git-fsck https://marc.info/?l=3Dgit&m=3D118143549107708 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_version-control_software https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deterministic_compilation https://www.monotone.ca/monotone.html#Trust-Evaluation-Hooks How does one know their entire copy of repo obtained on DVD, "mirror", or elsewhere cryptographically matches the authoritative repo... that any commits were actually signed off on... or that any reproducible builds are even reproducing the main repo... etc... cannot be done without secure crypto infrastructure at the very core. "User also knows that even if someone should break into the shared hosting server and tamper with the database, they won=E2=80=99t be able to inject malicious code into the project, because all revisions are signed by the team members, and he has set his Trust Evaluation Hooks so he doesn=E2=80=99t trust the server key for signing revisions. In monotone, the important trust consideration is on the signed content, rather than on the replication path by which that content arrived in your database." Note also CVS, which some BSD's still use (ahem: Open, Net), is even worse than SVN with zero protection at all in any component regarding this subject. It really time to migrate repo tech to year 2020.
[broken links fixed] For consideration... SVN really may not offer much in the way of native internal self authenticating repo to cryptographic levels of security against bitrot, transit corruption and repo ops, external physical editing, have much signing options, etc. Similar to blockchain and ZFS hash merkle-ization, signing the repo init and later points tags commits, along with full verification toolset, is useful function. https://www.monotone.ca/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotone_(software) https://git-scm.com/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git Maintaining the kernel's web of trust https://lwn.net/Articles/798230/ Distributing kernel developer PGP keys via pgpkeys.git https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/8/30/597 Signing patch flow https://lwn.net/Articles/737093/ Compromised security happens https://lwn.net/Articles/464233/ https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/67920/how-safe-are-signed-git-tags-only-as-safe-as-sha-1-or-somehow-safer https://stackoverflow.com/questions/28792784/why-does-git-use-a-cryptographic-hash-function http://fossil-scm.org/index.html/doc/trunk/www/hashpolicy.wiki https://ericsink.com/vcbe/html/cryptographic_hashes.html https://svn.haxx.se/dev/archive-2015-06/0052.shtml http://git.661346.n2.nabble.com/Verifying-the-whole-repository-td1368311.html https://shattered.io/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G8wQ88d85s4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_degradation https://git-scm.com/docs/git-fsck https://marc.info/?l=git&m=118143549107708 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_version-control_software https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deterministic_compilation https://www.monotone.ca/monotone.html#Trust-Evaluation-Hooks How does one know their entire copy of repo obtained on DVD, "mirror", or elsewhere cryptographically matches the authoritative repo... that any commits were actually signed off on... or that any reproducible builds are even reproducing the main repo... etc... cannot be done without secure crypto infrastructure at the very core. "User also knows that even if someone should break into the shared hosting server and tamper with the database, they won?t be able to inject malicious code into the project, because all revisions are signed by the team members, and he has set his Trust Evaluation Hooks so he doesn?t trust the server key for signing revisions. In monotone, the important trust consideration is on the signed content, rather than on the replication path by which that content arrived in your database." Note also CVS, which some BSD's still use (ahem: Open, Net), is even worse than SVN with zero protection at all in any component regarding this subject. It really time to migrate repo tech to year 2020.