FreeBSD Security Advisories
2011-Sep-28 09:06 UTC
[FreeBSD-Announce] FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-11:05.unix
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================FreeBSD-SA-11:05.unix Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Buffer overflow in handling of UNIX socket addresses Category: core Module: kern Announced: 2011-09-28 Credits: Mateusz Guzik Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_7, 7.4-STABLE) 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_7_4, 7.4-RELEASE-p3) 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_7_3, 7.3-RELEASE-p7) 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_8, 8.2-STABLE) 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_8_2, 8.2-RELEASE-p3) 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_8_1, 8.1-RELEASE-p5) 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_9, 9.0-RC1) For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>. I. Background UNIX-domain sockets, also known as "local" sockets, are a mechanism for interprocess communication. They are similar to Internet sockets (and utilize the same system calls) but instead of relying on IP addresses and port numbers, UNIX-domain sockets have addresses in the local file system address space. II. Problem Description When a UNIX-domain socket is attached to a location using the bind(2) system call, the length of the provided path is not validated. Later, when this address was returned via other system calls, it is copied into a fixed-length buffer. III. Impact A local user can cause the FreeBSD kernel to panic. It may also be possible to execute code with elevated privileges ("gain root"), escape from a jail, or to bypass security mechanisms in other ways. IV. Workaround No workaround is available, but systems without untrusted local users are not vulnerable. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 7-STABLE or 8-STABLE, or to the RELENG_8_2, RELENG_8_1, RELENG_7_4, or RELENG_7_3 security branch dated after the correction date. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patch has been verified to apply to FreeBSD 7.4, 7.3, 8.2 and 8.1 systems. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-11:05/unix.patch # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-11:05/unix.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile your kernel as described in <URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the system. 3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running 7.4-RELEASE, 7.3-RELEASE, 8.2-RELEASE, or 8.1-RELEASE on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install VI. Correction details The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was corrected in FreeBSD. CVS: Branch Revision Path - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- RELENG_7 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.206.2.13 RELENG_7_4 src/UPDATING 1.507.2.36.2.5 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.18.2.8 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.206.2.11.4.2 RELENG_7_3 src/UPDATING 1.507.2.34.2.9 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.16.2.11 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.206.2.11.2.2 RELENG_8 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.233.2.6 RELENG_8_2 src/UPDATING 1.632.2.19.2.5 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.83.2.12.2.8 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.233.2.2.2.2 RELENG_8_1 src/UPDATING 1.632.2.14.2.8 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.83.2.10.2.9 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.233.2.1.4.2 RELENG_9 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.244.2.2 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subversion: Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/7/ r225827 releng/7.4/ r225827 releng/7.3/ r225827 stable/8/ r225827 releng/8.2/ r225827 releng/8.1/ r225827 stable/9/ r225827 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- The latest revision of this advisory is available at http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-11:05.unix.asc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.18 (FreeBSD) iEYEARECAAYFAk6C4nUACgkQFdaIBMps37J5lwCgnq8BUBWckn0ZKMcsK5IDKMDV ocgAn0PwSvoKxjGY4dgHlM1M6xVM8OWz =AO92 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
FreeBSD Security Advisories
2011-Sep-28 09:06 UTC
FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-11:05.unix
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================FreeBSD-SA-11:05.unix Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Buffer overflow in handling of UNIX socket addresses Category: core Module: kern Announced: 2011-09-28 Credits: Mateusz Guzik Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_7, 7.4-STABLE) 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_7_4, 7.4-RELEASE-p3) 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_7_3, 7.3-RELEASE-p7) 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_8, 8.2-STABLE) 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_8_2, 8.2-RELEASE-p3) 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_8_1, 8.1-RELEASE-p5) 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_9, 9.0-RC1) For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>. I. Background UNIX-domain sockets, also known as "local" sockets, are a mechanism for interprocess communication. They are similar to Internet sockets (and utilize the same system calls) but instead of relying on IP addresses and port numbers, UNIX-domain sockets have addresses in the local file system address space. II. Problem Description When a UNIX-domain socket is attached to a location using the bind(2) system call, the length of the provided path is not validated. Later, when this address was returned via other system calls, it is copied into a fixed-length buffer. III. Impact A local user can cause the FreeBSD kernel to panic. It may also be possible to execute code with elevated privileges ("gain root"), escape from a jail, or to bypass security mechanisms in other ways. IV. Workaround No workaround is available, but systems without untrusted local users are not vulnerable. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 7-STABLE or 8-STABLE, or to the RELENG_8_2, RELENG_8_1, RELENG_7_4, or RELENG_7_3 security branch dated after the correction date. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patch has been verified to apply to FreeBSD 7.4, 7.3, 8.2 and 8.1 systems. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-11:05/unix.patch # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-11:05/unix.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile your kernel as described in <URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the system. 3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running 7.4-RELEASE, 7.3-RELEASE, 8.2-RELEASE, or 8.1-RELEASE on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install VI. Correction details The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was corrected in FreeBSD. CVS: Branch Revision Path - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- RELENG_7 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.206.2.13 RELENG_7_4 src/UPDATING 1.507.2.36.2.5 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.18.2.8 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.206.2.11.4.2 RELENG_7_3 src/UPDATING 1.507.2.34.2.9 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.16.2.11 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.206.2.11.2.2 RELENG_8 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.233.2.6 RELENG_8_2 src/UPDATING 1.632.2.19.2.5 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.83.2.12.2.8 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.233.2.2.2.2 RELENG_8_1 src/UPDATING 1.632.2.14.2.8 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.83.2.10.2.9 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.233.2.1.4.2 RELENG_9 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.244.2.2 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subversion: Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/7/ r225827 releng/7.4/ r225827 releng/7.3/ r225827 stable/8/ r225827 releng/8.2/ r225827 releng/8.1/ r225827 stable/9/ r225827 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- The latest revision of this advisory is available at http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-11:05.unix.asc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.18 (FreeBSD) iEYEARECAAYFAk6C4nUACgkQFdaIBMps37J5lwCgnq8BUBWckn0ZKMcsK5IDKMDV ocgAn0PwSvoKxjGY4dgHlM1M6xVM8OWz =AO92 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
FreeBSD Security Advisories
2011-Sep-28 09:06 UTC
FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-11:05.unix
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================FreeBSD-SA-11:05.unix Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Buffer overflow in handling of UNIX socket addresses Category: core Module: kern Announced: 2011-09-28 Credits: Mateusz Guzik Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_7, 7.4-STABLE) 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_7_4, 7.4-RELEASE-p3) 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_7_3, 7.3-RELEASE-p7) 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_8, 8.2-STABLE) 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_8_2, 8.2-RELEASE-p3) 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_8_1, 8.1-RELEASE-p5) 2011-09-28 08:47:17 UTC (RELENG_9, 9.0-RC1) For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>. I. Background UNIX-domain sockets, also known as "local" sockets, are a mechanism for interprocess communication. They are similar to Internet sockets (and utilize the same system calls) but instead of relying on IP addresses and port numbers, UNIX-domain sockets have addresses in the local file system address space. II. Problem Description When a UNIX-domain socket is attached to a location using the bind(2) system call, the length of the provided path is not validated. Later, when this address was returned via other system calls, it is copied into a fixed-length buffer. III. Impact A local user can cause the FreeBSD kernel to panic. It may also be possible to execute code with elevated privileges ("gain root"), escape from a jail, or to bypass security mechanisms in other ways. IV. Workaround No workaround is available, but systems without untrusted local users are not vulnerable. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 7-STABLE or 8-STABLE, or to the RELENG_8_2, RELENG_8_1, RELENG_7_4, or RELENG_7_3 security branch dated after the correction date. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patch has been verified to apply to FreeBSD 7.4, 7.3, 8.2 and 8.1 systems. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-11:05/unix.patch # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-11:05/unix.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile your kernel as described in <URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the system. 3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running 7.4-RELEASE, 7.3-RELEASE, 8.2-RELEASE, or 8.1-RELEASE on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install VI. Correction details The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was corrected in FreeBSD. CVS: Branch Revision Path - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- RELENG_7 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.206.2.13 RELENG_7_4 src/UPDATING 1.507.2.36.2.5 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.18.2.8 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.206.2.11.4.2 RELENG_7_3 src/UPDATING 1.507.2.34.2.9 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.16.2.11 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.206.2.11.2.2 RELENG_8 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.233.2.6 RELENG_8_2 src/UPDATING 1.632.2.19.2.5 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.83.2.12.2.8 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.233.2.2.2.2 RELENG_8_1 src/UPDATING 1.632.2.14.2.8 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.83.2.10.2.9 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.233.2.1.4.2 RELENG_9 src/sys/kern/uipc_usrreq.c 1.244.2.2 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subversion: Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/7/ r225827 releng/7.4/ r225827 releng/7.3/ r225827 stable/8/ r225827 releng/8.2/ r225827 releng/8.1/ r225827 stable/9/ r225827 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- The latest revision of this advisory is available at http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-11:05.unix.asc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.18 (FreeBSD) iEYEARECAAYFAk6C4nUACgkQFdaIBMps37J5lwCgnq8BUBWckn0ZKMcsK5IDKMDV ocgAn0PwSvoKxjGY4dgHlM1M6xVM8OWz =AO92 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Bengt Ahlgren
2011-Sep-29 15:55 UTC
[FreeBSD-Announce] FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-11:05.unix
Hello! This patch seems to have broken something in Unix sockets in the Linux ABI. The acroread Linux binary cannot connect to the local X11 unix socket ("cannot open display: :0.0". Setting DISPLAY=<hostname>:0 works (using a TCP socket instead), and I just verified that it works without the patch. Or can it be a bug in acroread? (I'm running 8.2-REL/i386 on an IBM Thinkpad X40, and I'm using KDE 4.5.5) Bengt
FreeBSD Security Advisories wrote:> FreeBSD-SA-11:05.unix Security Advisory > [...] > 2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: > [...] > c) Recompile your kernel as described in > <URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the > system. > > 3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: > > Systems running 7.4-RELEASE, 7.3-RELEASE, 8.2-RELEASE, or 8.1-RELEASE on > the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) > utility: > > # freebsd-update fetch > # freebsd-update installQuick question: after running freebsd-update install, do I reboot for this one, or not?
On 9/30/11 6:39 PM, Mike Brown wrote:> FreeBSD Security Advisories wrote: >> FreeBSD-SA-11:05.unix Security Advisory >> [...] >> 2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: >> [...] >> c) Recompile your kernel as described in >> <URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the >> system. >> >> 3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: >> >> Systems running 7.4-RELEASE, 7.3-RELEASE, 8.2-RELEASE, or 8.1-RELEASE on >> the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) >> utility: >> >> # freebsd-update fetch >> # freebsd-update install > > Quick question: after running freebsd-update install, do I reboot for this > one, or not?You should need to, because the patch affects the kernel. -- Glen Barber
Eitan Adler wrote:> > do I reboot for this one, or not? > The kernel is changed, so yes.Thanks. I had guessed a reboot was needed, but the advisory only mentioned a reboot in the context of building the kernel from sources. Hopefully, when a reboot is required, future advisories will mention it in the freebsd-update(8) instructions.