FreeBSD Security Advisories
2008-Jul-13 19:10 UTC
FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-08:06.bind
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============================================================================FreeBSD-SA-08:06.bind
Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: DNS cache poisoning
Category: contrib
Module: bind
Announced: 2008-07-13
Credits: Dan Kaminsky
Affects: All supported FreeBSD versions.
Corrected: 2008-07-12 10:07:33 UTC (RELENG_6, 6.3-STABLE)
2008-07-13 18:42:38 UTC (RELENG_6_3, 6.3-RELEASE-p3)
2008-07-13 18:42:38 UTC (RELENG_7, 7.0-STABLE)
2008-07-13 18:42:38 UTC (RELENG_7_0, 7.0-RELEASE-p3)
CVE Name: CVE-2008-1447
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
BIND 9 is an implementation of the Domain Name System (DNS) protocols.
The named(8) daemon is an Internet Domain Name Server. DNS requests
contain a query id which is used to match a DNS request with the response
and to make it harder for anybody but the DNS server which received the
request to send a valid response.
II. Problem Description
The BIND DNS implementation does not randomize the UDP source port when
doing remote queries, and the query id alone does not provide adequate
randomization.
III. Impact
The lack of source port randomization reduces the amount of data the
attacker needs to guess in order to successfully execute a DNS cache
poisoning attack. This allows the attacker to influence or control
the results of DNS queries being returned to users from target systems.
IV. Workaround
Limiting the group of machines that can do recursive queries on the DNS
server will make it more difficult, but not impossible, for this
vulnerability to be exploited.
To limit the machines able to perform recursive queries, add an ACL in
named.conf and limit recursion like the following:
acl example-acl {
192.0.2.0/24;
};
options {
recursion yes;
allow-recursion { example-acl; };
};
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 6-STABLE or 7-STABLE, or to the
RELENG_7_0 or RELENG_6_3 security branch dated after the correction
date.
2) To patch your present system:
The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 6.3 and
7.0 systems.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 6.3]
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-08:06/bind63.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-08:06/bind63.patch.asc
[FreeBSD 7.0]
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-08:06/bind7.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-08:06/bind7.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
# cd /usr/src/lib/bind
# make obj && make depend && make && make install
# cd /usr/src/usr.sbin/named
# make obj && make depend && make && make install
NOTE WELL: This update causes BIND to choose a new, random UDP port for
each new query; this may cause problems for some network configurations,
particularly if firewall(s) block incoming UDP packets on particular
ports. The avoid-v4-udp-ports and avoid-v6-udp-ports options should be
used to avoid selecting random port numbers within a blocked range.
NOTE WELL: If a port number is specified via the query-source or
query-source-v6 options to BIND, randomized port selection will not be
used. Consequently it is strongly recommended that these options not
be used to specify fixed port numbers.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
Branch Revision
Path
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELENG_6
src/contrib/bind9/bin/named/client.c 1.1.1.2.2.5
src/contrib/bind9/bin/named/server.c 1.1.1.2.2.4
src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/api 1.1.1.2.2.5
src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/dispatch.c 1.1.1.1.4.4
src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/include/dns/dispatch.h 1.1.1.1.4.3
src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/resolver.c 1.1.1.2.2.8
RELENG_6_3
src/UPDATING 1.416.2.37.2.8
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.15.2.7
src/contrib/bind9/bin/named/client.c 1.1.1.2.2.3.2.1
src/contrib/bind9/bin/named/server.c 1.1.1.2.2.2.2.1
src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/api 1.1.1.2.2.3.2.1
src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/dispatch.c 1.1.1.1.4.2.2.1
src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/include/dns/dispatch.h 1.1.1.1.4.1.2.1
src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/resolver.c 1.1.1.2.2.6.2.1
RELENG_7
src/contrib/bind9/bin/named/client.c 1.1.1.6.2.2
src/contrib/bind9/bin/named/server.c 1.1.1.6.2.2
src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/api 1.1.1.6.2.2
src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/dispatch.c 1.1.1.4.2.2
src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/include/dns/dispatch.h 1.1.1.3.2.2
src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/resolver.c 1.1.1.9.2.2
RELENG_7_0
src/UPDATING 1.507.2.3.2.7
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.5.2.7
src/contrib/bind9/bin/named/client.c 1.1.1.6.2.1.2.1
src/contrib/bind9/bin/named/server.c 1.1.1.6.2.1.2.1
src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/api 1.1.1.6.2.1.2.1
src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/dispatch.c 1.1.1.4.2.1.2.1
src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/include/dns/dispatch.h 1.1.1.3.2.1.2.1
src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/resolver.c 1.1.1.9.2.1.2.1
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-1447
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/800113
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-08:06.bind.asc
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There was no mention of checking named.conf to ensure that a port was not specified in the query-source clauses. Just upgrading will not fix the problem it if named.conf has "query-source port 53". Mark -- Mark Andrews, ISC 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: Mark_Andrews@isc.org
> NOTE WELL: If a port number is specified via the query-source or > query-source-v6 options to BIND, randomized port selection will not be > used. Consequently it is strongly recommended that these options not > be used to specify fixed port numbers > -- > Michael Scheidell, CTO > >|SECNAP Network Security > Winner 2008 Network Products Guide Hot Companies > FreeBSD SpamAssassin Ports maintainerYep, I missed it despite looking for it. Mark -- Mark Andrews, ISC 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: Mark_Andrews@isc.org
NOTE WELL: If a port number is specified via the query-source or query-source-v6 options to BIND, randomized port selection will not be used. Consequently it is strongly recommended that these options not be used to specify fixed port numbers -- Michael Scheidell, CTO>|SECNAP Network SecurityWinner 2008 Network Products Guide Hot Companies FreeBSD SpamAssassin Ports maintainer> From: Mark Andrews <Mark_Andrews@isc.org> > Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2008 10:29:36 +1000 > To: <freebsd-security@freebsd.org> > Cc: FreeBSD Security Advisories <security-advisories@freebsd.org> > Subject: Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-08:06.bind > > > There was no mention of checking named.conf to ensure that > a port was not specified in the query-source clauses. Just > upgrading will not fix the problem it if named.conf has > > "query-source port 53". > > Mark > -- > Mark Andrews, ISC > 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia > PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: Mark_Andrews@isc.org > _______________________________________________ > freebsd-security@freebsd.org mailing list > http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-security > To unsubscribe, send any mail to "freebsd-security-unsubscribe@freebsd.org"_________________________________________________________________________ This email has been scanned and certified safe by SpammerTrap(r). For Information please see http://www.spammertrap.com _________________________________________________________________________