Linux Virtualization - Jul 2019 - [RFC PATCH] virtio_ring: Use DMA API if guest memory is encrypted

Michael S. Tsirkin <mst at redhat.com> writes:
> On Thu, Jun 27, 2019 at 10:58:40PM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
>>
>> Michael S. Tsirkin <mst at redhat.com> writes:
>>
>> > On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 10:13:59PM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann
wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Michael S. Tsirkin <mst at redhat.com> writes:
>> >>
>> >> > On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 06:42:00PM -0300, Thiago Jung
Bauermann wrote:
>> >> >> I rephrased it in terms of address translation. What
do you think of
>> >> >> this version? The flag name is slightly different
too:
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_NO_TRANSLATION This feature
has the same
>> >> >>     meaning as VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM both when set
and when not set,
>> >> >>     with the exception that address translation is
guaranteed to be
>> >> >>     unnecessary when accessing memory addresses
supplied to the device
>> >> >>     by the driver. Which is to say, the device will
always use physical
>> >> >>     addresses matching addresses used by the driver
(typically meaning
>> >> >>     physical addresses used by the CPU) and not
translated further. This
>> >> >>     flag should be set by the guest if offered, but
to allow for
>> >> >>     backward-compatibility device implementations
allow for it to be
>> >> >>     left unset by the guest. It is an error to set
both this flag and
>> >> >>     VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > OK so VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM is designed to allow
unpriveledged
>> >> > drivers. This is why devices fail when it's not
negotiated.
>> >>
>> >> Just to clarify, what do you mean by unprivileged drivers? Is
it drivers
>> >> implemented in guest userspace such as with VFIO? Or
unprivileged in
>> >> some other sense such as needing to use bounce buffers for
some reason?
>> >
>> > I had drivers in guest userspace in mind.
>>
>> Great. Thanks for clarifying.
>>
>> I don't think this flag would work for guest userspace drivers.
Should I
>> add a note about that in the flag definition?
>
> I think you need to clarify access protection rules. Is it only
> translation that is bypassed or is any platform-specific
> protection mechanism bypassed too?
It is only translation. In a secure guest, if the device tries to access
a memory address that wasn't provided by the driver then the
architecture will deny that access. If the device accesses addresses
provided to it by the driver, then there's no protection mechanism or
translation to get in the way.
>> >> > This confuses me.
>> >> > If driver is unpriveledged then what happens with this
flag?
>> >> > It can supply any address it wants. Will that corrupt
kernel
>> >> > memory?
>> >>
>> >> Not needing address translation doesn't necessarily mean
that there's no
>> >> IOMMU. On powerpc we don't use VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM
but there's
>> >> always an IOMMU present. And we also support VFIO drivers. The
VFIO API
>> >> for pseries (sPAPR section in Documentation/vfio.txt) has
extra ioctls
>> >> to program the IOMMU.
>> >>
>> >> For our use case, we don't need address translation
because we set up an
>> >> identity mapping in the IOMMU so that the device can use guest
physical
>> >> addresses.
>
> OK so I think I am beginning to see it in a different light.  Right now the
specific
> platform creates an identity mapping. That in turn means DMA API can be
> fast - it does not need to do anything.  What you are looking for is a
> way to tell host it's an identity mapping - just as an optimization.
>
> Is that right?
Almost. Theoretically it is just an optimization. But in practice the
pseries boot firmware (SLOF) doesn't support IOMMU_PLATFORM so it's not
possible to boot a guest from a device with that flag set.
> So this is what I would call this option:
>
> VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_IDENTITY_ADDRESS
>
> and the explanation should state that all device
> addresses are translated by the platform to identical
> addresses.
>
> In fact this option then becomes more, not less restrictive
> than VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM - it's a promise
> by guest to only create identity mappings,
> and only before driver_ok is set.
> This option then would always be negotiated together with
> VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.
>
> Host then must verify that
> 1. full 1:1 mappings are created before driver_ok
>     or can we make sure this happens before features_ok?
>     that would be ideal as we could require that features_ok fails
> 2. mappings are not modified between driver_ok and reset
>     i guess attempts to change them will fail -
>     possibly by causing a guest crash
>     or some other kind of platform-specific error
I think VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_IDENTITY_ADDRESS is good, but requiring
it to be accompanied by ACCESS_PLATFORM can be a problem. One reason is
SLOF as I mentioned above, another is that we would be requiring all
guests running on the machine (secure guests or not, since we would use
the same configuration for all guests) to support it. But
ACCESS_PLATFORM is relatively recent so it's a bit early for that. For
instance, Ubuntu 16.04 LTS (which is still supported) doesn't know about
it and wouldn't be able to use the device.
> So far so good, but now a question:
>
> how are we handling guest address width limitations?
> Is VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_IDENTITY_ADDRESS subject to
> guest address width limitations?
> I am guessing we can make them so ...
> This needs to be documented.
I'm not sure. I will get back to you on this.
>> > And can it access any guest physical address?
>>
>> Sorry, I was mistaken. We do support VFIO in guests but not for virtio
>> devices, only for regular PCI devices. In which case they will use
>> address translation.
>
> Not sure how this answers the question.
Because I had said that we had VFIO virtio drivers, you asked:
> >> > This confuses me.
> >> > If driver is unpriveledged then what happens with this flag?
> >> > It can supply any address it wants. Will that corrupt kernel
> >> > memory?
Since we can't actually have VFIO virtio drivers, there's nothing to
corrupt the kernel memory.
>> >> If the guest kernel is concerned that an unprivileged driver
could
>> >> jeopardize its integrity it should not negotiate this feature
flag.
>> >
>> > Unfortunately flag negotiation is done through config space
>> > and so can be overwritten by the driver.
>>
>> Ok, so the guest kernel has to forbid VFIO access on devices where this
>> flag is advertised.
>
> That's possible in theory but in practice we did not yet teach VFIO not
> to attach to legacy devices without VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.  So all
> security relies on host denying driver_ok without
> VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.  New options that bypass guest security are
> thus tricky as they can create security holes for existing guests.
> I'm open to ideas about how to do this in a safe way,
If the new flag isn't coupled with ACCESS_PLATFORM then the existing
mechanism of the host denying driver_ok when ACCESS_PLATFORM isn't set
will be enough.
>> >> Perhaps there should be a note about this in the flag
definition? This
>> >> concern is platform-dependant though. I don't believe
it's an issue in
>> >> pseries.
>> >
>> > Again ACCESS_PLATFORM has a pretty open definition. It does
actually
>> > say it's all up to the platform.
>> >
>> > Specifically how will VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_NO_TRANSLATION be
>> > implemented portably? virtio has no portable way to know
>> > whether DMA API bypasses translation.
>>
>> The fact that VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_NO_TRANSLATION is set
>> communicates that knowledge to virtio. There is a shared understanding
>> between the guest and the host about what this flag being set means.
>
> Right but I wonder how are you going to *actually* implement it on Linux?
> Are you adding a new set of DMA APIs that do everything except
> translation?
Actually it's the opposite. There's nothing to do in the guest besides
setting up SWIOTLB and sharing its buffer with the host.

Normally on pseries, devices use the dma_iommu_ops defined in
arch/powerpc/kernel/dma-iommu.c. I have a patch which changes the
device's dma_ops to NULL so that the default DMA path will be used:

https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/20190713060023.8479-12-bauerman at
linux.ibm.com/

Then another patch forces use of SWIOTLB and defines the
set_memory_{encrypted,decrypted} functions so that SWIOTLB can make its
buffer be shared with the host:

https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/20190713060023.8479-13-bauerman at
linux.ibm.com/

--
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center

On Sun, Jul 14, 2019 at 02:51:18AM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann
wrote:
> 
> 
> Michael S. Tsirkin <mst at redhat.com> writes:
> 
> > On Thu, Jun 27, 2019 at 10:58:40PM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> >>
> >> Michael S. Tsirkin <mst at redhat.com> writes:
> >>
> >> > On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 10:13:59PM -0300, Thiago Jung
Bauermann wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> Michael S. Tsirkin <mst at redhat.com> writes:
> >> >>
> >> >> > On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 06:42:00PM -0300, Thiago
Jung Bauermann wrote:
> >> >> >> I rephrased it in terms of address translation.
What do you think of
> >> >> >> this version? The flag name is slightly
different too:
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_NO_TRANSLATION This
feature has the same
> >> >> >>     meaning as VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM both
when set and when not set,
> >> >> >>     with the exception that address translation
is guaranteed to be
> >> >> >>     unnecessary when accessing memory addresses
supplied to the device
> >> >> >>     by the driver. Which is to say, the device
will always use physical
> >> >> >>     addresses matching addresses used by the
driver (typically meaning
> >> >> >>     physical addresses used by the CPU) and not
translated further. This
> >> >> >>     flag should be set by the guest if offered,
but to allow for
> >> >> >>     backward-compatibility device
implementations allow for it to be
> >> >> >>     left unset by the guest. It is an error to
set both this flag and
> >> >> >>     VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> > OK so VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM is designed to allow
unpriveledged
> >> >> > drivers. This is why devices fail when it's not
negotiated.
> >> >>
> >> >> Just to clarify, what do you mean by unprivileged
drivers? Is it drivers
> >> >> implemented in guest userspace such as with VFIO? Or
unprivileged in
> >> >> some other sense such as needing to use bounce buffers
for some reason?
> >> >
> >> > I had drivers in guest userspace in mind.
> >>
> >> Great. Thanks for clarifying.
> >>
> >> I don't think this flag would work for guest userspace
drivers. Should I
> >> add a note about that in the flag definition?
> >
> > I think you need to clarify access protection rules. Is it only
> > translation that is bypassed or is any platform-specific
> > protection mechanism bypassed too?
> 
> It is only translation. In a secure guest, if the device tries to access
> a memory address that wasn't provided by the driver then the
> architecture will deny that access. If the device accesses addresses
> provided to it by the driver, then there's no protection mechanism or
> translation to get in the way.
> 
> >> >> > This confuses me.
> >> >> > If driver is unpriveledged then what happens with
this flag?
> >> >> > It can supply any address it wants. Will that
corrupt kernel
> >> >> > memory?
> >> >>
> >> >> Not needing address translation doesn't necessarily
mean that there's no
> >> >> IOMMU. On powerpc we don't use
VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM but there's
> >> >> always an IOMMU present. And we also support VFIO
drivers. The VFIO API
> >> >> for pseries (sPAPR section in Documentation/vfio.txt) has
extra ioctls
> >> >> to program the IOMMU.
> >> >>
> >> >> For our use case, we don't need address translation
because we set up an
> >> >> identity mapping in the IOMMU so that the device can use
guest physical
> >> >> addresses.
> >
> > OK so I think I am beginning to see it in a different light.  Right
now the specific
> > platform creates an identity mapping. That in turn means DMA API can
be
> > fast - it does not need to do anything.  What you are looking for is a
> > way to tell host it's an identity mapping - just as an
optimization.
> >
> > Is that right?
> 
> Almost. Theoretically it is just an optimization. But in practice the
> pseries boot firmware (SLOF) doesn't support IOMMU_PLATFORM so it's
not
> possible to boot a guest from a device with that flag set.
> 
> > So this is what I would call this option:
> >
> > VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_IDENTITY_ADDRESS
> >
> > and the explanation should state that all device
> > addresses are translated by the platform to identical
> > addresses.
> >
> > In fact this option then becomes more, not less restrictive
> > than VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM - it's a promise
> > by guest to only create identity mappings,
> > and only before driver_ok is set.
> > This option then would always be negotiated together with
> > VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.
> >
> > Host then must verify that
> > 1. full 1:1 mappings are created before driver_ok
> >     or can we make sure this happens before features_ok?
> >     that would be ideal as we could require that features_ok fails
> > 2. mappings are not modified between driver_ok and reset
> >     i guess attempts to change them will fail -
> >     possibly by causing a guest crash
> >     or some other kind of platform-specific error
> 
> I think VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_IDENTITY_ADDRESS is good, but requiring
> it to be accompanied by ACCESS_PLATFORM can be a problem. One reason is
> SLOF as I mentioned above, another is that we would be requiring all
> guests running on the machine (secure guests or not, since we would use
> the same configuration for all guests) to support it. But
> ACCESS_PLATFORM is relatively recent so it's a bit early for that. For
> instance, Ubuntu 16.04 LTS (which is still supported) doesn't know
about
> it and wouldn't be able to use the device.
OK and your target is to enable use with kernel drivers within
guests, right?
My question is, we are defining a new flag here, I guess old guests
then do not set it. How does it help old guests? Or maybe it's
not designed to ...
> > So far so good, but now a question:
> >
> > how are we handling guest address width limitations?
> > Is VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_IDENTITY_ADDRESS subject to
> > guest address width limitations?
> > I am guessing we can make them so ...
> > This needs to be documented.
> 
> I'm not sure. I will get back to you on this.
> 
> >> > And can it access any guest physical address?
> >>
> >> Sorry, I was mistaken. We do support VFIO in guests but not for
virtio
> >> devices, only for regular PCI devices. In which case they will use
> >> address translation.
> >
> > Not sure how this answers the question.
> 
> Because I had said that we had VFIO virtio drivers, you asked:
> 
> > >> > This confuses me.
> > >> > If driver is unpriveledged then what happens with this
flag?
> > >> > It can supply any address it wants. Will that corrupt
kernel
> > >> > memory?
> 
> Since we can't actually have VFIO virtio drivers, there's nothing
to
> corrupt the kernel memory.
> 
> >> >> If the guest kernel is concerned that an unprivileged
driver could
> >> >> jeopardize its integrity it should not negotiate this
feature flag.
> >> >
> >> > Unfortunately flag negotiation is done through config space
> >> > and so can be overwritten by the driver.
> >>
> >> Ok, so the guest kernel has to forbid VFIO access on devices where
this
> >> flag is advertised.
> >
> > That's possible in theory but in practice we did not yet teach
VFIO not
> > to attach to legacy devices without VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.  So all
> > security relies on host denying driver_ok without
> > VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.  New options that bypass guest security are
> > thus tricky as they can create security holes for existing guests.
> > I'm open to ideas about how to do this in a safe way,
> 
> If the new flag isn't coupled with ACCESS_PLATFORM then the existing
> mechanism of the host denying driver_ok when ACCESS_PLATFORM isn't set
> will be enough.
> 
> >> >> Perhaps there should be a note about this in the flag
definition? This
> >> >> concern is platform-dependant though. I don't believe
it's an issue in
> >> >> pseries.
> >> >
> >> > Again ACCESS_PLATFORM has a pretty open definition. It does
actually
> >> > say it's all up to the platform.
> >> >
> >> > Specifically how will VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_NO_TRANSLATION
be
> >> > implemented portably? virtio has no portable way to know
> >> > whether DMA API bypasses translation.
> >>
> >> The fact that VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_NO_TRANSLATION is set
> >> communicates that knowledge to virtio. There is a shared
understanding
> >> between the guest and the host about what this flag being set
means.
> >
> > Right but I wonder how are you going to *actually* implement it on
Linux?
> > Are you adding a new set of DMA APIs that do everything except
> > translation?
> 
> Actually it's the opposite. There's nothing to do in the guest
besides
> setting up SWIOTLB and sharing its buffer with the host.
> 
> Normally on pseries, devices use the dma_iommu_ops defined in
> arch/powerpc/kernel/dma-iommu.c. I have a patch which changes the
> device's dma_ops to NULL so that the default DMA path will be used:
> 
> https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/20190713060023.8479-12-bauerman at
linux.ibm.com/
> 
> Then another patch forces use of SWIOTLB and defines the
> set_memory_{encrypted,decrypted} functions so that SWIOTLB can make its
> buffer be shared with the host:
> 
> https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/20190713060023.8479-13-bauerman at
linux.ibm.com/
> 
> --
> Thiago Jung Bauermann
> IBM Linux Technology Center

Michael S. Tsirkin <mst at redhat.com> writes:
> On Sun, Jul 14, 2019 at 02:51:18AM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
>>
>>
>> Michael S. Tsirkin <mst at redhat.com> writes:
>>
>> > So this is what I would call this option:
>> >
>> > VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_IDENTITY_ADDRESS
>> >
>> > and the explanation should state that all device
>> > addresses are translated by the platform to identical
>> > addresses.
>> >
>> > In fact this option then becomes more, not less restrictive
>> > than VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM - it's a promise
>> > by guest to only create identity mappings,
>> > and only before driver_ok is set.
>> > This option then would always be negotiated together with
>> > VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.
>> >
>> > Host then must verify that
>> > 1. full 1:1 mappings are created before driver_ok
>> >     or can we make sure this happens before features_ok?
>> >     that would be ideal as we could require that features_ok fails
>> > 2. mappings are not modified between driver_ok and reset
>> >     i guess attempts to change them will fail -
>> >     possibly by causing a guest crash
>> >     or some other kind of platform-specific error
>>
>> I think VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_IDENTITY_ADDRESS is good, but
requiring
>> it to be accompanied by ACCESS_PLATFORM can be a problem. One reason is
>> SLOF as I mentioned above, another is that we would be requiring all
>> guests running on the machine (secure guests or not, since we would use
>> the same configuration for all guests) to support it. But
>> ACCESS_PLATFORM is relatively recent so it's a bit early for that.
For
>> instance, Ubuntu 16.04 LTS (which is still supported) doesn't know
about
>> it and wouldn't be able to use the device.
>
> OK and your target is to enable use with kernel drivers within
> guests, right?
Right.
> My question is, we are defining a new flag here, I guess old guests
> then do not set it. How does it help old guests? Or maybe it's
> not designed to ...
Indeed. The idea is that QEMU can offer the flag, old guests can reject
it (or even new guests can reject it, if they decide not to convert into
secure VMs) and the feature negotiation will succeed with the flag
unset.

--
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center

Hello,

Just going back to this question which I wasn't able to answer.

Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman at linux.ibm.com> writes:
> Michael S. Tsirkin <mst at redhat.com> writes:
>
>> So far so good, but now a question:
>>
>> how are we handling guest address width limitations?
>> Is VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_IDENTITY_ADDRESS subject to
>> guest address width limitations?
>> I am guessing we can make them so ...
>> This needs to be documented.
>
> I'm not sure. I will get back to you on this.
We don't have address width limitations between host and guest.

--
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center