bugzilla-daemon at netfilter.org
2017-Oct-19 12:37 UTC
[Bug 1193] New: Incorrect malloc for SQL statements and missing strings length check
https://bugzilla.netfilter.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1193 Bug ID: 1193 Summary: Incorrect malloc for SQL statements and missing strings length check Product: ulogd Version: SVN (please provide timestamp) Hardware: All OS: All Status: NEW Severity: major Priority: P5 Component: ulogd Assignee: netfilter-buglog at lists.netfilter.org Reporter: jean at phpnet.org I developed a filter module for ulogd2 similar to the PWSNIFF module that is getting the hostname and URI of HTTP GET/POST requests from raw packets and i was experiencing segfaults when long strings were passed to escape_string() as i am inserting these values on a database. sql_createstmt() allocates 100 bytes per key, no mater what their type and content are. The segfaults are caused by the fact that there is no check on the length of strings : Values can be way longer than 100 chars and escaped values might even be twice the length of the original string. In my usecase case, strings can be quite long and might be triggered by users, making it easy for end-users to crash ulogd. This patch makes the allocation more "dynamic" for integers and safer for strings : - Integers are now reserving only the maximum possible number of bytes they could use (eg. ULOGD_RET_INT32 lowest value is -2147483648 which is 11 characters long : it will now only allocates 11 bytes for those keys instead of 100) - For strings, SQL_STRINGSIZE now defines the max length of values (before being escaped), values longer than SQL_STRINGSIZE will be set to NULL and the double of SQL_STRINGSIZE is malloc'd in case all characters would have to be escaped (eg. a value consisting exclusively of quotes will be twice as long after being returned by escape_string()) It might be better to fully abort the query generation if a string is longer than SQL_STRINGSIZE instead of setting its value to NULL but i am unsure on how to do that properly. Patch on the 2.0.5 codebase : --- util/db.c 2014-03-23 16:30:50.000000000 +0100 +++ util/db.c 2017-10-02 18:09:02.069746918 +0200 @@ -57,7 +57,8 @@ } #define SQL_INSERTTEMPL "SELECT P(Y)" -#define SQL_VALSIZE 100 +/* Maximum string length (non-escaped), will be replaced with NULL if longer */ +#define SQL_STRINGSIZE 255 /* create the static part of our insert statement */ static int sql_createstmt(struct ulogd_pluginstance *upi) @@ -78,13 +79,35 @@ for (i = 0; i < upi->input.num_keys; i++) { if (upi->input.keys[i].flags & ULOGD_KEYF_INACTIVE) continue; + + struct ulogd_key *key = upi->input.keys[i].u.source; + short key_length = 4; + /* we need space for the key and a comma, as well as - * enough space for the values */ - size += strlen(upi->input.keys[i].name) + 1 + SQL_VALSIZE; + * enough space for the values (and quotes around strings) */ + if(key->type == ULOGD_RET_STRING) { + /* SQL_STRINGSIZE is the max (VAR)CHAR length, *2 in case every of its characters would be escaped and +3 for the quotes around the string and the comma at the end */ + ulogd_log(ULOGD_DEBUG, "allocating %d bytes for string %s of type %s", (SQL_STRINGSIZE * 2) + 3, key->name, type_to_string(key->type)); + size += (SQL_STRINGSIZE * 2) + 3; + } else { + /* key_length is the maximum strlen for the specified integer type (ex: ULOGD_RET_INT32 lowest value is -2147483648 which is 11 characters long) */ + key_length = ulogd_key_size(key); + if(key_length < 1) { + /* ulogd_key_size() returns -1 for key types it does not know */ + key_length = SQL_STRINGSIZE; + ulogd_log(ULOGD_ERROR, "%s key length cannot be determined, forced to %hd bytes", upi->input.keys[i].name, key_length); + } else { + key_length = 10*key_length*8/33+2; + } + ulogd_log(ULOGD_DEBUG, "allocating %hd bytes for int %s of type %s", key_length, upi->input.keys[i].name, type_to_string(key->type)); + + /* +1 for the comma at the end */ + size += key_length + 1; + } } size += strlen(procedure); - ulogd_log(ULOGD_DEBUG, "allocating %u bytes for statement\n", size); + ulogd_log(ULOGD_DEBUG, "allocating a total of %u bytes for the statement\n", size); mi->stmt = (char *) malloc(size); if (!mi->stmt) { @@ -373,14 +396,20 @@ sprintf(stmt_ins, "'%d',", res->u.value.b); break; case ULOGD_RET_STRING: - *(stmt_ins++) = '\''; if (res->u.value.ptr) { - stmt_ins +- di->driver->escape_string(upi, stmt_ins, - res->u.value.ptr, - strlen(res->u.value.ptr)); + if(strlen(res->u.value.ptr) > SQL_STRINGSIZE) { + ulogd_log(ULOGD_ERROR, "The string for the key %s is too long (>%d chars), value is set to NULL", upi->input.keys[i].name, SQL_STRINGSIZE); + stmt_ins += sprintf(stmt_ins, "NULL,"); + } else { + /* the string is escaped and put between quotes */ + *(stmt_ins++) = '\''; + stmt_ins += di->driver->escape_string(upi, stmt_ins, res->u.value.ptr, strlen(res->u.value.ptr)); + stmt_ins += sprintf(stmt_ins, "\',"); + } + } else { + ulogd_log(ULOGD_NOTICE, "No string passed for the key %s, setting the value to NULL", upi->input.keys[i].name); + stmt_ins += sprintf(stmt_ins, "NULL,"); } - sprintf(stmt_ins, "',"); break; case ULOGD_RET_RAWSTR: sprintf(stmt_ins, "%s,", (char *) res->u.value.ptr); -- You are receiving this mail because: You are watching all bug changes. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... 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