FreeBSD Security Advisories
2001-Jul-30 16:07 UTC
FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-01:51.openssl
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ============================================================================FreeBSD-SA-01:51 Security Advisory FreeBSD, Inc. Topic: OpenSSL 0.9.6a and earlier contain flaw in PRNG Category: core Module: openssl Announced: 2001-07-30 Credits: Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <markku-juhani.saarinen@nokia.com> The OpenSSL Project <URL:http://www.openssl.org/> Affects: All releases of FreeBSD 4.x prior to 4.4, FreeBSD 4.3-STABLE prior to the correction date Corrected: 2001-07-19 21:00:45 UTC (FreeBSD 4.3-STABLE) 2001-07-19 21:01:08 UTC (FreeBSD 4.3-SECURITY aka RELENG_4_3) FreeBSD only: NO I. Background FreeBSD includes software from the OpenSSL Project. The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library. II. Problem Description A flaw in the pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) of OpenSSL versions previous to 0.9.6b allows an attacker to determine the PRNG state and future output under certain restricted conditions, thereby weakening the strength of the PRNG and any cryptographic protection which is derived from it. In effect, the flaw is that a portion of the PRNG state is incorrectly used as the PRNG output, allowing attackers to gain knowledge of the internal state of the PRNG by observing the output if they can sample it in a certain way. An attack taking advantage of this flaw has been identified that can recover the complete state of the PRNG from the output of one carefully sized PRNG request followed by a few hundred consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests. This access pattern is not typically obtainable in real-world uses of the PRNG in cryptographic protocols, and no exploit against a protocol supported by OpenSSL is currently known. III. Impact By successfully exploiting a flaw in the PRNG, an attacker can gain important information that may allow him to deduce nonces (leading to the compromise of the protocol session) or encryption keys (allowing the attacker to obtain the plaintext of the encrypted data). Whether or not this flaw is exploitable depends upon the specifics of the application using OpenSSL. No vulnerable applications or protocols are currently known. IV. Workaround None applicable. V. Solution One of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable FreeBSD system to 4.3-STABLE or the 4.3-SECURITY (aka RELENG_4_3) security branch after the respective correction dates. 2) FreeBSD 4.x systems prior to the correction date: The following patch have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 4.2-RELEASE, 4.3-RELEASE and 4.3-STABLE dated prior to the correction date. These patches may or may not apply to older, unsupported releases of FreeBSD. Download the patch and the detached PGP signature from the following locations, and verify the signature using your PGP utility. ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-01:51/openssl.patch ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-01:51/openssl.patch.asc # cd /usr/src/ # patch -p < /path/to/patch # cd /usr/src/lib/libcrypto/ # make depend && make all install One must also recompile any statically linked applications that use OpenSSL's PRNG. There are no such applications in the base system. 3) FreeBSD 4.3-RELEASE systems: An experimental upgrade package is available for users who wish to provide testing and feedback on the binary upgrade process. This package may be installed on FreeBSD 4.3-RELEASE systems only, and is intended for use on systems for which source patching is not practical or convenient. If you use the upgrade package, feedback (positive or negative) to security-officer@FreeBSD.org is requested so we can improve the process for future advisories. During the installation procedure, backup copies are made of the files which are replaced by the package. These backup copies will be reinstalled if the package is removed, reverting the system to a pre-patched state. # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/packages/SA-01:51/security-patch-openssl-01.51.tgz # fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/packages/SA-01:51/security-patch-openssl-01.51.tgz.asc Verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # pkg_add security-patch-openssl-01.51.tgz VI. Correction details The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was corrected for the maintained versions of FreeBSD. FreeBSD Version and CVS Tag Path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- FreeBSD 4.3-SECURITY (tag: RELENG_4_3) src/crypto/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.2.1 FreeBSD 4.3-STABLE (tag: RELENG_4) src/crypto/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c 1.1.1.1.2.4 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- VII. References <URL:http://www.openssl.org/source/exp/CHANGES> <URL:http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/3004> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (FreeBSD) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iQCVAwUBO2XkmVUuHi5z0oilAQFtJgP/WG21Z4Z61Lm2g9DPyvfXuPP9y4CjWl7J NqRPnIDoohXAGDm6KSybuNJ5DJ9jkdo4KW81S51w+aIMK6CvNb6yx1u+IDQsyuUD D6kzRid/RVhryBvG6W93VsLSw5wxZAyxDXZztdypemaEGWVXVJ3DKabTbJRfOFXH QlzWH/UvxDI=KGqc -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- This is the moderated mailing list freebsd-announce. The list contains announcements of new FreeBSD capabilities, important events and project milestones. 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