similar to: Problems with bad UDP checksums

On Thursday, April 5, 2001, at 02:09 , Theo de Raadt wrote: > please mail details about the bugs asap. The first bug I sent (pending/1759: 2.5.2p2 can't connect using protocol 2 to a 2.3.0p1 server), got sent back as "fixed in current" so hopefully that is taken care of (details at the bottom of this message). I'm happy to try and repro / debug these if necessary. The

https://bugzilla.netfilter.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1477 Bug ID: 1477 Summary: Unable to use saved ruleset when using dynamic sets Product: nftables Version: unspecified Hardware: x86_64 OS: All Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P5 Component: nft Assignee: pablo at

Hello, How can I pass a hash as parameter from a template with url_for? e.g. : if I have test = { :a => "a", :b => "b" } How can I pass that with my request? Is it possible to pass nested hash''es to? Right now, url_for :action => :test, test doesn''t seem to work. Thank you, --

On 19 Jun 2013, at 13:34, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> wrote: > > Could you provide the boot log of the DomU, backtrace, Xen version and > Dom0 kernel version? I did not have a console attached when it rebooted, so I did not have a log of the initial boot. Now that I did, I see that it fails to mount its root volume. It had been running previously on pvhvm_v10 for about

I apologize if this has been covered before. I have not seen a blow-by-blow installation guide for Ubuntu onto an iSCSI target. The install guides I have seen assume that you can make a target visible to all, which is a problem if you want multiple iSCSI installations on the same COMSTAR target. During install Ubuntu generates three random initiators and you have to deal with them to get things

Hello puppet users, I´de like to switch from md5 checksums to md5lite to save a few cpu cycles on my (overloaded) puppetmaster. so it is just replacing md5 to md5lite within my manifests and I´m done or do I have to keep things like the local clientbucket in mind? are there any procedures/recommondations regarding this? I´m running puppet >= 3.1.x on my puppet minions and master. bye ,

Being new at distro SOPs, I don't know if this is an unusual thought. With a kernel debug package (or any such debug package) would it be prudent in todays world to have a checksum or signature process to assure the downloaded file is untampered with and complete? What prompts this is I just downloaded the kernel packages that Johnny put up. I had not realized they were so large and thought

Hello, A little informal input on the TCP/UDP checksum deferral/offload: it fails for me. I have one Xen host, running a snapshot of xen-unstable at 2006-03-24 (9435:11fee62328cc). Each of its domUs are allocated their own /30, with the help of a hacked-up vif script. Prior to working around the problem, Domain-0 could establish TCP connections to other domains. In the case of SSH, it would

Hi, have you ever considered adding checksums to http://libguestfs.org/download/ (minor request) -- Evaggelos Balaskas - Unix System Engineer http://gr.linkedin.com/in/evaggelosbalaskas

There are known Collision Attacks for the MD5SUM method of hashing, so it is possible to modify a file and make it have the same MD5SUM as another file. See this link for details on Collision Attacks: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collision_attack Recommendation from the US-CERT concerning MD5SUM hashes: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/836068 Based on the above information, the CentOS team will

There are known Collision Attacks for the MD5SUM method of hashing, so it is possible to modify a file and make it have the same MD5SUM as another file. See this link for details on Collision Attacks: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collision_attack Recommendation from the US-CERT concerning MD5SUM hashes: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/836068 Based on the above information, the CentOS team will

--- builder/checksums.ml | 4 ++++ builder/checksums.mli | 1 + 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/builder/checksums.ml b/builder/checksums.ml index 73d541f..25b3328 100644 --- a/builder/checksums.ml +++ b/builder/checksums.ml @@ -24,17 +24,21 @@ open Utils open Printf type csum_t = +| SHA256 of string | SHA512 of string let string_of_csum_t = function + | SHA256 _ ->

Make use of the Checksums module to ease the verification of the SHA1 checksums in manifests. --- v2v/input_ova.ml | 17 +++++------------ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/v2v/input_ova.ml b/v2v/input_ova.ml index 4f848e2..5731a45 100644 --- a/v2v/input_ova.ml +++ b/v2v/input_ova.ml @@ -143,18 +143,11 @@ object if Str.string_match rex line 0 then (

On 02/09/2017 06:30 AM, Leonard den Ottolander wrote: > Hi all, > > Since the vault for 7.3.1611 has been cleared out last sunday (20170207) > - why is that? - I'm using git to download a "SRPM", or more accurately, > its contents. > > However, using git has one major drawback: It is missing checksums for > the files. > > Are there any plans to

Hello Johnny, On Thu, 2017-02-09 at 09:07 -0600, Johnny Hughes wrote: > Yes .. that content will be republished. It was an accident. How about my request for checksums in the git repo? Regards, Leonard. -- mount -t life -o ro /dev/dna /genetic/research

On Thu, 9 Feb 2017, Leonard den Ottolander wrote: > How about my request for checksums in the git repo? What checksums would you actually want in git? jh

On 02/09/2017 12:50 PM, Leonard den Ottolander wrote: > Hello John, > > On Thu, 2017-02-09 at 16:33 +0000, John Hodrien wrote: >> On Thu, 9 Feb 2017, Leonard den Ottolander wrote: >> >>> How about my request for checksums in the git repo? >> >> What checksums would you actually want in git? > > SRPMS are signed which allows the integrity of the

On Thu, 2017-02-09 at 12:58 -0600, Johnny Hughes wrote: > At the time of extraction, the <name>.metadata file is created (again, > not by us, but by the Red Hat team that distributes source), and all the > non-text sha1sums are in there as well as all the text sources. Aha, <name>.metadata, well, for f.e. bc I see only a checksum for the tarball, but not for the patch files.

On 02/09/2017 10:50 AM, Leonard den Ottolander wrote: > SRPMS are signed which allows the integrity of the contents to be > checked. Such an integrity check is missing from the git repo. Git already has the protection you're looking for. As part of its core design, git uses a hash chain to verify the integrity of its history. Every change and every file is thus protected.

On Thu, 2017-02-09 at 14:12 -0600, Johnny Hughes wrote: > The patch files are in git as text files, right? Why would you need > checksums of those? That is the purpose of git, right? Checksums are there to make sure that you get what you are supposed to get. That is also true for text files. (A source tarball is just a bunch of text files in an archive.) Having checksums for all files