similar to: About setpcred() and chroot()

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1567 Summary: Insufficient privileges to chroot() on AIX Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.2p1 Platform: PPC OS/Version: AIX Status: NEW Severity: major Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: unassigned-bugs at mindrot.org ReportedBy: bana

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=969 Summary: early setpcred() stomps on PAM Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 3.9p1 Platform: All OS/Version: AIX Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: openssh-bugs at mindrot.org ReportedBy: dleonard at

I need this for BSD/OS 4.2 + privsep perhaps we should not call do_setusercontext() after chroot(). --- sshd.c.orig Fri Jun 21 03:09:47 2002 +++ sshd.c Tue Jun 25 13:11:03 2002 @@ -548,21 +548,35 @@ /* Change our root directory*/ if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1) fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, strerror(errno)); if

Hi, (please CC me as I'm not subscribed to the list) If compiled with SELinux support, OpenSSH 4.8 current cvs fails for accounts where the new ChrootDirectory option is active : debug1: PAM: establishing credentials debug3: PAM: opening session debug2: User child is on pid 1695 debug3: mm_request_receive entering debug1: PAM: establishing credentials debug3: safely_chroot: checking

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1249 Summary: pam_open_session called with dropped privs Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 4.4p1 Platform: PPC OS/Version: AIX Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: bitbucket at mindrot.org ReportedBy: dleonard at

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1678 Summary: Insufficient privileges to chroot() on AIX Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.3p1 Platform: PPC OS/Version: AIX Status: NEW Severity: major Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: unassigned-bugs at mindrot.org ReportedBy:

Hi, the following patch by Pierre A. Humblet <Pierre.Humblet at ieee.org> allows to use more than one uid on 9x/Me boxes which is currently blocked due to the behaviour of Cygwin's security code. After this patch is applied to sshd, we can safely change the affected code in Cygwin. Thanks, Corinna Index: session.c ===================================================================

The way this was last supplied to this list (2002-07-13) has the chroot after the call to 'setpcred'. In AIX 4.3.3 the call to setpcred changes the uid and eff. uid to the user attempting to logon. Then the call to chroot( new_home ) fails because AIX requires that any user issuing the chroot subroutine be at root authority. Net result: attempting to do a chroot after the call to

Normally, in the !UseLogin case on a system with login classes, the umask is set implicitly by the first setusercontext() call in do_setusercontext() in session.c. However, FreeBSD treats the umask differently from other login settings: unless running with the target user's UID, it will only apply the value from /etc/login.conf, not that from the user's ~/.login.conf. The patch below

Currently, sshd requires the chroot directory to be owned by root. This makes it impossible to chroot users into their own home directory, which would be convenient for sftp-only users. Is there a particular reason why, in safely_chroot() in session.c, if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot "

Can we do this? Or should we drop the whole char *tty; ? There will be no way of setting the TTY= correctly while using privsep (Mainly for multiple streams over single session). The only thing we really could do is do: In do_setusercontext() if (use_privsep) aix_usrinfo(pw, NULL); and back in the old spot put: if (!use_privsep) aix_usrinfo(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty);

hi! i need ssh users and sftp users on my server. they don't mix so sftp users have a /bin/false as their shell. however when i try a ssh connect to such a user. he does not get disconnected but hangs forever. can it be that sshd searches foer /bin/false in the chroot environment? but i tried to place it there including ldd requirements. no success. i just want sftp users to get no shell

Hi all, Today, I was tasked at work with setting up a chroot SFTP server on a 64bit Arch Linux server. I naturally turned to Arch Linux's wiki article on the subject (http://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/SFTP-chroot) and the directions were very clear. However, the directions did not work. I kept getting a "Write failed: Broken pipe" error after attempting to connect. Upon digging

Hi, I am using OpenSSH_5.2p1. It seems ssh server doesn't support key regeneration after a specified amount of time. I manually verified the OpenSSH_5.2p1 and OpenSSH-6.2 source codes and haven?t found any code support for session rekeying in both releases. SSH2 supports session rekeying using the parameter ?RekeyIntervalSeconds? with default value 3600 seconds (one hour) in both

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=779 Summary: Chroot environment for sftp client crazy Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 3.7.1p2 Platform: Other URL: http://aixpanish.com OS/Version: AIX Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sftp-server AssignedTo:

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1461 Summary: session.c: don't chdir() after chroot() if chroot_path==pw->pw_dir Classification: Unclassified Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.0p1

For root sessions pam_open_session is called, but not pam_close_session. sshd behavior is broken for root logins because if pam session is run from the child, close is never called due to exec: on open since use_privsep is not set, parent calls do_exec_pty(), which does not open session. then, it skips calling do_setusercontext(), so it does not open session. child calls

Hi All. First the questions: Is there anything objectionable in this patch? Is AUDIT_FAIL_AUTH appropriate for the "Reason" field? Now the details: attached is a patch that changes some of the #includes for AIX. It moves the AIX-specific includes to port-aix.h and adds includes that contain the prototypes for many of the authentication functions. The idea isto fix some warnings.

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3715 Bug ID: 3715 Summary: safely_chroot is a little too restrictive: noexec or nosuid should be enough Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 9.8p1 Hardware: Other OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5

The following is a patch I've been working on to support a "ChrootUser" option in the sshd_config file. I was looking for a way to offer sftp access and at the same time restict interactive shell access. This patch is a necessary first step (IMO). It applies clean with 'patch -l'. Also attached is a shell script that helps to build a chrooted home dir on a RedHat 7.2