similar to: [Bridge] [PATCH] bridge: check kmem_cache_create() error

When the following commands are executed: brctl addbr br0 ifconfig br0 hw ether <addr> rmmod bridge The calltrace will occur: [ 563.312114] device eth1 left promiscuous mode [ 563.312188] br0: port 1(eth1) entered disabled state [ 563.468190] kmem_cache_destroy bridge_fdb_cache: Slab cache still has objects [ 563.468197] CPU: 6 PID: 6982 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G O

When the following commands are executed: brctl addbr br0 ifconfig br0 hw ether <addr> rmmod bridge The calltrace will occur: [ 563.312114] device eth1 left promiscuous mode [ 563.312188] br0: port 1(eth1) entered disabled state [ 563.468190] kmem_cache_destroy bridge_fdb_cache: Slab cache still has objects [ 563.468197] CPU: 6 PID: 6982 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G O

On 15/05/2023 11:50, Johannes Nixdorf wrote: > A malicious actor behind one bridge port may spam the kernel with packets > with a random source MAC address, each of which will create an FDB entry, > each of which is a dynamic allocation in the kernel. > > There are roughly 2^48 different MAC addresses, further limited by the > rhashtable they are stored in to 2^31. Each entry is

Use bitmap_set and bitmap_clear rather than modifying individual bits in a memory region. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita at gmail.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge at citrix.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk at oracle.com> Cc: xen-devel at lists.xensource.com Cc: virtualization at lists.linux-foundation.org --- drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c |

Use bitmap_set and bitmap_clear rather than modifying individual bits in a memory region. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita at gmail.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge at citrix.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk at oracle.com> Cc: xen-devel at lists.xensource.com Cc: virtualization at lists.linux-foundation.org --- drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c |

A malicious actor behind one bridge port may spam the kernel with packets with a random source MAC address, each of which will create an FDB entry, each of which is a dynamic allocation in the kernel. There are roughly 2^48 different MAC addresses, further limited by the rhashtable they are stored in to 2^31. Each entry is of the type struct net_bridge_fdb_entry, which is currently 128 bytes big.

A malicious actor behind one bridge port may spam the kernel with packets with a random source MAC address, each of which will create an FDB entry, each of which is a dynamic allocation in the kernel. There are roughly 2^48 different MAC addresses, further limited by the rhashtable they are stored in to 2^31. Each entry is of the type struct net_bridge_fdb_entry, which is currently 128 bytes big.

The following 6 patches cleanup the jbd code and kill about 200 lines. First of 4 patches can apply to 2.6.13-git8 and 2.6.13-mm2. The rest of them can apply to 2.6.13-mm2. fs/jbd/checkpoint.c | 179 +++++++++++-------------------------------- fs/jbd/commit.c | 101 ++++++++++-------------- fs/jbd/journal.c | 11 +- fs/jbd/revoke.c | 158

On Sun, Oct 28, 2012 at 04:18:59PM +0900, Akinobu Mita wrote: > Use random32_get_bytes() to generate 16 bytes of pseudo-random bytes. > > Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Since your patch is going to allow users to set the random seed, it means that what had previously been a bad security bug has just become a grievous security bug. If you are going to be

any idea what the reason for this error is? [2006-11-07 13:59:31 xend 3167] DEBUG (__init__:1072) exception looking up device number for 0: [Errno 2] No such file or directory: ''/dev/0'' my config file looks like this: name = "solaris" memory = "400" kernel = "/solaris/platform/i86xen/kernel/amd64/unix" extra =

I'm running a bit late with the e-mail this time around, but I think that's ok since there really isn't any major new features here - the bulk of the Ocfs2 update is bug fixes, or cleanups. The same goes for configfs. The only two things that could be described as features would be: - Sunil has updated Ocfs2 to provide even more live cluster locking information via debugfs. - Joel

Introduce a limit on the amount of learned FDB entries on a bridge, configured by netlink with a build time default on bridge creation in the kernel config. For backwards compatibility the kernel config default is disabling the limit (0). Without any limit a malicious actor may OOM a kernel by spamming packets with changing MAC addresses on their bridge port, so allow the bridge creator to limit

Changes since v9: * series re-ordering so make functionality more distinct. Basic vlan filtering is patches 1-4. Support for PVID/untagged vlans is patches 5 and 6. VLAN support for FDB/MDB is patches 7-11. Patch 12 is still additional egress policy. * Slight simplification to code that extracts the VID from skb. Since we now depend on the vlan module, at the time of input skb_tci is

This series of patches provides an ability to add VLANs to the bridge ports. This is similar to what can be found in most switches. The bridge port may have any number of VLANs added to it including vlan 0 priority tagged traffic. When vlans are added to the port, only traffic tagged with particular vlan will forwarded over this port. Additionally, vlan ids are added to FDB entries and become