Displaying 20 results from an estimated 7000 matches similar to: "security features"
2014 May 14
3
[CFT] ASLR, PIE, and segvguard on 11-current and 10-stable
Hey All,
[NOTE: crossposting between freebsd-current@, freebsd-security@, and
freebsd-stable at . Please forgive me if crossposting is frowned upon.]
Address Space Layout Randomization, or ASLR for short, is an exploit
mitigation technology. It helps secure applications against low-level
exploits. A popular secure implementation is known as PaX ASLR, which is
a third-party patch for Linux. Our
2014 May 14
3
[CFT] ASLR, PIE, and segvguard on 11-current and 10-stable
Hey All,
[NOTE: crossposting between freebsd-current@, freebsd-security@, and
freebsd-stable at . Please forgive me if crossposting is frowned upon.]
Address Space Layout Randomization, or ASLR for short, is an exploit
mitigation technology. It helps secure applications against low-level
exploits. A popular secure implementation is known as PaX ASLR, which is
a third-party patch for Linux. Our
2005 Jan 26
1
Compiling xenlinux 2.4.29 with grsec.. help needed
Hi list!
I''m trying to run 2.4.29-xenU with grsec. Jacob Gorm Hansen said couple of
weeks ago, that grsec should work with xen when pax is disabled..
Well, to get the kernel compiling there''s some source hacking that needs to
be done.. I''ll describe what I did and what error I got:
I downloaded xen-2.0-testing-src.tgz and extracted it. I edited the toplevel
Makefile
2011 Dec 09
1
[LLVMdev] [PATCH] Add the disable_aslr option that will disable the address space layout randomization under AddressSanitizer on 10.6
On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 12:00 PM, Alexander Potapenko <glider at google.com>wrote:
> > As for the patch, I really don't like
> > 1. 3 different cases for 3 different flavors of MacOS. How are we
> goring
> > to support it?
> The first is Leopard, which we don't want to support at all. Maybe we
> should check that in some other place.
> The second is
2011 Dec 09
0
[LLVMdev] [PATCH] Add the disable_aslr option that will disable the address space layout randomization under AddressSanitizer on 10.6
> As for the patch, I really don't like
> 1. 3 different cases for 3 different flavors of MacOS. How are we goring
> to support it?
The first is Leopard, which we don't want to support at all. Maybe we
should check that in some other place.
The second is Snow Leopard, where ASLR is controlled by the
DYLD_NO_PIE env var, which is read by the dynamic loader.
The third is Lion,
2007 Oct 26
1
Linux grsec Guest on HVM Xen 3.1.1
Hello everybody
For network simulation purposes I am trying to run a Linux image with
a PAX enabled grsec kernel on a Gentoo xen-3.1.1 with HVM. While the
image boots flawlessly on real hardware the kernel does not really
like the fully virtualized Xen/Qemu environment. It does not succeed
to boot (for dmesg see attachment). I first tried with the grsec-
patched 2.6.14.6 sources but it
2011 Dec 09
0
[LLVMdev] [PATCH] Add the disable_aslr option that will disable the address space layout randomization under AddressSanitizer on 10.6
Options when creating a main executable
-pie This makes a special kind of main executable that is position
independent (PIE). On Mac OS X 10.5 and later, the OS the OS
will load a PIE at a random address each time it is executed.
You cannot create a PIE from .o files compiled with -mdy-
namic-no-pic. That means the
2011 Dec 09
2
[LLVMdev] [PATCH] Add the disable_aslr option that will disable the address space layout randomization under AddressSanitizer on 10.6
Yes, we have no ASRL with -no_pie.
Can we disable ASRL even with -pie?
On linux we can do it with "setarch x86_64 -R".
Another question: if asan would require -no_pie on Mac, will this be a
serious limitation?
Thanks,
--kcc
On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 11:07 AM, Eric Christopher <echristo at apple.com>wrote:
> Options when creating a main executable
> -pie This
2011 Dec 09
2
[LLVMdev] [PATCH] Add the disable_aslr option that will disable the address space layout randomization under AddressSanitizer on 10.6
On Dec 9, 2011, at 11:46 AM, Alexander Potapenko wrote:
>> Link time is of course better.
>> But if there is a syscall (like the one used by setarch) we could call it
>> and reexec.
>> Using setenv("DYLD_NO_PIE")+reexec looks gross to me.
> There's posix_spawnattr_setflags() that can do the job
>
2011 Dec 09
2
[LLVMdev] [PATCH] Add the disable_aslr option that will disable the address space layout randomization under AddressSanitizer on 10.6
On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 11:24 AM, Eric Christopher <echristo at apple.com>wrote:
>
> On Dec 9, 2011, at 11:23 AM, Kostya Serebryany wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 11:16 AM, Eric Christopher <echristo at apple.com>wrote:
>
>>
>> On Dec 9, 2011, at 11:12 AM, Kostya Serebryany wrote:
>>
>> > Yes, we have no ASRL with -no_pie.
>>
2011 Dec 09
0
[LLVMdev] [PATCH] Add the disable_aslr option that will disable the address space layout randomization under AddressSanitizer on 10.6
> Link time is of course better.
> But if there is a syscall (like the one used by setarch) we could call it
> and reexec.
> Using setenv("DYLD_NO_PIE")+reexec looks gross to me.
There's posix_spawnattr_setflags() that can do the job
(http://reverse.put.as/2011/08/11/how-gdb-disables-aslr-in-mac-os-x-lion/),
but the necessary flag appeared only in Lion.
To the best of my
2013 Feb 08
1
[LLVMdev] The MBlaze backend: can we remove it?
On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 5:54 PM, Chandler Carruth <chandlerc at google.com>wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 7:37 PM, 陳韋任 (Wei-Ren Chen) <
> chenwj at iis.sinica.edu.tw> wrote:
>
>> Hi Rogelio,
>>
>> Glad to see MBlaze will not be removed. I suggest you put your name on
>> CODE_OWNERS.TXT. ;)
>>
>
> I think instead, it would be more
2015 Oct 21
2
Some feedback on Libfuzzer
On Tue, Oct 20, 2015 at 10:53 PM, Kostya Serebryany <kcc at google.com> wrote:
> Can you open a separate bug with exact repro instructions?
Well the bug tracker seems to require an account.
But in any case I don't see anything specific to reproduce. I did an
svn update of llvm and clang and built and installed (I even tried
make clean and removed the old install but it didn't
2017 Sep 13
4
sanitizer test case failures after OS update
I updated one of my powerpc64le llvm test systems to Fedora 25 and I
started getting a whole bunch of sanitizer test case failures. I tried
testing some earlier revisions on the new OS that had worked fine under
the old but they generate the same errors now so it isn't any changes in
llvm.
There are two different errors:
FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range
FATAL: Found 47 -
2015 Sep 12
2
Some feedback on Libfuzzer
On Sat, Sep 12, 2015 at 7:48 PM, Greg Stark <stark at mit.edu> wrote:
> I get that even if I put -fPIE in CFLAGS.
Er, yeah. Even a trivial test case doesn't work:
$ cat foo.c
int main(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[]) {
return 1;
}
$ clang -o foo -fsanitize=memory -fPIE -pie foo.c
$ sysctl kernel.randomize_va_space
kernel.randomize_va_space = 2
$ ./foo
FATAL: Code
2020 Mar 04
2
[PATCH v11 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization
On Tue, Mar 03, 2020 at 01:19:22PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 03, 2020 at 01:01:26PM -0800, Kristen Carlson Accardi wrote:
> > On Tue, 2020-03-03 at 07:43 -0800, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> > > On Tue, Mar 3, 2020 at 1:55 AM Peter Zijlstra <peterz at infradead.org>
> > > > But,... do we still need this in the light of that fine-grained
> > >
2020 Mar 04
2
[PATCH v11 00/11] x86: PIE support to extend KASLR randomization
On Tue, Mar 03, 2020 at 01:19:22PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 03, 2020 at 01:01:26PM -0800, Kristen Carlson Accardi wrote:
> > On Tue, 2020-03-03 at 07:43 -0800, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> > > On Tue, Mar 3, 2020 at 1:55 AM Peter Zijlstra <peterz at infradead.org>
> > > > But,... do we still need this in the light of that fine-grained
> > >
2015 Oct 20
2
Some feedback on Libfuzzer
Hm, that bug has been closed as resolved but I still see the problem:
$ clang --version
clang version 3.8.0 (trunk 250848) (llvm/trunk 250846)
Target: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
Thread model: posix
InstalledDir: /usr/local/bin
configure:4042: ./conftest
FATAL: Code 0x5615faea43f0 is out of application range. Non-PIE build?
FATAL: MemorySanitizer can not mmap the shadow memory.
FATAL: Make sure to
2011 Dec 09
2
[LLVMdev] [PATCH] Add the disable_aslr option that will disable the address space layout randomization under AddressSanitizer on 10.6
+llvmdev
Question to MacOS gurus: is there a way to disable ASLR (address space
layout randomization) on Darwin at link time
instead of doing setenv("DYLD_NO_PIE", "1", 1); and reexec?
Thanks,
--kcc
On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 4:28 AM, Alexander Potapenko <glider at google.com>wrote:
> The attached patch introduces the disable_aslr option (off by default)
> and the
2011 Dec 09
4
[LLVMdev] [PATCH] Add the disable_aslr option that will disable the address space layout randomization under AddressSanitizer on 10.6
On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 11:16 AM, Eric Christopher <echristo at apple.com>wrote:
>
> On Dec 9, 2011, at 11:12 AM, Kostya Serebryany wrote:
>
> > Yes, we have no ASRL with -no_pie.
> > Can we disable ASRL even with -pie?
> > On linux we can do it with "setarch x86_64 -R".
> >
>
> You asked about link time. Now it sounds like you're talking