similar to: how to block brute force attacks on reverse tunnels?

For many years I've been running ssh reverse tunnels on portable Linux, OpenWRT, Android etc. hosts so they can be accessed from a server whose IP is stable (I call such a server a "nexus host"). Increasingly there's a problem with brute force attacks on the nexus host's tunnel ports. The attack is forwarded to the portable tunneling host, where it fails, but it chews up

https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=6695 Summary: whitespace problem in directory paths; I know of no work-around Product: rsync Version: 3.0.6 Platform: Other OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P3 Component: core AssignedTo: wayned at samba.org

In https://wiki.dovecot.org/Migration/Courier , mail_location = maildir:~/Maildir namespace { prefix = INBOX. separator = . inbox = yes } ... is wrong. Apparently it should be ... mail_location = maildir:~/INBOX ...which at least seemed to work, although (by that time?) I wound up re-downloading all mail. Steve Newcomb srn at coolheads.com (Unable to edit the wiki page...

Why do attacks from the Internet get shown in the Asterisk logs with myAsteriskServerIP instead of the attacker's IP?! Really useful for blocking them, that is... Example: [Mar 6 00:00:00] NOTICE[1926] chan_sip.c: Failed to authenticate user 5550000<sip:5550000 at myAsteriskServerIP>;tag=ab8537ae (I replaced our IP address with myAsteriskServerIP. The attacks are not coming from

I was hoping to set up fail2ban to block IP addresses that generate too many Samba password failures, but it needs a syslog message with the IP address of the computer that failed password authentication. Unfortunately, Samba doesn't seem to do this in my environment. Here's a sample error message: smbd[312]: smb_pam_passcheck: PAM: smb_pam_auth failed - Rejecting User brutus ! I

We have several web applications deployed under Apache that require a user id / password authentication. Some of these use htdigest and others use the application itself. Recently we have experienced several brute force attacks against some of these services which have been dealt with for the nonce by changes to iptables. However, I am not convinced that these changes are the answer. Therefore

I'm looking for a way to deny access to dovecot from certain IP addresses, basically to help prevent brute force attacks on the server. Right now I'm using denyhosts which scans /var/log/secure for authentication failures which then can add an entry to /etc/hosts.deny, but since dovecot doesn't have tcp wrappers support, that doesn't do anything. It doesn't look like I can

Hi We've just noticed attempts (close to 200000 attempts, sequential peer numbers) at guessing peers on 2 of out servers and thought I'd share the originating IPs with the list in case anyone wants to firewall them as we have done 109.170.106.59 112.142.55.18 124.157.161.67 Ish -- Ishfaq Malik Software Developer PackNet Ltd Office: 0161 660 3062 -------------- next part

Hi Jochen, On Wed, 12 Feb 2020 at 00:16, Jochen Bern <Jochen.Bern at binect.de> wrote: > > On 02/11/2020 07:07 PM, Cl?ment P?ron wrote: > > - I have X devices (around 30) and one SSH server > > - Each of them have a unique public key and create one dynamic reverse > > port forwarding on the server > > - All of them connect with the same UNIX user (I don't

Hello list. I'm trying to find a way to block any ip that tries to login more than three times with the wrong password and try to log in three different extensions. For I have suffered some brute force attacks on my asterisk in the morning period. The idea would be: Any ip with three attempts without success to log into an extension is blocked. Is there any way to accomplish this directly

Over the weekend one of our servers at a remote location was hammered by an IP originating in mainland China. This attack was only noteworthy in that it attempted to connect to our pop3 service. We have long had an IP throttle on ssh connections to discourage this sort of thing. But I had not considered the possibility that other services were equally at risk. Researching this on the web does

On 24.10.24 02:06, Mabry Tyson wrote: > I [...] sent mail to openssh at openssh.com but the mail was not delivered. > 24 hours after I sent email to that address, I got a DSN indicating > >> Remote server returned '550 5.4.300 Message expired -> 451 Temporary >> failure, please try again later.' ... yeaaahhh whatever it takes to convince the MX that it's *not*

Hello everyone, I work in a setting where remote logins are usually authenticated with SSH user keypairs, but many target accounts need to have a password set nonetheless (to use with sudo, log in via remote KVM, etc.) and cannot be put under a central user administration like LDAP. Enter a corporate password policy that requires passwords to be complex, different everywhere, and of limited

On 05/16/2018 06:07 AM, Aki Tuomi wrote: >> On 15 May 2018 at 22:43 Gandalf Corvotempesta <gandalf.corvotempesta at gmail.com> wrote: >> Is possible to implement and end-to-end encryption with dovecot, where >> server-side there is no private key to decrypt messages? > > You could probably automate this with sieve and e.g. GnuPG, which would mean > that all your

Hi, On Mon, Jan 13, 2020 at 03:16:00PM +0000, Jochen Bern wrote: > Out of interest: > 1. If an extended mechanism were to be implemented, which server pubkey > do you expect to be seen/stored/verified by the client? The proxy's > / v4 middlebox's, or the v6 backend's? Or would you require that all > server-side machines use the *same* host keypairs? I'd do

I was wondering if anyone had implemented rules like this in shorewall: http://blog.andrew.net.au/tech I see tons of brute force attempts on the machines I administer, and I like the idea of limiting them without the need for extra daemons scanning for attacks. Thanks, Dale -- Dale E. Martin - dale@the-martins.org http://the-martins.org/~dmartin

Hello, I have asked on the postfix mailing list for a solution, how to encrypt incoming emails with public gpg key My original idea was to use a smtpd-milter, which would encrypt all incoming plaintext messages of given user, using the users public gpg key. This way, it would look as if the original sender has sent the message encrypted. Somebody suggested this might be better done in Dovecot,

On Fri, 2019-02-15 at 15:57 +1100, Darren Tucker wrote: > That was the original intent (and it's mentioned in RFC4419) however > each moduli file we ship (70-80 instances of 6 sizes) takes about 1 > cpu-month to generate on a lowish-power x86-64 machine. Most of it > is > parallelizable, but even then it'd likely take a few hours to > generate > one of each size. I

I wanted to bring up a security concern, and sent mail to openssh at openssh.com but the mail was not delivered.? I hope that one of the developers is on this list and can make sure this mail delivery problem is seen by the right people. (If needed, please contact me directly.)? My apologies for sending this to the whole list... (FYI, it is not about an urgent security issue, but something I

On 12/15/2018 12:34 AM, @lbutlr wrote: > On 14 Dec 2018, at 16:30, @lbutlr <kremels at kreme.com> wrote: >> Is it possible to override the POP3 delete on download command and make >> sure that messages stay on the server for at least X hours or X days? >> It is important that the messages be around long enough to hit a snapshot >> cycle (using rsnapshot to backup