similar to: Does CVE-2020-1472 impact samba AD domains?

Yes $ ./zerologon_tester.py ap42 192.168.1.2 Performing authentication attempts...

On Tue, 2020-09-15 at 19:33 -0400, Tom Diehl via samba wrote: > Hi, > > I saw > https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/09/14/cve-2020-1472-zerologon-critical-privilege-escalation/ > and > https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472 > today and I am wondering what impact if any this has on samba AD > domains in > particular and samba in

Release Announcements --------------------- These are security releases in order to address the following defect: o CVE-2020-1472: Unauthenticated domain takeover via netlogon ("ZeroLogon"). The following applies to Samba used as domain controller only (most seriously the Active Directory DC, but also the classic/NT4-style DC). Installations running Samba as a file server only are

Release Announcements --------------------- These are security releases in order to address the following defect: o CVE-2020-1472: Unauthenticated domain takeover via netlogon ("ZeroLogon"). The following applies to Samba used as domain controller only (most seriously the Active Directory DC, but also the classic/NT4-style DC). Installations running Samba as a file server only are

Release Announcements --------------------- This is the first stable release of the Samba 4.13 release series. Please read the release notes carefully before upgrading. ZeroLogon ========= Please avoid to set "server schannel = no" and "server schannel= auto" on all Samba domain controllers due to the wellknown ZeroLogon issue. For details please see

Release Announcements --------------------- This is the first stable release of the Samba 4.13 release series. Please read the release notes carefully before upgrading. ZeroLogon ========= Please avoid to set "server schannel = no" and "server schannel= auto" on all Samba domain controllers due to the wellknown ZeroLogon issue. For details please see

The following applies to Samba used as domain controller only. (Both as classic/NT4-style and active direcory DC.) Samba users have reported that the exploit for "ZeroLogin" passes against Samba. Samba has some protection for this issue because since Samba 4.8 we have set a default of 'server schannel = yes'. Users who have changed this default are hereby warned that

The following applies to Samba used as domain controller only. (Both as classic/NT4-style and active direcory DC.) Samba users have reported that the exploit for "ZeroLogin" passes against Samba. Samba has some protection for this issue because since Samba 4.8 we have set a default of 'server schannel = yes'. Users who have changed this default are hereby warned that

Hello ML, are there information about the CVE-2020-1472 , whether this bug also infects samba Server without DC configuration (standalone smb Server) ? I'll did not find any information in the short time and can not decide if this systems are affected. Can you please help me, to clear my clouded brain. best regards Michael

Hello Richard As discussed in the IRC channel, when merging a moderately large reg file (~35MB) to a hiv file (~118 MB); hivex generates a huge hiv file (~580 MB). These changes address that by creating a list of unallocated blocks and reassigning unused blocks. I used https://github.com/msuhanov/regf/blob/master/Windows%20registry%20file%20format%20specification.md as a reference for the

https://portal.msrc.micro...idance/advisory/adv200005 Published: 03/10/2020 ? Workarounds The following workaround may be helpful in your situation. In all cases, Microsoft strongly recommends that you install the updates for this vulnerability as soon as they become available even if you plan to leave this workaround in place: Disable SMBv3 compression You can disable compression to block

Mandi! Andrew Bartlett via samba In chel di` si favelave... > If you don't have any trusted domains then the big thing is an attacker > being able to remove a member server from the domain, or get session > keys (assisting a takeover 'MITM attack' of an existing session). So, effectively, on NT domain the attack surface of the bug is reduced? If i've understood well

On Fri, 2020-09-18 at 15:39 +0200, Marco Gaiarin via samba wrote: > Mandi! Karolin Seeger via samba > In chel di` si favelave... > > > (Both as classic/NT4-style and active direcory DC.) > > I've searched some info on impact of this bug on NT domains, finding > nothing on the net. > > OK, NT domain are dead, i know, but... i seek some feedback. > On real

Hello again, after obtaining the keytab file I tried to use kinit keytab.file followed by the spn $ samba-tool spn list z1 z1 User CN=z1,CN=Users,DC=home,DC=lan has the following servicePrincipalName: zookeeper/ap42.home.lan $ samba-tool domain exportkeytab z1.ktab --principal=z1 $ samba-tool domain exportkeytab z1.ktab --principal=zookeeper/ap42.home.lan $ kinit -V -k -t z1.ktab

The production will be updated as soon as possible, back to the kinit it seems to me that we are going around the problem :) I will do tests, in the next few days I will make up for it unless there are some hints. thanks. Il giorno mer 10 giu 2020 alle ore 20:46 Rowland penny via samba < samba at lists.samba.org> ha scritto: > On 10/06/2020 19:25, banda bassotti via samba wrote: >

Hello, since we install the most recent windows updates from 07/2023 Test-ComputerSecureChannel -Verbose show False [4]. Moved the machine to local workgroup, deleted machine account on the ad controller and rejoined it (which works), but Test-ComputerSecureChannel -Verbose show again False. I'm not sure this is an issue on the samba or on the windows side. Affected samba versions so far:

On 19/09/2020 14:00, Rowland penny via samba wrote: > > On 19/09/2020 13:42, Michael Wandel via samba wrote: >> Hello ML, >> >> are there information about the CVE-2020-1472 , whether this bug also >> infects samba Server without DC configuration (standalone smb Server) ? >> >> I'll did not find any information in the short time and can not decide

Can you run this script on both DC's. https://github.com/thctlo/samba4/raw/master/samba-collect-debug-info.sh Anonimize where needed but keep thing like. You.dom.tld like that, dont change that to example.tld. Greetz, Louis > -----Oorspronkelijk bericht----- > Van: samba [mailto:samba-bounces at lists.samba.org] Namens > Durwin via samba > Verzonden: vrijdag 28 februari

-----Original Message----- From: centos-bounces at centos.org [mailto:centos-bounces at centos.org] On Behalf Of Yiorgos Stamoulis Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 3:33 PM To: CentOS mailing list Subject: [CentOS] is everyone aware of this? BRUCE STANLEY wrote: > I am having some issues (e.g. System lock ups) with my ATI 9250 Video > card. > > I am thinging about replacing it with

Hi everyone, While trying software, I've found that when I tried to install Catz 2, my computer reboot (I've tried twice). Before opening a bug, what channel I have to log ? WINEDEBUG = +seh,+relay ? I'm using xUbuntu 6.06 and wine 0.9.27 Thanks, Michael