similar to: Samba AD Trust and Linux Clients Failing with Kerberos

Just a tip... is all server have same time ? not sure that will help you.. ----------------------------------- St?phane PURNELLE Admin. Syst?mes et R?seaux Service Informatique Corman S.A. Tel : 00 32 (0)87/342467 samba-technical-bounces at lists.samba.org wrote on 20/02/2014 10:46:38: > De : Georg Hopp <georg at steffers.org> > A : Sumit

Hi, I rarely deal with kerberos but everytime I do it's painful... I have a Windows Server 2016 VM at foo-ad.foo.com. It has the AD role and it owns the FOO.COM domain. I added a *AD* account FOO\aaptel%aaptel. PS C:\share> get-aduser aaptel DistinguishedName : CN=aaptel,CN=Users,DC=foo,DC=com Enabled : True GivenName : Name :

Asterisk Project Security Advisory - AST-2008-003 +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Product | Asterisk | |--------------------+---------------------------------------------------| | Summary | Unauthenticated calls allowed from SIP channel | | | driver

Asterisk Project Security Advisory - AST-2008-003 +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Product | Asterisk | |--------------------+---------------------------------------------------| | Summary | Unauthenticated calls allowed from SIP channel | | | driver

modern syslog daemons (including rsyslog, which is default on just about every linux system) allow you to filter efficiently on the message contents, not just the severity, so you can opt to throw out the messages you don't want. I advocate for a slightly different way of dealing with it, filter these messages from your main logstream, but put them into either a script directly, or a

Asterisk Project Security Advisory - AST-2011-005 Product Asterisk Summary File Descriptor Resource Exhaustion Nature of Advisory Denial of Service Susceptibility Remote Unauthenticated TCP Based Sessions (TCP SIP, Skinny,

Asterisk Project Security Advisory - AST-2011-005 Product Asterisk Summary File Descriptor Resource Exhaustion Nature of Advisory Denial of Service Susceptibility Remote Unauthenticated TCP Based Sessions (TCP SIP, Skinny,

Dear OpenSSH developers, a publicly accessible sshd on port 22 generates a lot of log clutter from unauthenticated connections. For an exemplary host on a university network, sshd accumulates 5~20k log lines on a single day (more than 90% of the total amount of syslog lines). That is despite the host having a restricted configuration (no SSH password authentication, firewall rate limit for

I am having an issue adding new clients to puppet. The master is not accepting connections from unauthenticated clients, even though my auth.conf that worked with v3.1.1 has not changed. If I test ssl via curl -k, the puppet master returns "can''t convert nil into String" to the client. The http log on the master shows a 400 return code. Also note, I''m using

Hi list, i noticed from the cli my asterisk box is accepting unauthenticated calls how can i prevent this? CLI: -- Accepting UNAUTHENTICATED call from 192.168.0.2: > requested format = gsm, > requested prefs = (), > actual format = ulaw, > host prefs = (g729|ulaw|alaw), > priority = mine -------------- next part -------------- An HTML

> Asterisk Project Security Advisory - ASA-2007-010 > > +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ > | Product | Asterisk | > |--------------------+---------------------------------------------------| > | Summary | Two stack buffer overflows in SIP

> Asterisk Project Security Advisory - ASA-2007-010 > > +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ > | Product | Asterisk | > |--------------------+---------------------------------------------------| > | Summary | Two stack buffer overflows in SIP

Skipped content of type multipart/alternative-------------- next part -------------- Console logs from Asterisk A: Executing Dial("SIP/test0-5821", "Zap/6/327557670||Tt") in new stack -- Requested transfer capability: 0x00 - SPEECH -- Called 6/327557670 -- Zap/6-1 is proceeding passing it to SIP/test0-5821 -- Accepting UNAUTHENTICATED call from 195.66.73.122:

On 05/17/2018 11:38 AM, Frank Vanoni wrote: > On Thu, 2018-05-17 at 11:18 -0400, sean darcy wrote: > >> 3. How do I set up the server to block these ? >> >> 4. Can I stop the retransmitting of the 401 Unauthorized packets ? > > I'm happy with Fail2Ban protecting my Asterisk 13. Here is my > configuration: > > in /etc/asterisk/logger.conf: > >

What is the difference between H323 and OH323 in Asterisk? I need Asterisk to have basic H.323 support so we can offer some simple H323 termination for some of our Cisco and Quintim hardware. Our upstream provider uses SIP, so I figured I'd use Asterisk as the go-between. I already setup Asterisk so it can push calls out through our providers via SIP. I just need a good/solid/very simple H323

I am totally not understanding this : My IAX.conf : register => BOX-YOCAN:passwd at remote_asterisk_ip On remote Asterisk : *CLI> [Aug 30 20:37:07] -- Registered IAX2 'BOX-YOCAN' (AUTHENTICATED) at ip:4569 So this is normal... Now the following : [remoteasterisk] type=peer host=ip remote asterisk auth=md5 secret=passwd On the remote Asterisk : [BOX-YOCAN] type=user

On Thu, 22 Feb 2018, hw wrote: > That seems neither useful, nor feasible for customers wanting to use the > wireless network we would set up for them with their cell phones. Are cell > phones even capable of this kind of authentication? Yes, entirely capable. WPA2-Enterprise isn't some freakish and unusual solution. https://www.eduroam.org/ I configure wireless once on my device

> > > https://www.eduroam.org/ > > > > I configure wireless once on my device (phone/tablet/laptop) and then can > > travel to institutions all round the world and use their networks seamlessly. > > How useless and infeasible indeed. > > Well, this country "this country"? > is almost the worst of all countries around the world when > it

On Fri, 23 Feb 2018, hw wrote: > There are devices that are using PXE-boot and require access to the company > LAN. If I was to allow PXE-boot for unauthenticated devices, the whole > thing would be pointless because it would defeat any security advantage that > could be gained by requiring all devices and users to be authenticated: > Anyone could bring a device capable of

I am seeing a recent increase in SSH harvesting attempts and brute forcing in the log of my system. I'm interested in opening up some discussion around what OpenSSH can do itself to counter measure against: * DoS attack where too many unauthenticated connections are open. I'm not interested in stopping the professional saboteur but the casual script kiddie (to use IRC terms) from