similar to: selinux problem policies

Hello, On Sonntag, 30. April 2017 18:40:23 CEST Gordon Messmer wrote: > On 04/30/2017 07:03 AM, G?nther J. Niederwimmer wrote: > > I write this! > > > > semanage fcontext -a -t httpd_sys_rw_content_t "/var/www/html(/.*)?/ > > typo3conf(/.*)?" > > OK. Did you get an error? I have only Errors ;-). when I like to set this Rule ? semanage fcontext -a

On 04/30/2017 07:03 AM, G?nther J. Niederwimmer wrote: > I write this! > > semanage fcontext -a -t httpd_sys_rw_content_t "/var/www/html(/.*)?/ > typo3conf(/.*)?" OK. Did you get an error? > I have more instances from typo3 > I found this construct in the selinux policies > "/var/www/html(/.*)?/uploads(/.*)?" > > but my is not working ? Can you

On 04/30/2017 07:24 PM, G?nther J. Niederwimmer wrote: > when I like to set this Rule ? > semanage fcontext -a -t httpd_sys_rw_content_t "/var/www/html(/.*)?/ > typo3conf(/.*)?" > > This Errors are displayd ? > neverallow check failed at /etc/selinux/targeted/tmp/modules/100/selinuxutil/ > cil:244 I see, now. What happens if you run "find

In addition to Rowlands answer. About . [samba] path = /samba/ What are the rights on /samba/ ? My guess here, the rights on /samba does not allow you to set rights on that and subfolders. I also suggest, if you share a folder share a subfolder in /samba/share1 Makes it more easy to manage your ACL. Greetz, Louis > -----Oorspronkelijk bericht----- > Van: samba

I recently setup my Puppetmaster server to run through Passenger via Apache instead of on the default webrick web server. SELinux made that not work and I've found some documentation on making rules to allow it however mine won't load. This is the policy I found via this website, http://sandcat.nl/~stijn/2012/01/20/selinux-passenger-and-puppet-oh-my/comment-page-1/ . module

We have a CentOS 7 workstation whose user has started reporting periodic login failures. This seems to be the result of the krb5 cache aging out, and sssd's krb5_child attempting and failing to remove the old cache file. The AVC follows: type=AVC msg=audit(1586670874.327:73041): avc: denied { unlink } for pid=28735 comm="krb5_child" name="krb5cc_1985100122_oxJnH7"

I followed this guide: the user who gives permission to the network share is without problems but at the file system level I do not understand the user using the acl. What should I do? Il 24/01/2019 18:32, Rowland Penny via samba ha scritto: > On Thu, 24 Jan 2019 18:19:45 +0100 > marco pirola via samba <samba at lists.samba.org> wrote: > >> This is my smb.conf of the member

This is my selinux conf. # Authors: Jason Tang <jtang at tresys.com> # # Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Tresys Technology, LLC # #  This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or #  modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public #  License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either #  version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. # #  This

On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 6:03 PM Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> wrote: > On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 04:02:17PM +0300, Ram Lavi wrote: > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 3:33 PM Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> > > wrote: > > > > > On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 03:21:17PM +0300, Ram Lavi wrote: > > > > Hello all, > > > > > >

Witch your suggest the my problem persisted Il 29/01/2019 12:06, L.P.H. van Belle via samba ha scritto: > In addition to Rowlands answer. > > About . > [samba] > path = /samba/ > > What are the rights on /samba/ ? > My guess here, the rights on /samba does not allow you to set rights on that and subfolders. > > I also suggest, if you share a folder share a subfolder

On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 3:33 PM Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> wrote: > On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 03:21:17PM +0300, Ram Lavi wrote: > > Hello all, > > > > tl;dr, can you point me to the point in the libvirt repo where it's > trying > > to change a tap-device's SELinux label? > > > > I am trying to create a tap device with libvirt on

This patch set adds XSM security labels to useful debugging output locations, and fixes some assumptions that all interrupts behaved like GSI interrupts (which had useful non-dynamic IDs). It also cleans up the policy build process and adds an example of how to use the user field in the security context. Debug output: [PATCH 01/10] xsm: Add security labels to event-channel dump [PATCH 02/10] xsm: