similar to: RHEL 7.3 wish-list

Hi All. In curl manual: --ciphers -> "(SSL) Specifies which ciphers to use in the connection. The list of ciphers must specify valid ciphers. Read up on SSL cipher list details on this URL:http://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html" In openssl: http://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html#CIPHER_SUITE_NAMES there are names such as "SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA RC4-SHA" but

hi I want to use ECC(ellyptic curve cryptography) for SSL-connections but somehow dovecot doesn't like my ECC-certificates :( I tried to test using following scenario: machine: debian 6 (x64) dovecot 2.0.15-0~auto+21 ((f6a2c0e8bc03) from http://xi.rename-it.nl/debian openssl 1.0.0e-2 from testing (as the default 0.9.8o-4squeeze3 needs also the parameter -cipher ECCdraft for testing)

----- Forwarded message from Zooko O''Whielacronx <zooko at zooko.com> ----- From: Zooko O''Whielacronx <zooko at zooko.com> Date: Sat, 21 May 2011 12:50:19 -0600 To: Crypto discussion list <cryptography at randombit.net> Subject: Re: [cryptography] rolling hashes, EDC/ECC vs MAC/MIC, etc. Reply-To: Crypto discussion list <cryptography at randombit.net>

I'm not sure if collision resistance is required for DH key derivation, but generally, SHA-1 is on its way out. If it's possible (if there's not a very large percentage of servers that do not support anything newer), it should be disabled.

OpenSSH 7.1 has just been released. It will be available from the mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/ shortly. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. OpenSSH also includes transitional support for the legacy SSH 1.3 and 1.5 protocols that may be enabled at compile-time. Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community

This was posted not too long ago on sci.crypt... Enjoy... I think the most relevant information is near the top, but it''s all quite good... :-) -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- There is no intrinsic difference between algorithm and data, the same information can be viewed as data in one context and as algorithm in another. Why then do so many people claim that encryption algorithms

On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 9:30 PM, Guus Sliepen <guus at tinc-vpn.org> wrote: > Although the cryptography is now separated from the rest of the logic in > tinc, it is not really replaceable, since only OpenSSL is supported. > However, there is also a new protocol in tinc 1.1, which uses Ed25519 > and ChaCha-Poly1305. The code for those algorithms is included in tinc, > so the

>> facing [ no shared cipher ] error with EC private keys. > the client connecting to your instance has to support ecdsa > > It does - Thunderbird 60.0b10 (64-bit) [ security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_gcm_sha384;true ] It seems there is a difference between the private key (rsa vs. ecc -> SSL_CTX?) used for the certificate signing request and the signed certificate. The csr

>>>> facing [ no shared cipher ] error with EC private keys. >>> the client connecting to your instance has to support ecdsa >>> >>> >> It does - Thunderbird 60.0b10 (64-bit) >> >> [ security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_gcm_sha384;true ] >> >> It seems there is a difference between the private key (rsa vs. ecc -> >>

2.2.4? I didn't think SSL was implemented until version 2.4.3. What would be helpful, not to mention useful, is to explain specifically and exactly what goes into the key file. The choices are: your server's private key, your server's public key, your server's certifying authority (CA) key, maybe even the curl CA. I've also seen this in examples of the SSL stanza from

OpenSSH 7.4 has just been released. It will be available from the mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/ shortly. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. OpenSSH also includes transitional support for the legacy SSH 1.3 and 1.5 protocols that may be enabled at compile-time. Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community

OpenSSH 7.4 has just been released. It will be available from the mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/ shortly. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. OpenSSH also includes transitional support for the legacy SSH 1.3 and 1.5 protocols that may be enabled at compile-time. Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community

Hi, I am running the below servers on Red Hat Enterprise Linux release 8.7 (Ootpa). The details are as follows. # rpm -qa | grep openssh openssh-8.0p1-16.el8.x86_64 openssh-askpass-8.0p1-16.el8.x86_64 openssh-server-8.0p1-16.el8.x86_64 openssh-clients-8.0p1-16.el8.x86_64 # cat /etc/redhat-release Red Hat Enterprise Linux release 8.7 (Ootpa) # How do I enable strong KexAlgorithms, Ciphers and

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3603 Bug ID: 3603 Summary: ssh clients can't communicate with server with default cipher when fips is enabled at server end Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 9.4p1 Hardware: All OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: critical

>>>>>> facing [ no shared cipher ] error with EC private keys. >>>>> the client connecting to your instance has to support ecdsa >>>>> >>>>> >>>> It does - Thunderbird 60.0b10 (64-bit) >>>> >>>> [ security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_gcm_sha384;true ] >>>> >>>> It seems there is

CentoOS 7 python-cryptography package is at version 0.8.2 It has a build-requires for python-cryptography-vectors of the same version (but different source tarball apparently) There is no python-cryptography-vectors in CentOS 7 base or updates. There is one in EPEL but it is version 0.8 -=- If you relax the BuildRequires to just require python-cryptography-vectors then the build fails

Hi, OpenSSH 7.5p1 is almost ready for release, so we would appreciate testing on as many platforms and systems as possible. This is a bugfix release. Snapshot releases for portable OpenSSH are available from http://www.mindrot.org/openssh_snap/ The OpenBSD version is available in CVS HEAD: http://www.openbsd.org/anoncvs.html Portable OpenSSH is also available via git using the instructions at

There were a few notes in this thread that may indicate open areas for development. I forward merely as FYI. http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2015-January/024231.html ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz> Date: Sun, Jan 4, 2015 at 9:29 PM Subject: Re: [Cryptography] Why aren?t we using SSH for everything? To: calestyo at

Geting a seg fault. Have not investigted the cause. rkotler at mipsswbrd002:~/richard$ tar vfxz ~/Downloads/ellcc-mips-linux-2014-Mar-24-07-32-26.tgz rkotler at mipsswbrd002:~/richard/ellcc/bin$ gdb ./ecc GNU gdb (GDB) 7.4.1-debian Copyright (C) 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html> This is free software: you are

In the past 24 hours multiple persons have contacted me regarding the use of elliptic curve cryptography in tinc 1.1 in light of the suspicion that the NSA might have weakened algorithms and/or elliptic curves published by NIST. The new protocol in tinc 1.1 (SPTPS) uses ECDH and ECDSA to do session key exchange and authentication, in such a way that it has the perfect forward secrecy (PFS)