Displaying 20 results from an estimated 1000 matches similar to: "[PATCH v8 0/2] s390: virtio: let arch validate VIRTIO features"
2020 Aug 18
1
[PATCH v8 2/2] s390: virtio: PV needs VIRTIO I/O device protection
On Tue, 18 Aug 2020 16:58:31 +0200
Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> If protected virtualization is active on s390, the virtio queues are
> not accessible to the host, unless VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM has been
> negotiated.
> Define CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_MEMORY_ACCESS and export
> arch_has_restricted_memory_access to fail probe if that's
> not the
2020 Aug 19
4
[PATCH v9 0/2] s390: virtio: let arch validate VIRTIO features
Hi all,
The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture
to validate VIRTIO device features.
in this respin:
The tests are back to virtio_finalize_features.
No more argument for the architecture callback which only reports
if the architecture needs guest memory access restrictions for
VIRTIO.
I renamed the callback to arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access,
and the config
2020 Sep 10
6
[PATCH v12 0/2] s390: virtio: let arch validate VIRTIO features
Hi all,
The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture
to validate VIRTIO device features.
I changed VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM to VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM
I forgot in drivers/virtio/Kconfig, and put back the inclusion
of virtio_config.h for the definition of the callback in
arch/s390/mm/init.c I wrongly removed in the last series.
Regards,
Pierre
Pierre Morel (2):
virtio: let
2020 Sep 10
6
[PATCH v12 0/2] s390: virtio: let arch validate VIRTIO features
Hi all,
The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture
to validate VIRTIO device features.
I changed VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM to VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM
I forgot in drivers/virtio/Kconfig, and put back the inclusion
of virtio_config.h for the definition of the callback in
arch/s390/mm/init.c I wrongly removed in the last series.
Regards,
Pierre
Pierre Morel (2):
virtio: let
2020 Aug 18
0
[PATCH v8 2/2] s390: virtio: PV needs VIRTIO I/O device protection
If protected virtualization is active on s390, the virtio queues are
not accessible to the host, unless VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM has been
negotiated.
Define CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_MEMORY_ACCESS and export
arch_has_restricted_memory_access to fail probe if that's
not the case, preventing a host error on access attempt.
Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com>
---
2020 Aug 18
2
[PATCH v8 1/2] virtio: let arch validate VIRTIO features
On Tue, 18 Aug 2020 16:58:30 +0200
Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> An architecture may need to validate the VIRTIO devices features
> based on architecture specifics.
>
> Provide a new Kconfig entry, CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_MEMORY_ACCESS,
> the architecture can select when it provides a callback named
> arch_has_restricted_memory_access to validate the
2020 Aug 18
2
[PATCH v8 1/2] virtio: let arch validate VIRTIO features
On Tue, 18 Aug 2020 16:58:30 +0200
Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> An architecture may need to validate the VIRTIO devices features
> based on architecture specifics.
>
> Provide a new Kconfig entry, CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_MEMORY_ACCESS,
> the architecture can select when it provides a callback named
> arch_has_restricted_memory_access to validate the
2020 Jul 14
4
[PATCH v6 0/2] s390: virtio: let arch validate VIRTIO features
Hi all,
The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture
to validate VIRTIO device features.
in this respin:
1) I kept removed the ack from Jason as I reworked the patch
@Jason, the nature and goal of the patch did not really changed
please can I get back your acked-by with these changes?
2) Rewording for warning messages
Regards,
Pierre
Pierre Morel (2):
2020 Jul 07
5
[PATCH v4 0/2] s390: virtio: let arch validate VIRTIO features
Hi all,
I changed the patch subject to reflect the content, becoming more
general.
1) I removed the ack from Christian and Jason even far as
I understand they gave it for the functionality more than for the
implementation.
@Jason, @Christian, please can I get back your acked-by with these changes?
2) previous patch had another name:
[PATCH v3 0/1] s390: virtio: let arch choose to
2020 Sep 07
8
[PATCH v11 0/2] s390: virtio: let arch validate VIRTIO features
Hi all,
The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture
to validate VIRTIO device features.
The tests are back to virtio_finalize_features.
No more argument for the architecture callback which only reports
if the architecture needs guest memory access restrictions for
VIRTIO.
I renamed the callback to arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access,
the config option to
2020 Sep 07
8
[PATCH v11 0/2] s390: virtio: let arch validate VIRTIO features
Hi all,
The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture
to validate VIRTIO device features.
The tests are back to virtio_finalize_features.
No more argument for the architecture callback which only reports
if the architecture needs guest memory access restrictions for
VIRTIO.
I renamed the callback to arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access,
the config option to
2020 Jul 09
4
[PATCH v5 0/2] s390: virtio: let arch validate VIRTIO features
Hi all,
The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture
to validate VIRTIO device features.
in this respin:
1) I kept removed the ack from Jason as I reworked the patch
@Jason, the nature and goal of the patch did not really changed
please can I get back your acked-by with these changes?
2) I suppressed the unnecessary verbosity of the architecture
specific
2020 Jul 15
5
[PATCH v7 0/2] s390: virtio: let arch validate VIRTIO features
Hi all,
The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture
to validate VIRTIO device features.
in this respin:
1) I kept removed the ack from Jason as I reworked the patch
@Jason, the nature and goal of the patch did not really changed
please can I get back your acked-by with these changes?
2) Rewording for warning messages
Regards,
Pierre
Pierre Morel (2):
2020 Aug 31
3
[PATCH v10 0/2] s390: virtio: let arch validate VIRTIO features
Hi all,
The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture
to validate VIRTIO device features.
The tests are back to virtio_finalize_features.
No more argument for the architecture callback which only reports
if the architecture needs guest memory access restrictions for
VIRTIO.
I renamed the callback to arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access,
and the config option to
2020 Jun 17
6
[PATCH v3 0/1] s390: virtio: let arch choose to accept devices without IOMMU feature
An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host
access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the
use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices
without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
Pierre Morel (1):
s390: virtio: let arch accept devices without IOMMU feature
arch/s390/mm/init.c | 6 ++++++
2020 Aug 06
3
[PATCH v1 0/1] s390: virtio-ccw: PV needs VIRTIO I/O device protection
Hi all,
In another series I proposed to add an architecture specific
callback to fail feature negociation on architecture need.
In VIRTIO, we already have an entry to reject the features on the
transport basis.
Transport is not architecture so I send a separate series in which
we fail the feature negociation inside virtio_ccw_finalize_features,
the virtio_config_ops.finalize_features for S390
2020 Aug 06
3
[PATCH v1 0/1] s390: virtio-ccw: PV needs VIRTIO I/O device protection
Hi all,
In another series I proposed to add an architecture specific
callback to fail feature negociation on architecture need.
In VIRTIO, we already have an entry to reject the features on the
transport basis.
Transport is not architecture so I send a separate series in which
we fail the feature negociation inside virtio_ccw_finalize_features,
the virtio_config_ops.finalize_features for S390
2020 Jun 10
5
[PATCH] s390: protvirt: virtio: Refuse device without IOMMU
Protected Virtualisation protects the memory of the guest and
do not allow a the host to access all of its memory.
Let's refuse a VIRTIO device which does not use IOMMU
protected access.
Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com>
---
drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c
2020 Jun 10
5
[PATCH] s390: protvirt: virtio: Refuse device without IOMMU
Protected Virtualisation protects the memory of the guest and
do not allow a the host to access all of its memory.
Let's refuse a VIRTIO device which does not use IOMMU
protected access.
Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com>
---
drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c
2020 Jun 15
4
[PATCH v2 0/1] s390: virtio: let's arch choose to accept devices without IOMMU feature
An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host
access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the
use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices
without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
Pierre Morel (1):
s390: virtio: let arch accept devices without IOMMU feature
arch/s390/mm/init.c | 6 ++++++