similar to: [PATCH v1 0/1] s390: virtio-ccw: PV needs VIRTIO I/O device protection

On Thu, 6 Aug 2020 16:23:01 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > Hi all, > > In another series I proposed to add an architecture specific > callback to fail feature negociation on architecture need. > > In VIRTIO, we already have an entry to reject the features on the > transport basis. > > Transport is not architecture so I send a separate

On Tue, 18 Aug 2020 16:58:30 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > An architecture may need to validate the VIRTIO devices features > based on architecture specifics. > > Provide a new Kconfig entry, CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_MEMORY_ACCESS, > the architecture can select when it provides a callback named > arch_has_restricted_memory_access to validate the

On Tue, 18 Aug 2020 16:58:30 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > An architecture may need to validate the VIRTIO devices features > based on architecture specifics. > > Provide a new Kconfig entry, CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_MEMORY_ACCESS, > the architecture can select when it provides a callback named > arch_has_restricted_memory_access to validate the

Hi all, The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture to validate VIRTIO device features. in this respin: I use the original idea from Connie for an optional arch_has_restricted_memory_access. I renamed the callback accordingly, added the definition of ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_MEMORY_ACCESS inside the VIRTIO Kconfig and the selection in the PROTECTED_VIRTUALIZATION_GUEST config

On 2020-06-10 15:24, Cornelia Huck wrote: > On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 15:11:51 +0200 > Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > >> Protected Virtualisation protects the memory of the guest and >> do not allow a the host to access all of its memory. >> >> Let's refuse a VIRTIO device which does not use IOMMU >> protected access. >> >>

On 2020-06-10 15:24, Cornelia Huck wrote: > On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 15:11:51 +0200 > Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > >> Protected Virtualisation protects the memory of the guest and >> do not allow a the host to access all of its memory. >> >> Let's refuse a VIRTIO device which does not use IOMMU >> protected access. >> >>

On 2018?07?09? 15:22, Tiwei Bie wrote: > Signed-off-by: Tiwei Bie <tiwei.bie at intel.com> > --- > drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c | 8 ++++++++ > drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c | 2 ++ > 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c b/drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c > index 8f5c1d7f751a..ff5b85736d8d 100644 > ---

Protected Virtualisation protects the memory of the guest and do not allow a the host to access all of its memory. Let's refuse a VIRTIO device which does not use IOMMU protected access. Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> --- drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c

Protected Virtualisation protects the memory of the guest and do not allow a the host to access all of its memory. Let's refuse a VIRTIO device which does not use IOMMU protected access. Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> --- drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c

Michael, the following patches have all been posted in the past. I've collected them on top of your vhost branch -- please let me know whether this works for you. The following changes since commit 6bdf1e0efb04a1716373646cb6f35b73addca492: Makefile: drop -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__ from cflags (2016-12-16 00:13:43 +0200) are available in the git repository at:

Michael, the following patches have all been posted in the past. I've collected them on top of your vhost branch -- please let me know whether this works for you. The following changes since commit 6bdf1e0efb04a1716373646cb6f35b73addca492: Makefile: drop -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__ from cflags (2016-12-16 00:13:43 +0200) are available in the git repository at:

On Fri, 26 Apr 2019 20:32:38 +0200 Halil Pasic <pasic at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > Nothing precludes to accepting VIRTIO_F_RING_PACKED any more. "precludes us from accepting" > > Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic at linux.ibm.com> > --- > drivers/s390/virtio/virtio_ccw.c | 4 +--- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git

On Mon, 8 Dec 2014 15:05:58 +0200 "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst at redhat.com> wrote: > This will make it easy for transports to validate features and return > failure. > > Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst at redhat.com> > --- > include/linux/virtio_config.h | 3 ++- > drivers/lguest/lguest_device.c | 4 +++- >

On Mon, 8 Dec 2014 15:05:58 +0200 "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst at redhat.com> wrote: > This will make it easy for transports to validate features and return > failure. > > Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst at redhat.com> > --- > include/linux/virtio_config.h | 3 ++- > drivers/lguest/lguest_device.c | 4 +++- >

On Mon, 15 Jun 2020 14:39:24 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: I find the subject (commit short) sub optimal. The 'arch' is already accepting devices 'without IOMMU feature'. What you are introducing is the ability to reject. > An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host > access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device

On Mon, 15 Jun 2020 14:39:24 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: I find the subject (commit short) sub optimal. The 'arch' is already accepting devices 'without IOMMU feature'. What you are introducing is the ability to reject. > An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host > access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device

Two enhancements for virtio_ccw, on top of latest 1.0 patchset Cornelia Huck (1): virtio_ccw: finalize_features error handling Michael S. Tsirkin (1): virtio_ccw: future-proof finalize_features drivers/s390/kvm/virtio_ccw.c | 18 +++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) -- MST

Two enhancements for virtio_ccw, on top of latest 1.0 patchset Cornelia Huck (1): virtio_ccw: finalize_features error handling Michael S. Tsirkin (1): virtio_ccw: future-proof finalize_features drivers/s390/kvm/virtio_ccw.c | 18 +++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) -- MST

These are minor robustness enhancements on top of v8 of the patchset [PATCH v8 00/50] linux: towards virtio-1 guest support http://mid.gmane.org/1417449619-24896-1-git-send-email-mst at redhat.com As that one seems stable and actually seems to work well for people, I'm not respinning it anymore. The main motivation is to prevent us accidentally supporting bad configurations, such as legacy

These are minor robustness enhancements on top of v8 of the patchset [PATCH v8 00/50] linux: towards virtio-1 guest support http://mid.gmane.org/1417449619-24896-1-git-send-email-mst at redhat.com As that one seems stable and actually seems to work well for people, I'm not respinning it anymore. The main motivation is to prevent us accidentally supporting bad configurations, such as legacy