similar to: [PATCH v3 0/1] s390: virtio: let arch choose to accept devices without IOMMU feature

On Wed, Jun 17, 2020 at 12:43:57PM +0200, Pierre Morel wrote: > An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host > access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the > use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices > without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Signed-off-by: Pierre

On Wed, Jun 17, 2020 at 12:43:57PM +0200, Pierre Morel wrote: > An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host > access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the > use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices > without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Signed-off-by: Pierre

On 6/17/20 5:43 AM, Pierre Morel wrote: > An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host > access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the > use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices > without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel at

On 6/17/20 5:43 AM, Pierre Morel wrote: > An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host > access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the > use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices > without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel at

An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. Pierre Morel (1): s390: virtio: let arch accept devices without IOMMU feature arch/s390/mm/init.c | 6 ++++++

On 15.06.20 14:39, Pierre Morel wrote: > An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host > access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the > use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices > without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel at

On 15.06.20 14:39, Pierre Morel wrote: > An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host > access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the > use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices > without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel at

On Mon, 15 Jun 2020 14:39:24 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: I find the subject (commit short) sub optimal. The 'arch' is already accepting devices 'without IOMMU feature'. What you are introducing is the ability to reject. > An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host > access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device

On Mon, 15 Jun 2020 14:39:24 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: I find the subject (commit short) sub optimal. The 'arch' is already accepting devices 'without IOMMU feature'. What you are introducing is the ability to reject. > An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host > access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device

Hi all, The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture to validate VIRTIO device features. in this respin: 1) I kept removed the ack from Jason as I reworked the patch @Jason, the nature and goal of the patch did not really changed please can I get back your acked-by with these changes? 2) I suppressed the unnecessary verbosity of the architecture specific

Hi all, I changed the patch subject to reflect the content, becoming more general. 1) I removed the ack from Christian and Jason even far as I understand they gave it for the functionality more than for the implementation. @Jason, @Christian, please can I get back your acked-by with these changes? 2) previous patch had another name: [PATCH v3 0/1] s390: virtio: let arch choose to

Hi all, The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture to validate VIRTIO device features. in this respin: 1) I kept removed the ack from Jason as I reworked the patch @Jason, the nature and goal of the patch did not really changed please can I get back your acked-by with these changes? 2) Rewording for warning messages Regards, Pierre Pierre Morel (2):

On Wed, Jun 17, 2020 at 12:43:57PM +0200, Pierre Morel wrote: > An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host > access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the > use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices > without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Signed-off-by: Pierre

On Wed, Jun 17, 2020 at 12:43:57PM +0200, Pierre Morel wrote: > An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host > access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the > use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices > without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Signed-off-by: Pierre

Hi all, The goal of the series is to give a chance to the architecture to validate VIRTIO device features. in this respin: 1) I kept removed the ack from Jason as I reworked the patch @Jason, the nature and goal of the patch did not really changed please can I get back your acked-by with these changes? 2) Rewording for warning messages Regards, Pierre Pierre Morel (2):

On 2020-06-29 18:05, Cornelia Huck wrote: > On Mon, 29 Jun 2020 11:57:14 -0400 > "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst at redhat.com> wrote: > >> On Wed, Jun 17, 2020 at 12:43:57PM +0200, Pierre Morel wrote: >>> An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host >>> access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the

On 2020-06-29 18:05, Cornelia Huck wrote: > On Mon, 29 Jun 2020 11:57:14 -0400 > "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst at redhat.com> wrote: > >> On Wed, Jun 17, 2020 at 12:43:57PM +0200, Pierre Morel wrote: >>> An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host >>> access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the

On Thu, 9 Jul 2020 10:39:19 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > If protected virtualization is active on s390, the virtio queues are > not accessible to the host, unless VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM has been > negotiated. Use the new arch_validate_virtio_features() interface to > fail probe if that's not the case, preventing a host error on access > attempt

On Thu, 9 Jul 2020 10:39:19 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > If protected virtualization is active on s390, the virtio queues are > not accessible to the host, unless VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM has been > negotiated. Use the new arch_validate_virtio_features() interface to > fail probe if that's not the case, preventing a host error on access > attempt

On 2020-06-11 05:10, Jason Wang wrote: > > On 2020/6/10 ??9:11, Pierre Morel wrote: >> Protected Virtualisation protects the memory of the guest and >> do not allow a the host to access all of its memory. >> >> Let's refuse a VIRTIO device which does not use IOMMU >> protected access. >> >> Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel at