similar to: [PATCH 5/5] virtio: Add bounce DMA ops

Hi Srivatsa, Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve: [auto build test ERROR on vhost/linux-next] [also build test ERROR on xen-tip/linux-next linus/master v5.7-rc3 next-20200429] [cannot apply to swiotlb/linux-next] [if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improve the system. BTW, we also suggest to use '--base' option to specify the base

On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 05:09:18PM +0530, Srivatsa Vaddagiri wrote: > For better security, its desirable that a guest VM's memory is > not accessible to any entity that executes outside the context of > guest VM. In case of virtio, backend drivers execute outside the > context of guest VM and in general will need access to complete > guest VM memory. One option to restrict the

Hi Srivatsa, Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve: [auto build test ERROR on vhost/linux-next] [also build test ERROR on xen-tip/linux-next linus/master v5.7-rc3 next-20200428] [cannot apply to swiotlb/linux-next] [if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improve the system. BTW, we also suggest to use '--base' option to specify the base

Hi Srivatsa, Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve: [auto build test WARNING on vhost/linux-next] [also build test WARNING on xen-tip/linux-next linus/master v5.7-rc3 next-20200428] [cannot apply to swiotlb/linux-next] [if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improve the system. BTW, we also suggest to use '--base' option to specify

Hi Srivatsa, Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve: [auto build test ERROR on vhost/linux-next] [also build test ERROR on xen-tip/linux-next linus/master v5.7-rc3 next-20200428] [cannot apply to swiotlb/linux-next] [if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improve the system. BTW, we also suggest to use '--base' option to specify the base

On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 03:39:53PM +0530, Srivatsa Vaddagiri wrote: > That would still not work I think where swiotlb is used for pass-thr devices > (when private memory is fine) as well as virtio devices (when shared memory is > required). So that is a separate question. When there are multiple untrusted devices, at the moment it looks like a single bounce buffer is used. Which to me

On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 03:39:53PM +0530, Srivatsa Vaddagiri wrote: > That would still not work I think where swiotlb is used for pass-thr devices > (when private memory is fine) as well as virtio devices (when shared memory is > required). So that is a separate question. When there are multiple untrusted devices, at the moment it looks like a single bounce buffer is used. Which to me

On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 12:26:43PM +0200, Jan Kiszka wrote: > On 29.04.20 12:20, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 03:39:53PM +0530, Srivatsa Vaddagiri wrote: > > > That would still not work I think where swiotlb is used for pass-thr devices > > > (when private memory is fine) as well as virtio devices (when shared memory is > > > required).

On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 11:19:52PM +0530, Srivatsa Vaddagiri wrote: > * Michael S. Tsirkin <mst at redhat.com> [2020-04-28 12:17:57]: > > > Okay, but how is all this virtio specific? For example, why not allow > > separate swiotlbs for any type of device? > > For example, this might make sense if a given device is from a > > different, less trusted vendor.

On Tue, 28 Apr 2020, Srivatsa Vaddagiri wrote: > For better security, its desirable that a guest VM's memory is > not accessible to any entity that executes outside the context of > guest VM. In case of virtio, backend drivers execute outside the > context of guest VM and in general will need access to complete > guest VM memory. One option to restrict the access provided to

On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 10:22:32AM +0800, Lu Baolu wrote: > On 2020/4/29 4:41, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 11:19:52PM +0530, Srivatsa Vaddagiri wrote: > > > * Michael S. Tsirkin<mst at redhat.com> [2020-04-28 12:17:57]: > > > > > > > Okay, but how is all this virtio specific? For example, why not allow > > > >

On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 03:14:10PM +0530, Srivatsa Vaddagiri wrote: > * Michael S. Tsirkin <mst at redhat.com> [2020-04-29 02:50:41]: > > > So it seems that with modern Linux, all one needs > > to do on x86 is mark the device as untrusted. > > It's already possible to do this with ACPI and with OF - would that be > > sufficient for achieving what this

On 29.04.20 12:20, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 03:39:53PM +0530, Srivatsa Vaddagiri wrote: >> That would still not work I think where swiotlb is used for pass-thr devices >> (when private memory is fine) as well as virtio devices (when shared memory is >> required). > > So that is a separate question. When there are multiple untrusted >

On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 01:42:13PM +0800, Lu Baolu wrote: > On 2020/4/29 12:57, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 10:22:32AM +0800, Lu Baolu wrote: > > > On 2020/4/29 4:41, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > > > On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 11:19:52PM +0530, Srivatsa Vaddagiri wrote: > > > > > * Michael S. Tsirkin<mst at redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: kbuild test robot <lkp at intel.com> --- virtio_bounce.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_bounce.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_bounce.c index 3de8e0eb71e48..5a68d48667c42 100644 --- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_bounce.c +++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_bounce.c @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ static phys_addr_t bounce_buf_paddr; static

On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 03:32:56PM +0530, Srivatsa Vaddagiri wrote: > Some hypervisors may not support MMIO transport i.e trap config > space access and have it be handled by backend driver. They may > allow other ways to interact with backend such as message-queue > or doorbell API. This patch allows for hypervisor specific > methods for config space IO. > > Signed-off-by:

On 30.04.20 13:11, Srivatsa Vaddagiri wrote: > * Will Deacon <will at kernel.org> [2020-04-30 11:41:50]: > >> On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 04:04:46PM +0530, Srivatsa Vaddagiri wrote: >>> If CONFIG_VIRTIO_MMIO_OPS is defined, then I expect this to be unconditionally >>> set to 'magic_qcom_ops' that uses hypervisor-supported interface for IO (for >>>

On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 03:32:55PM +0530, Srivatsa Vaddagiri wrote: > The Type-1 hypervisor we are dealing with does not allow for MMIO transport. How about PCI then? -- MST

This series forms the kvm host part of paravirtual spinlock based against kvm tree. Please refer to https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/8/9/265 for kvm guest and Xen, x86 part merged to -tip spinlocks. Please note that: kvm uapi: Add KICK_CPU and PV_UNHALT definition to uapi is a common patch for both guest and host. Changes since V12: fold the patch 3 into patch 2 for bisection. (Eric Northup)

This series forms the kvm host part of paravirtual spinlock based against kvm tree. Please refer to https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/8/9/265 for kvm guest and Xen, x86 part merged to -tip spinlocks. Please note that: kvm uapi: Add KICK_CPU and PV_UNHALT definition to uapi is a common patch for both guest and host. Changes since V12: fold the patch 3 into patch 2 for bisection. (Eric Northup)