similar to: [RFC PATCH 03/12] s390/mm: force swiotlb for protected virtualization

On Fri, 5 Apr 2019 01:16:13 +0200 Halil Pasic <pasic at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > On s390 protected virtualization guests also have to use bounce I/O > buffers. That requires some plumbing. > > Let us make sure any device using DMA API accordingly is spared from the > problems that hypervisor attempting I/O to a non-shared secure page would > bring. I have problems

On s390, protected virtualization guests have to use bounced I/O buffers. That requires some plumbing. Let us make sure, any device that uses DMA API with direct ops correctly is spared from the problems, that a hypervisor attempting I/O to a non-shared page would bring. Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic at linux.ibm.com> --- arch/s390/Kconfig | 4 +++

On Wed, 8 May 2019 15:15:40 +0200 Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > On Fri, 26 Apr 2019 20:32:39 +0200 > Halil Pasic <pasic at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > > > On s390, protected virtualization guests have to use bounced I/O > > buffers. That requires some plumbing. > > > > Let us make sure, any device that uses DMA API with direct

> Subject: [PATCH 04/10] s390/mm: force swiotlb for protected virtualization > Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2019 20:32:39 +0200 > From: Halil Pasic <pasic at linux.ibm.com> > To: kvm at vger.kernel.org, linux-s390 at vger.kernel.org, Cornelia Huck <cohuck at redhat.com>, > Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky at de.ibm.com>, Sebastian Ott <sebott at linux.ibm.com> > CC:

From: Halil Pasic <pasic at linux.ibm.com> On s390, protected virtualization guests have to use bounced I/O buffers. That requires some plumbing. Let us make sure, any device that uses DMA API with direct ops correctly is spared from the problems, that a hypervisor attempting I/O to a non-shared page would bring. Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic at linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:

From: Halil Pasic <pasic at linux.ibm.com> On s390, protected virtualization guests have to use bounced I/O buffers. That requires some plumbing. Let us make sure, any device that uses DMA API with direct ops correctly is spared from the problems, that a hypervisor attempting I/O to a non-shared page would bring. Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic at linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:

On s390, protected virtualization guests have to use bounced I/O buffers. That requires some plumbing. Let us make sure, any device that uses DMA API with direct ops correctly is spared from the problems, that a hypervisor attempting I/O to a non-shared page would bring. Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic at linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda at linux.ibm.com> ---

On s390, protected virtualization guests have to use bounced I/O buffers. That requires some plumbing. Let us make sure, any device that uses DMA API with direct ops correctly is spared from the problems, that a hypervisor attempting I/O to a non-shared page would bring. Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic at linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda at linux.ibm.com> ---

On Fri, 26 Apr 2019 20:32:39 +0200 Halil Pasic <pasic at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > On s390, protected virtualization guests have to use bounced I/O > buffers. That requires some plumbing. > > Let us make sure, any device that uses DMA API with direct ops > correctly is spared from the problems, that a hypervisor attempting > I/O to a non-shared page would bring. > >

On Fri, 26 Apr 2019 20:32:39 +0200 Halil Pasic <pasic at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > On s390, protected virtualization guests have to use bounced I/O > buffers. That requires some plumbing. > > Let us make sure, any device that uses DMA API with direct ops > correctly is spared from the problems, that a hypervisor attempting > I/O to a non-shared page would bring. > >

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 08:32:39PM +0200, Halil Pasic wrote: > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(set_memory_encrypted); > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(set_memory_decrypted); > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active); Why do you export these? I know x86 exports those as well, but it shoudn't be needed there either.

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 08:32:39PM +0200, Halil Pasic wrote: > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(set_memory_encrypted); > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(set_memory_decrypted); > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active); Why do you export these? I know x86 exports those as well, but it shoudn't be needed there either.

On 29.04.19 15:59, Halil Pasic wrote: > On Fri, 26 Apr 2019 12:27:11 -0700 > Christoph Hellwig <hch at infradead.org> wrote: > >> On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 08:32:39PM +0200, Halil Pasic wrote: >>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(set_memory_encrypted); >> >>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(set_memory_decrypted); >> >>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active); >>

On Fri, 26 Apr 2019 12:27:11 -0700 Christoph Hellwig <hch at infradead.org> wrote: > On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 08:32:39PM +0200, Halil Pasic wrote: > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(set_memory_encrypted); > > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(set_memory_decrypted); > > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active); > > Why do you export these? I know x86 exports those as well, but > it

Enhanced virtualization protection technology may require the use of bounce buffers for I/O. While support for this was built into the virtio core, virtio-ccw wasn't changed accordingly. Some background on technology (not part of this series) and the terminology used. * Protected Virtualization (PV): Protected Virtualization guarantees, that non-shared memory of a guest that operates in PV

Enhanced virtualization protection technology may require the use of bounce buffers for I/O. While support for this was built into the virtio core, virtio-ccw wasn't changed accordingly. Some background on technology (not part of this series) and the terminology used. * Protected Virtualization (PV): Protected Virtualization guarantees, that non-shared memory of a guest that operates in PV

Enhanced virtualization protection technology may require the use of bounce buffers for I/O. While support for this was built into the virtio core, virtio-ccw wasn't changed accordingly. Some background on technology (not part of this series) and the terminology used. * Protected Virtualization (PV): Protected Virtualization guarantees, that non-shared memory of a guest that operates in PV

Enhanced virtualization protection technology may require the use of bounce buffers for I/O. While support for this was built into the virtio core, virtio-ccw wasn't changed accordingly. Some background on technology (not part of this series) and the terminology used. * Protected Virtualization (PV): Protected Virtualization guarantees, that non-shared memory of a guest that operates in PV

Enhanced virtualization protection technology may require the use of bounce buffers for I/O. While support for this was built into the virtio core, virtio-ccw wasn't changed accordingly. Some background on technology (not part of this series) and the terminology used. * Protected Virtualization (PV): Protected Virtualization guarantees, that non-shared memory of a guest that operates in PV

Enhanced virtualization protection technology may require the use of bounce buffers for I/O. While support for this was built into the virtio core, virtio-ccw wasn't changed accordingly. Some background on technology (not part of this series) and the terminology used. * Protected Virtualization (PV): Protected Virtualization guarantees, that non-shared memory of a guest that operates in PV