similar to: [Bug 2445] New: Fix gssapi-with-mic support when is set to PermitRootLogin without-password

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2456 Bug ID: 2456 Summary: gssapi-keyex blocked by PermitRootLogin=without-password Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 7.1p1 Hardware: Other OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: minor Priority: P5 Component: sshd

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2495 Bug ID: 2495 Summary: add GSI GSSAPI SSO authentication to OpenSSH Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 7.1p1 Hardware: amd64 OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: Kerberos support Assignee:

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2443 Bug ID: 2443 Summary: Bugs intended to be fixed for OpenSSH 7.1 Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Hardware: Other OS: Linux Status: NEW Keywords: meta Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: Miscellaneous

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=928 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org> changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Blocks| |2076 -- You are receiving this mail because: You are the assignee for the bug. You are watching someone on the CC

I'm running version 4.7p1 of OpenSSH on a Linux system (it was originally a RedHat system, but I've changed almost everything.) When I originally built OpenSSH I used the config option --without-pam, and installed the software in /usr/local. I explicitly forbade root login with sshd (by setting the PermitRootLogin to "no" in the sshd_config file), but found that I could login as

[Please keep CC, I'm not in this list] The default settings for PermitRootLogin appears to be 'yes'. Increased number of attacks target the ssh port 22 and root logins directly[1] throught the Internet. Would it be possible to tighten the initial installation by defaulting PermitRootLogin to 'no' (or even in *.c) in forthcoming releases and have administrators relax it if

Greetings, I know that part of the following has been discussed here before but please bear with me. We are running on Solaris versions 2.6 - 9 with a NISplus name service. The permissions on the NISplus password map have been modified to limit read access to the encrypted password field of the passwd table to only the entry owner and the table administrators. See:

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2061 Bug ID: 2061 Summary: Request for PermitRootLogin to be enforced prior to credential check Classification: Unclassified Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 6.1p1 Hardware: Other OS: OpenBSD Status: NEW Severity: enhancement

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2354 Bug ID: 2354 Summary: please document that PermitRootLogin really checks for uid=0 Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 6.7p1 Hardware: All OS: All Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: Documentation

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=486 Summary: "PermitRootLogin no" can implicitly reveal root password Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 3.5p1 Platform: All OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: security Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: openssh-unix-dev at

Hi all, I think that there is a security problem with the PermitRootLogin option. I asked an root ssh connection: $ ssh root at machine root at machine's password: I typed no password, this prompt stayed in place. In a second time, I changed the PermitRootLogin to no, and then restart ssh server. Third, I typed the password on the previous prompt, and the access was allowed. I then

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=486 cjwatson at debian.org changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Status|RESOLVED |REOPENED Resolution|FIXED | ------- Additional Comments From cjwatson at debian.org 2003-05-06 10:08

Hello, I'm currently experiencing the issue laid out in this thread from last year: http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=106908815129641&w=2 The discussion that ensued resulted in a number of ideas on how best to 'fix' this issue. The two that seemed most reasonable were: 1. implement a pubkey-only option to PermitRootLogin that would only allow root to login

https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=6590 Summary: [sender] could not find xattr #1 for home/jdoe/TheFresh Product: rsync Version: 3.0.5 Platform: Other OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P3 Component: core AssignedTo: wayned at samba.org ReportedBy: stlman at

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=995 Summary: PermitRootLogin by IP address block specification Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 3.6.1p2 Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P3 Component: sshd AssignedTo: openssh-bugs at mindrot.org

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1216 Summary: Warn via Logwatch when sshd PermitRootLogin is in effect Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 4.3p2 Platform: ix86 OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: bitbucket at mindrot.org

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2164 Bug ID: 2164 Summary: PermitRootLogin=without-password as default Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 6.2p1 Hardware: Other OS: All Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: sshd Assignee: unassigned-bugs at

On 04 Feb (10:46:55), Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On Thu 2016-02-04 07:40:39 -0500, David Goulet wrote: > > > I would like to know if adding support for Unix socket to sshd would be a > > feature that would be consider to be added upstream? (ListenAddress). > > fwiw, i think this is a good idea, but i wouldn't implement it as an > explicit ListenAddress option:

Steps to reproduce: 1) PermitRootLogin no in sshd_config 2) login with "root" user from other host Present behaviour: 1) it asks for password 3 times and only then close the connection. 2) cpu consumption during bruteforce "attacks". Expected behaviour: Immediate disconnect/login fail Workaround is to change ssh port, or ban IP after some login fails, or limit IP that can

I have "PermitRootLogin no" in my sshd_config, but under Tru64 and SIA, the root login attempts still get passed to the SIA system (so I get lots of warnings about failed root logins). On systems with a "max failed attempts" setting, the root account can be locked out this way. I started looking at the code, and I'm not sure I understand what I see. In auth-passwd.c,