similar to: Understanding Problem with rsa min key length 1024

Greetings, Given the weakness with Diffie-Hellman modp groups less than 2048, is it time to bump the suggested 1024 bit minimum value from the RFC 4419 to a more current 2048 value for OpenSSH 7.0? If so, should this be just a compile-time change, or should there be a new client and server runtime option? Thanks, -- Mark

On 25 September 2017 at 02:32, Mark D. Baushke <mdb at juniper.net> wrote: > [+CC Loganaden Velvindron <logan at hackers.mu>] primary author of > the RFC 4419 refresh draft. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-lvelvindron-curdle-dh-group-exchange/ ? Tangent: has any consideration been given to increasing the maximum allowed beyond 8192 bits (which is below the current NIST

Functionality request for supporting Digital Signatures for RSA and DSS Public Key Algorithms in alignment with NIST SP800-131A. I assume this has been asked before, but I could not find in the archives. Support of "ssh-rsa-sha256" and "ssh-dss-sha256" public key algorithms for OpenSSH? I know Suite B Algorithms and x509 SSH Extension Algorithms are supported, but not a

I referred to the fact that there is no value for 4096-bit groups at all. For higher strengths than 128 bits one should probably not use non-EC crypto at all, as the document suggests. On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 9:19 AM Darren Tucker <dtucker at dtucker.net> wrote: > > On Fri, 15 Feb 2019 at 16:45, Yegor Ievlev <koops1997 at gmail.com> wrote: > > That doesn't seem to be

> On 30 July 2018 at 20:37 ????? <vtol at gmx.net> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>> facing [ no shared cipher ] error with EC private keys. > >>>>>> the client connecting to your instance has to support ecdsa > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> It does - Thunderbird 60.0b10 (64-bit) >

Hi, You will be aware of https://weakdh.org/ by now, I presume; the take-home seems to be that 1024-bit DH primes might well be too weak. I'm wondering what (if anything!) you propose to do about this issue, and what Debian might do for our users? openssh already prefers ECDH, which must reduce the impact somewhat, although the main Windows client (PuTTY) doesn't support ECDH yet. But

Also, how are default moduli shipped with OpenSSH for use in diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1/sha256 chosen? Are they chosen randomly by developers or are they chosen for security properties? If they are random, why not use moduli from RFC 7919 instead, like Mozilla recommends? On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 3:48 AM Mark D. Baushke <mdb at juniper.net> wrote: > > Yegor Ievlev <koops1997

Hi, i want to disable the nwfilter functionality of libvirt. It's surely nice for some people, nevertheless i don't want libvirt to alter any netfilter rules, neither i want the according functionality even available. I know about nwfilter-undefine, but what i'm looking for is an option to globally disable this functionality at all. Some config flag or similar. How can i achieve

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2666 Bug ID: 2666 Summary: Ability to specify minimum RSA key size for user keys Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Hardware: All OS: All Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: sshd Assignee:

I am interested in configuring Dovecot's TLS so as to retain forward secrecy, but eliminate all of NIST's elliptic curves. Besides being subject to side channel attacks [1], in some quarters there is a general distrust of NIST's curves and any of their other cryptographic primitives after the Dual EC DRBG debacle. >From what I can tell, the following will prevent the use of

The defaults for HostKeyAlgorithms option are: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01 at openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01 at openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01 at openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01 at openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa Why does OpenSSH prefer older and less secure

In the past 24 hours multiple persons have contacted me regarding the use of elliptic curve cryptography in tinc 1.1 in light of the suspicion that the NSA might have weakened algorithms and/or elliptic curves published by NIST. The new protocol in tinc 1.1 (SPTPS) uses ECDH and ECDSA to do session key exchange and authentication, in such a way that it has the perfect forward secrecy (PFS)

In the past 24 hours multiple persons have contacted me regarding the use of elliptic curve cryptography in tinc 1.1 in light of the suspicion that the NSA might have weakened algorithms and/or elliptic curves published by NIST. The new protocol in tinc 1.1 (SPTPS) uses ECDH and ECDSA to do session key exchange and authentication, in such a way that it has the perfect forward secrecy (PFS)

This patch supplies software IEEE floating point support. The comment from the patch reproduced below says all there is to say. This patch contains the prior "cleanup" patch; please don't apply that one. Please let me know of any bugs. It is tested reasonably well, but until I put together random tests it's hard to have 100% confidence. Neil. /* A self-contained host- and

On Fri 2015-06-12 01:52:54 -0400, Mark D. Baushke wrote: > I have communicated with Allen Roginsky on this topic and I have been given permission to post his response. > > In this message below, the 'vendor' was Darren Tucker's generated prime > that used a generator value of 5. > > -- Mark > > From: "Roginsky, Allen" <allen.roginsky at

On Mon, 13 Aug 2018, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL wrote: > Lack of time on the Open Source projects is understandable, and not uncommon. > > However, PKCS11 has been in the codebase practically forever - the ECC > patches that I saw did not alter the API or such. It is especially > non-invasive when digital signature is concerned. > > Considering how long those patches have

On Mon, 28 May 2018, Yegor Ievlev wrote: > Can we prefer RSA to ECDSA? For example: > HostKeyAlgorithms > ssh-rsa,ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 not without a good reason

On 09/13/2018 08:18 PM, Damien Miller wrote: > We have any plans to add more crypto options to OpenSSH without a strong > justification, and I don't see one for X448-SHA512 ATM. What I like about it is that it offers ~224 bit security level, whereas X25519 offers ~128 bits (according to RFC7748). Hence, pairing X448 with AES256 would provide a full chain of security in the ~224 bit

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I am it has two weeks trying to twirl the PDC with samba + LDAP and ties the moment only migraines. It would like to know which is the problem, now, below described in mine log's? [2005/02/27 12:14:47, 1] lib/smbldap.c:another_ldap_try(1004) ~ Connection to LDAP server failed for the 8 try! [2005/02/27 12:14:48, 0]

vsftpd-2.0.1-5 I am trying to get vsftpd to start with ssl_enabled=yes and not having much success. The config file works when ssl_enabled=No and does not work when ssl_enabled=Yes. I have tried setting the following: rsa_cert_file=/usr/share/ssl/certs/inet06cert.pem which is the public certificate and this: rsa_cert_file=/usr/share/ssl/private/inet06key.pem which is the server private