similar to: PEM file opened without DIRECT I/O which makes private key readable by attacker exploiting MELTDOWN

On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 5:38 PM, Philipp Marek <philipp at marek.priv.at> wrote: > I think we are possibly interested in switching to DIRECT IO (given that it >> bypasses any caching system including page cache) when reading *.PEM file >> > Sorry, but this makes no sense. > The data could just as well be read from the SSH process > memory space. > I think

Just a heads up that I'm seeing major stability problems on these builds. Didn't have console capture setup unfortunately, but have seen my test hypervisor hard lock twice over the weekend. This is with xpti being used, rather than the shim. Cheers, Nathan > -----Original Message----- > From: CentOS-virt [mailto:centos-virt-bounces at centos.org] On Behalf Of > George Dunlap

I have built all the source code releases from upstream for RHEL-6 regarding meltdown /spectre and released those into packages into the CentOS Linux 6.9 updates repository. As to whether or not either Arch (x86_64 or i386) is or is not vulnerable, the CentOS team does not test for or make claims concerning security fitness. What we do build the source code that is released upstream. Users must

On Fri, Mar 9, 2018 at 10:46 AM, Peter Wood <peterwood.sd at gmail.com> wrote: > Anyway, I'm stuck with a few 32bit systems exposed to customers and I have > to come up with an answer to their question about meltdown/spectre. At this > point all I can say is that Red Hat hasn't patched 32bit systems but that > is hard to believe so I assumed that I'm wrong and

Awesome. Thank you. Embarrassing but I can't find the Q&A page with this question. Can you please post a link to it. Thanks, -- Peter On Fri, Mar 9, 2018 at 11:16 AM, Akemi Yagi <amyagi at gmail.com> wrote: > On Fri, Mar 9, 2018 at 10:46 AM, Peter Wood <peterwood.sd at gmail.com> > wrote: > > > Anyway, I'm stuck with a few 32bit systems exposed to

By now, we're sure most everyone have heard of the Meltdown and Spectre attacks. If not, head over to https://meltdownattack.com/ and get an overview. Additional technical details are available from Google Project Zero. https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The FreeBSD Security Team was notified of the issue in late December and received a

By now, we're sure most everyone have heard of the Meltdown and Spectre attacks. If not, head over to https://meltdownattack.com/ and get an overview. Additional technical details are available from Google Project Zero. https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html The FreeBSD Security Team was notified of the issue in late December and received a

Hi Johnny, Thank you for your reply. It seems to me that my message may have came around as offensive but that was not my intend. I have basic understanding how things work and when I said CentOS I actually meant Red Hat and all its derivatives. I asked CentOS community because that's the community I'm member of. Not to say that CentOS is not secure or anything like that. Anyway,

What are the patches that I can download and install to be protected against the Meltdown and Spectre security vulnerabilities? ===BEGIN SIGNATURE=== Turritopsis Dohrnii Teo En Ming's Academic Qualifications as at 30 Oct 2017 [1] https://tdtemcerts.wordpress.com/ [2] http://tdtemcerts.blogspot.sg/ [3] https://www.scribd.com/user/270125049/Teo-En-Ming ===END SIGNATURE===

Does anyone know if Red Hat are working on backporting improved mitigation techniques and features from newer, 4.14.14+ kernels? $ grep . /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/* /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown:Mitigation: PTI /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1:Vulnerable /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2:Vulnerable: Minimal generic ASM retpoline

Has anyone applied patches to gluster storage node or fuse clients in an attempt to address Meltdown/Spectre issues? I'm curious if anyone has noticed or expects to see a performance impact. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://lists.gluster.org/pipermail/gluster-users/attachments/20180117/28573776/attachment.html>

Thanks George. As there are now quite many options to choose from, what would be the best option performance wise for running 32bit domUs under xen-4.6? Best, Peter On Wed, Jan 17, 2018 at 7:14 PM, George Dunlap <dunlapg at umich.edu> wrote: > I've built & tagged packages for CentOS 6 and 7 4.6.6-9, with XPTI > "stage 1" Meltdown mitigation. > > This will

> -----Original Message----- > From: CentOS-virt [mailto:centos-virt-bounces at centos.org] On Behalf Of > Peter Peltonen > Sent: Thursday, January 18, 2018 11:19 AM > To: Discussion about the virtualization on CentOS <centos-virt at centos.org> > Subject: Re: [CentOS-virt] Xen 4.6.6-9 (with XPTI meltdown mitigation) > packages making their way to centos-virt-xen-testing

Hi, Depends on your centos release; 6 or 7 ? The most recent kernel are patched; have a look at the release notes, e.g. https://www.redhat.com/archives/rhsa-announce/2018-January/msg00080.html <https://www.redhat.com/archives/rhsa-announce/2018-January/msg00080.html> https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:0008 <https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:0008> Regards . G?tz

I have a clean install, fully updated CentOS 6 32-bit. When I run the Red Hat detection script: https://access.redhat.com/sites/default/files/spectre-meltdown--a79614b.sh it finds that the system is vulnerable. Is this false positive or there is no patches for CentOS 6 32-bit systems? Thank you, -- Peter

I've built & tagged packages for CentOS 6 and 7 4.6.6-9, with XPTI "stage 1" Meltdown mitigation. This will allow 64-bit PV guests to run safely (with a few caveats), but incurs a fairly significant slowdown for 64-bit PV guests on Intel boxes (including domain 0). If you prefer using Vixen / Comet, you can turn it off by adding 'xpti=0' to your Xen command-line.

> -----Original Message----- > From: CentOS-virt [mailto:centos-virt-bounces at centos.org] On Behalf Of > Johnny Hughes > Sent: Wednesday, January 24, 2018 6:39 AM > To: centos-virt at centos.org > Subject: Re: [CentOS-virt] Xen 4.6.6-9 (with XPTI meltdown mitigation) > packages making their way to centos-virt-xen-testing > > On 01/24/2018 01:01 AM, Pasi K?rkk?inen

Hi, > Hmm.. isn't this the ldisc bug that was discussed a few months ago on this list, > and a patch was applied to virt-sig kernel aswell? > > Call trace looks similar.. Good memory! I'd forgotten about that despite being the one who ran into it. Looks like that patch was just removed in 4.9.75-30 which I just upgraded this system to:

On 01/23/2018 05:57 PM, Karl Johnson wrote: > > > On Tue, Jan 23, 2018 at 4:50 PM, Nathan March <nathan at gt.net > <mailto:nathan at gt.net>> wrote: > > Hi, > > > Hmm.. isn't this the ldisc bug that was discussed a few months ago on this > list, > > and a patch was applied to virt-sig kernel aswell? > > >

On 01/24/2018 01:01 AM, Pasi K?rkk?inen wrote: > On Tue, Jan 23, 2018 at 06:20:39PM -0600, Kevin Stange wrote: >> On 01/23/2018 05:57 PM, Karl Johnson wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jan 23, 2018 at 4:50 PM, Nathan March <nathan at gt.net >>> <mailto:nathan at gt.net>> wrote: >>> >>> Hi, >>> >>> >