similar to: "PermitRootLogin no" should not proceed with root login

I read an article today about keyboard interactive auth allowing bruteforcing. I'm afraid I have minimal understanding of what keyboard-interactive really does. What does it do, and should I have my clients set it to off in sshd_config? --- Scott Neugroschl | XYPRO Technology Corporation 4100 Guardian Street | Suite 100 |Simi Valley, CA 93063 | Phone 805 583-2874|Fax 805 583-0124 |

On Sat, 2015-02-21 at 23:36 +0000, Philip Hands wrote: > I'm glad to say that the default for the Debian package Unfortunately, Debian overdid it quite a lot and also set a number of not so smart (respectively security-critical) defaults: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=765632 So it's like 1:1 ;-) Cheers, Chris. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=486 Summary: "PermitRootLogin no" can implicitly reveal root password Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 3.5p1 Platform: All OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: security Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: openssh-unix-dev at

Gang, For months now, we're all seeing repeated bruteforce attempts on SSH. I've configured my pf install to ratelimit TCP connections to port 22 and to automatically add IP-addresses that connect too fast to a table that's filtered: table <lamers> { } block quick from <lamers> to any pass in quick on $ext_if inet proto tcp from any to ($ext_if) port 22 modulate

Dear All, About a week ago; I posted a proposal over on the centos-devel mailing list, the proposal is for a SIG 'CentOS hardening', there were a few of the members of the community who are also interested in this. Therefore, I am extending that email to this community; where there is a larger community. Some things that we will like to achieve are as follows: SSH: disable root

Hi All, While testing another patch, I found that I could not longer log in as root, even if PermitRootLogin was yes. It seems to be the following code in auth_password: $ cvs diff -r1.48 -r1.49 auth-passwd.c [snip] #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN - if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES) + if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login !=

There is no /root/.ssh/authorized_keys on remote host, so I have to authenticate with password. On the remote host: # /usr/sbin/sshd -T | egrep permitroot permitrootlogin yes Attempting: $ ssh root@<remotehost> shows: Received disconnect from <remotehost> port 22:2: Too many authentication failures for root packet_write_wait: Connection to <remotehost> port 22: Broken

I'm running version 4.7p1 of OpenSSH on a Linux system (it was originally a RedHat system, but I've changed almost everything.) When I originally built OpenSSH I used the config option --without-pam, and installed the software in /usr/local. I explicitly forbade root login with sshd (by setting the PermitRootLogin to "no" in the sshd_config file), but found that I could login as

Greetings, I know that part of the following has been discussed here before but please bear with me. We are running on Solaris versions 2.6 - 9 with a NISplus name service. The permissions on the NISplus password map have been modified to limit read access to the encrypted password field of the passwd table to only the entry owner and the table administrators. See:

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1216 Summary: Warn via Logwatch when sshd PermitRootLogin is in effect Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 4.3p2 Platform: ix86 OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: bitbucket at mindrot.org

Hi all, I think that there is a security problem with the PermitRootLogin option. I asked an root ssh connection: $ ssh root at machine root at machine's password: I typed no password, this prompt stayed in place. In a second time, I changed the PermitRootLogin to no, and then restart ssh server. Third, I typed the password on the previous prompt, and the access was allowed. I then

It works for the "yes" case but not for the "without-password" case. The function that checks (auth_root_allowed(auth_method) is special cased for "password". The Pam case sends "keyboard-interactive/pam" which like all other authentication methods except password succeeds. Here is a patch to make it work for me. Please feel free to criticize as

Hello, I'm currently experiencing the issue laid out in this thread from last year: http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=106908815129641&w=2 The discussion that ensued resulted in a number of ideas on how best to 'fix' this issue. The two that seemed most reasonable were: 1. implement a pubkey-only option to PermitRootLogin that would only allow root to login

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2164 Bug ID: 2164 Summary: PermitRootLogin=without-password as default Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 6.2p1 Hardware: Other OS: All Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: sshd Assignee: unassigned-bugs at

Hi all, among other things, we provide shell access to various unix based platforms for our students and university staff. Recently, there has been increasing number of root login attacks on one particular Tru64 machine running OpenSSH. The host is configured with "PermitRootLogin no" but every once in a while SIA auth with TCB enhanced security locks the root account. I suppose

I have "PermitRootLogin no" in my sshd_config, but under Tru64 and SIA, the root login attempts still get passed to the SIA system (so I get lots of warnings about failed root logins). On systems with a "max failed attempts" setting, the root account can be locked out this way. I started looking at the code, and I'm not sure I understand what I see. In auth-passwd.c,

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=486 cjwatson at debian.org changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Status|RESOLVED |REOPENED Resolution|FIXED | ------- Additional Comments From cjwatson at debian.org 2003-05-06 10:08

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2354 Bug ID: 2354 Summary: please document that PermitRootLogin really checks for uid=0 Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 6.7p1 Hardware: All OS: All Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: Documentation

Hello all, I was running some tests with openssh 3.7.1p2 and I noticed that PermitRootLogin without-password does not work when PAM is enabled. In fact, when PAM is enabled, PermitRootLogin will work as "yes" if " without-password" is used, no matter what kind of authentication is used for root login. Is that a bug, I missed something in the configurations, or expected

I updated my Solaris 8 machines from openssh-2.3.0p1 to 2.5.1p1 yesterday and it fixed the cron/audit issue but now root logins are no longer permitted. I updated it to 2.5.1p2 this morning and that is still the case: golfer:/[207]# ssh -v tsunami OpenSSH_2.5.1p2, SSH protocols 1.5/2.0, OpenSSL 0x0090600f debug: Reading configuration data /var/ssh/ssh_config debug: Applying options for *