similar to: Dovecote 1.2.17 poodle

Hi! I'm new to this list and i could not find a way to search through the already posted articles, so please forgive me if this subject has been discussed before. Our security scanner stumbled over the IMAPs server i've set up recently using dovecot on a RedHat Enterprise 64bit Server. The security scanner found an error regarding a new SSL security leak named "BEAST". The

Using OpenSSL, is there a preferred/recommended rate of rekeying an encrypted stream of data? Does OpenSSL handle this for developers behind the scenes? Does it even need to be rekeyed? Thanks in advance. -sc -- Sean Chittenden -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 202 bytes Desc: not available

# HG changeset patch # User Cristian Rodr?guez <crrodriguez at opensuse.org> # Date 1318533592 10800 # Node ID c15d6befe20082009cb40926afa208ab4b684818 # Parent 962df5d9413a4a0fcc68aacc1df0dca7a44a0240 Use SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS if available to keep memory usage low. diff -r 962df5d9413a -r c15d6befe200 src/login-common/ssl-proxy-openssl.c --- a/src/login-common/ssl-proxy-openssl.c Wed

Hi, I came up with the following patch while trying to figure out a good solution for the situation described in Debian bug #871987[1]. In short, OpenSSL in Debian unstable has disabled TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 *by default*. That means that unless an application requests otherwise, only TLSv1.2 is supported. In the world of e-mail this is seemingly an issue, as there are still way too many old clients

I've set up a list of ciphers that excludes SSLv2 ciphers (and other weak ones) in the hope of preventing SSLv2 connections: ssl_cipher_list = TLSv1+HIGH : !SSLv2 : RC4+MEDIUM : !aNULL : !eNULL : !3DES : @STRENGTH However, this doesn't prevent the SSLv2 connection being allowed as our Nessus scans show and I'm tasked with trying to plug that "hole". I see Dovecot2 had

Hi Is there known advices on how to favor PFS with dovecot? In Apache, I use the following directives, with cause all modern browsers to adopt 256 bit PFS ciphers, while keeping backward compatibility with older browsers and avoiding BEAST attack: SSLProtocol all -SSLv2 SSLHonorCipherOrder On SSLCipherSuite ECDHE at STRENGTH:ECDH at STRENGTH:DH at STRENGTH:HIGH:-SSLv3-SHA1:-TLSv10

RedHat released sendmail-8.13.8-10.el5_11.src.rpm which includes sendmail-8.13.8-ssl-opts.patch which adds support for disabling SSLv3 and SSLv2 in sendmail.cf But as far as I can see there is no support in sendmail.mc - I can't see how to compile sendmail.mc to get the required line ServerSSLOptions in sendmail.cf Does anyone know how to do this ? -- Andrew Daviel, TRIUMF, Canada

Am 04.07.2015 um 15:34 schrieb Gregory P. Ennis <PoMec at PoMec.Net>: > On Sat, 2015-07-04 at 08:07 -0500, Gregory P. Ennis wrote: >> Everyone, >> >> Looks like the new version of oppenssl has broken my sendmail's use >> of >> tls. Has anyone else had this problem or seen a fix? >> >> Greg Ennis >>

Running CentOS release 5.5. I'm trying to update or patch an SRPMS file, specifically openssl-0.9.8e-12.el5_4.6.src.rpm. Basically, I'm trying to change one line in the source, in ssl/ssl.h. I create a "diff ?u" file called openssl-ssl-h.patch. I then edit the openssl.spec file, and add 2 lines to that in the appropriate place: Patch88: openssl-ssl-h.patch And

Good Day All Sorry if this is a repeated email, but I need some information about how to disable SSL on a Samba4.2.2 AD domain controller as the nessus scanner is reporting the POODLE vulnerability and we are not allowed to have any of that in our environment. the nessus scan reports poodle vulnerability on all these ports: 443, 636, 3269 I had a look at previous posts but couldn't find a

Thanks Kelvin I'm a bit confised tho, is this patch already avaiable? if yes, what is the parameter that disable ssl into the smb.conf? Maybe the guys from Enterprise samba have already included the patch into their releases so it's just a maatter of enabling the flag. I'm using sernet-samba-4.2.2 Thanks!

Hi all, As I reported earlier (with a typo in the work [BUG]) client certification validation *does not* work even if you do everything exactly according to all documentation and attempts at helpful advice. I have seen this issue with both startssl.com and self-signed certificates, and based on what I've seen from searching the web, this is a problem that has gotten little attention because

>> facing [ no shared cipher ] error with EC private keys. > the client connecting to your instance has to support ecdsa > > It does - Thunderbird 60.0b10 (64-bit) [ security.ssl3.ecdhe_ecdsa_aes_256_gcm_sha384;true ] It seems there is a difference between the private key (rsa vs. ecc -> SSL_CTX?) used for the certificate signing request and the signed certificate. The csr

In the file ./src/login-common/ssl-proxy-openssl.c appears the code: if (verbose_ssl) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ssl_ctx, ssl_info_callback); It appears the SSL_CTX_set_info_callback symbol only occurs in the openssl development branch starting with 0x00909000L as this symbol is missing from openssl 0.9.8b and 0.9.8e (no check of the latest nightly snapshot of the stable 0.9.8 branch).

The openssl library in Debian unstable (targeting Buster) supports TLS1.2 by default. The library itself supports also TLS1.1 and TLS1.0. If the admin decides to also support TLS1.[01] users he can then enable the lower protocol version in case the users can't update their system. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian at breakpoint.cc> --- src/config/all-settings.c

The following updates address POODLE on CentOS: CentOS-5: http://lists.centos.org/pipermail/centos-announce/2014-October/020696.html CentOS-6.5: http://lists.centos.org/pipermail/centos-announce/2014-October/020697.html CentOS-7: http://lists.centos.org/pipermail/centos-announce/2014-October/020695.html Please note that the CentOS-6.5 updates are built from: openssl-1.0.1e-30.el6_5.2.src.rpm

I read this on the RHN commentary respecting cve-2014-3566: https://securityblog.redhat.com/2014/10/15/poodle-a-ssl3-vulnerability-cve-2014-3566/: . . . The first aspect of POODLE, the SSL 3.0 protocol vulnerability, has already been fixed through iterative protocol improvements, leading to the current TLS version, 1.2. It is simply not possible to address this in the context of the SSL 3.0

Hi all, Am trying to find a way to disable SSLv3 protocol in smb.conf on Samba4. I am using the following: tls enabled = yes tls keyfile = tls/myKey.pem tls certfile = tls/myCert.pem tls cafile = With a self-signed cert. But when I remote connect from another host using: openssl s_client -showcerts -connect samba4-dc:636 -ssl3 I get a successful

# HG changeset patch # User David Hicks <david at hicks.id.au> # Date 1373085976 -36000 # Sat Jul 06 14:46:16 2013 +1000 # Node ID ccd83f38e4b484ae18f69ea08631eefcaf6a4a4e # Parent 1fbac590b9d4dc05d81247515477bfe6192c262c login-common: Add support for ECDH/ECDHE cipher suites ECDH temporary key parameter selection must be performed during OpenSSL context initialisation before ECDH and

Hi Xiph.org Team. We are using opusfile library <https://github.com/xiph/opusfile> for streaming *.opus* audio in our projects. But now we have a problem with building opusfile library for android with *ndk-build*. In particular, with arm64-v8a platform: Google removed <sys/timeb.h> from android. And now building opusfile with nkd-build crashes with error "fatal error: