similar to: Cipher Order in sshd_config

On Aug 25, 2014, at 9:52 AM, Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org> wrote: > On Wed, 20 Aug 2014, HAROUAT, KARIM (KARIM) wrote: >> Sorry to disturb you but I am looking for a question I have, but I don't find any clue for it on the archive list, neither Internet (google search). >> Id like to know in sshd_config file, if the order given for cipher key word has an impact

While compiling openssl with option `no-des', it caused the openssh build failure ... cipher.c:85:41: error: 'EVP_des_ede3_cbc' undeclared here (not in a function); ... Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia at windriver.com> --- cipher.c | 2 ++ configure.ac | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+) diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c index

Hi, In a recent security review some systems I manage were flagged due to supporting "weak" ciphers, specifically the ones listed below. So first question is are people generally modifying the list of ciphers supported by the ssh client and sshd? On CentOS 6 currently it looks like if I remove all the ciphers they are concerned about then I am left with Ciphers

Hi, I am running the below servers on Red Hat Enterprise Linux release 8.7 (Ootpa). The details are as follows. # rpm -qa | grep openssh openssh-8.0p1-16.el8.x86_64 openssh-askpass-8.0p1-16.el8.x86_64 openssh-server-8.0p1-16.el8.x86_64 openssh-clients-8.0p1-16.el8.x86_64 # cat /etc/redhat-release Red Hat Enterprise Linux release 8.7 (Ootpa) # How do I enable strong KexAlgorithms, Ciphers and

Hi, Is cipher "3des-ctr" supported by openssh? It is not mentioned in the list of supported ciphers in the man page of ssh_config: Thanks, Sunil Ciphers Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2 in order of preference. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. The supported ciphers are ''3des-cbc'', ''aes128-cbc'',

Hi Kaushal, I maintain a set of SSH hardening guides for various platforms, including RHEL 8. You can find them here: https://ssh-audit.com/hardening_guides.html - Joe -- Joseph S. Testa II Founder & Principal Security Consultant Positron Security On Thu, 2024-01-25 at 18:39 +0530, Kaushal Shriyan wrote: > Hi, > > I am running the below servers on Red Hat Enterprise

When testing chacha20-poly1305, I noticed that aes-gcm is significantly faster than aes-ctr or aes-cbs with umac. Even on systems w/o aes-ni or other recent instruction set additions. And there seems to be consensus in the crypto community that AEAD ciphers are the way forward. As such, it promoting the AEAD ciphers to the head of the preference list looks like a good idea. That would mean

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1340 Summary: Support for Camellia block cipher to OpenSSH-portable. Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P2 Component: Miscellaneous AssignedTo: bitbucket at mindrot.org

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3603 Bug ID: 3603 Summary: ssh clients can't communicate with server with default cipher when fips is enabled at server end Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 9.4p1 Hardware: All OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: critical

Why are legacy MACs (like md5-96), and legacy Ciphers (anything in cbc-mode, arcfour*(?)) enabled by default? My proposal would be to change the defaults for ssh_config and sshd_config to contain: MACs hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1 Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr ...removing md5, truncated versions of sha1, umac64 (for which I can find barely any review), any cipher in cbc

Hello, in addition to my last thread about a new config option to make strict-kex mandatory, I also wonder if a new mechanism for ciphers/macs can be introduced and is reliable by simple both sides using it. So there could be a Chacha20-Poly1305v2 at openssh.com which uses AD data to chain the messages together, so it will be resistant against terrapin even without the strict-kex. Consequently

OpenSSH Security Advisory: cbc.adv Regarding the "Plaintext Recovery Attack Against SSH" reported as CPNI-957037[1]: The OpenSSH team has been made aware of an attack against the SSH protocol version 2 by researchers at the University of London. Unfortunately, due to the report lacking any detailed technical description of the attack and CPNI's unwillingness to share necessary

Hi OpenSSH team, I find a url http://www.gossamer-threads.com/lists/openssh/dev/42808?do=post_view_threaded#42808, which provides unofficial patch for FIPS Capable OpenSSH. I try it and it seems working for some cases. (BTW, I also find that aes128-ctr, aes192-ctr and aes256-ctr ciphers can't work in FIPS mode properly. The fips mode sshd debug info is as following.

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3194 Bug ID: 3194 Summary: Please consider lowering chacha20-poly1305 at openssh.com cipher priority on AES-NI capable CPU Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 8.3p1 Hardware: amd64 OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: enhancement

On 25.01.24 14:09, Kaushal Shriyan wrote: > I am running the below servers on Red Hat Enterprise Linux release 8.7 > How do I enable strong KexAlgorithms, Ciphers and MACs On RHEL 8, you need to be aware that there are "crypto policies" modifying sshd's behaviour, and it would likely be the *preferred* method to inject your intended config changes *there* (unless they

Hello everybody, First a big thanks for tinc-vpn I am still using it next to wireguard and openvpn. I am having a setup where the tinc debian appliance is at 100% cpu load doing about 7.5MB/s. Compression = 9 PMTU = 1400 PMTUDiscovery = yes Cipher = aes-128-cbc How can I pick a cipher that is the fasted for my CPU and don't create a CPU bottleneck at 100%. Kind regards, Jelle de Jong

Hi there, > So there could be a Chacha20-Poly1305v2 at openssh.com which uses AD data to chain the > messages together, so it will be resistant against terrapin even without the strict-kex. > > Consequently the hmac-etmv2 at openssh.com mode could be deviced in a similar manner, to > also include the transcript hash or similar things. This would still require both, client and

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2333 Bug ID: 2333 Summary: forbid old Ciphers, KexAlgorithms and MACs by default Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 6.6p1 Hardware: Other OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: Miscellaneous Assignee:

Hi, looking through the key specification, you can see that its the second field in the key file: https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/PROTOCOL.key#L11 It looks like there is no convenient way to get this information with openssh cli, but given that the file format is just base64 encoded, you can read it out with something like this: $ cat /tmp/rsa | head -n -1 | tail -n +2 |

Am 19.10.2016 um 00:58 schrieb Gordon Messmer <gordon.messmer at gmail.com>: > On 10/18/2016 03:28 PM, Clint Dilks wrote: >> So first >> question is are people generally modifying the list of ciphers supported by >> the ssh client and sshd? > > I suspect that "generally" people are not. I do, because I can, and so that I can offer at least some advice