similar to: [Bug 2232] New: curve25519-sha256@libssh.org Signature Failures When 'ssh' Used with Dropbear, libssh Servers

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2233 Bug ID: 2233 Summary: curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org Signature Failures When 'sshd' Used with Dropbear Clients Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 6.6p1 Hardware: All OS: All Status: NEW Severity: major Priority: P5

if I understand http://git.libssh.org/projects/libssh.git/commit/?id=4cb6afcbd43ab503d4c3d3054b96a1492605ea8d correctly, then the shared secret is encoded as a bignum, probably because the rest of the code assumes it's a bignum (e.g. for key derivation, etc). however, the DH public keys are always encoded as strings (both in my patches and in the libssh.org code). Am 02.11.2013 um 07:57

Hi, So I screwed up when writing the support for the curve25519 KEX method that doesn't depend on OpenSSL's BIGNUM type - a bug in my code left leading zero bytes where they should have been skipped. The impact of this is that OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 will fail during key exchange with a peer that implements curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org properly about 0.2% of the time (one in every 512ish

It should be compatible with the original patch. However I think that the shared secret should be encoded as a string, too. What does libssh do? > Am 02.11.2013 um 05:46 schrieb Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>: > >> On Fri, 1 Nov 2013, Markus Friedl wrote: >> >> Here are three versions (patch against openbsd cvs) >> >> 1) repace nacl w/libsodium,

On Tue, Sep 24, 2013 at 10:21 PM, Aris Adamantiadis <aris at 0xbadc0de.be> wrote: [snip] > I've worked this week on an alternative key exchange mechanism, in > reaction to the whole NSA leaks and claims over cryptographic backdoors > and/or cracking advances. The key exchange is in my opinion the most > critical defense against passive eavesdropping attacks. > I believe

Here are three versions (patch against openbsd cvs) 1) repace nacl w/libsodium, so i could test 2) curve25519-donna 3) Matthew's public domain reference implementation. i'd vote for #3 -------------- next part -------------- Am 30.10.2013 um 07:27 schrieb Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org>: > On Tue, 24 Sep 2013, Aris Adamantiadis wrote: > >> Dear OpenSSH

Am 02.11.2013 um 11:38 schrieb Aris Adamantiadis <aris at 0xbadc0de.be>: > RFC4251 describes mpint to be multi-size and with positive values having > MSB clear, so it's clearly incompatible with raw string. > > Since you both agreed on the curve25519 implementation to use, I'll work > today on Markus' patch to make the changes Damien wanted. What do you want to

Dear OpenSSH developers, I've worked this week on an alternative key exchange mechanism, in reaction to the whole NSA leaks and claims over cryptographic backdoors and/or cracking advances. The key exchange is in my opinion the most critical defense against passive eavesdropping attacks. I believe Curve25519 from DJB can give users a secure alternative to classical Diffie-Hellman (with fixed

On Fri, Jan 26, 2024 at 7:24?PM Jochen Bern <Jochen.Bern at binect.de> wrote: > On 25.01.24 14:09, Kaushal Shriyan wrote: > > I am running the below servers on Red Hat Enterprise Linux release 8.7 > > How do I enable strong KexAlgorithms, Ciphers and MACs > > On RHEL 8, you need to be aware that there are "crypto policies" > modifying sshd's behaviour,

Il giorno gio 22 nov 2018 alle ore 21:24 Stuart Henderson <stu at spacehopper.org> ha scritto: > > On 2018/11/22 19:55, owl700 at gmail.com wrote: > > Hi, I have compatibility issues with the latest version of > > openssh-server and an old dropbear client, the dopbear client stops at > > preauth > > > > ov 22 14:34:03 myhostname sshd[3905]: debug1: Client

Hello to everyone, and thank for your job. I am reporting here about a problem I am experiencing with portable SSH client, version 7.3p1. My client is an Archlinux system. I am connecting to an Ubuntu server, which provides SSH with some patches (see below). It worked until the upgrade to 7.3p1. This is the produced debug output. Command line: ssh -v -v -v -v -v -v username at 10.196.37.5

Hi, I have compatibility issues with the latest version of openssh-server and an old dropbear client, the dopbear client stops at preauth ov 22 14:34:03 myhostname sshd[3905]: debug1: Client protocol version 2.0; client software version dropbear_0.46 Nov 22 14:34:03 myhostname sshd[3905]: debug1: no match: dropbear_0.46 Nov 22 14:34:03 myhostname sshd[3905]: debug1: Local version string

I have developed a compact at the same time high performance library for curve25519/ed25519 and I have placed it in the public domain. It support DH key exchange as well as ed25519 keygen, sign and verify. The implementation is constant-time, supports blinding, bulk-verify and more. The library is available as portable-C as well as ASM for Intel-x64 CPUs. It outperforms curve25519-donna by a

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3527 Bug ID: 3527 Summary: ssh-copy-id broken for dropbear Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 9.1p1 Hardware: Other OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: major Priority: P5 Component: ssh-copy-id Assignee: unassigned-bugs at mindrot.org

Hello, I've developed a custom PAM module which only allows a user to authenticate to the server only if another user of the same machine also authenticates succesfully. It's currently a simple module which also works as a PAM aware application since it authenticates each user with PAM itself. Both the pamtester utility and su can use this module correctly. However, when I try to use

Hi, We have a proprietary RTOS which is *not* POSIX complaint. We want to port SSH server and SCP client onto our platform. How difficult it would be, to port Dropbear into our platform? We would like to integrate our CLI with the SSH. Any recommendations on using Dropbear for our platform? Appreciate sharing your experiences with Dropbear. --- Thanks, Mohan

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3680 Bug ID: 3680 Summary: Wrong destination in case of dropbear server Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 8.9p1 Hardware: Other OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P5 Component: ssh-copy-id Assignee: unassigned-bugs at

Hi, I have a router running an old version of OpenWRT with an old version of dropbear (Dropbear sshd v0.44test3). It has been working for many years and I ssh in from my desktop systems (running Debian Testing) with no problem. However, recently I upgraded one of my desktops and I can no longer connect to the router. Dropbear on the router is exiting with: exit before auth: bad

I was reading https://weakdh.org/sysadmin.html They also have a very interesting paper as a PDF. Anyway it appears that most ssh servers, when using DHE key exchange, use the 1024-bit Oakley Group 2 and there is suspicion the NSA has done the pre-computations needed to passively decrypt any tls communication using DHE with that particular prime group. They recommend setting the following:

I can suggest a few things. krb5.conf ( if you use nfsv4 with kerberized mounts _ [libdefaults] ignore_k5login = true in But, it does not look like it in you logs your useing kerberized mounts. Im missing in SSHD_config : UseDNS yes And the defaults : # GSSAPI options GSSAPIAuthentication yes GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes Are sufficient for a normal ssh kerberized login. Optional,