Displaying 20 results from an estimated 3000 matches similar to: "SSL Cipher Order in Dovecot"
2013 Aug 14
3
force ciphers order for clients
Hi Timo,
reading this
http://www.kuketz-blog.de/perfect-forward-secrecy-mit-apple-mail/
it looks like DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA can be forced in use
with apple mail
( if no ECDHE is possible ,by missing openssl 1.x etc,
seems that apple mail tries ECDHE first if fails its going to use
RSA-AES128-SHA )
force soltution as tried
ssl_cipher_list =
2016 Oct 05
2
Ast 13.10 to 13.11 stop working webrtc
>From this change (res_rtp_asterisk): ast 13.10 to 13.11 webrtc JSSIP stop
working, failing with
chan_sip.c:4083 retrans_pkt: Hanging up call
7238b48c11581d4166b899bf747a05f7 at 130.211.62.184:0 - no reply to our
critical packet (see
https://wiki.asterisk.org/wiki/display/AST/SIP+Retransmissions).
is there any way to configure to have the previous behaviour?
Im trying to set
2014 Dec 02
0
disabling certain ciphers
Am 02.12.2014 um 17:33 schrieb Darren Pilgrim:
> On 12/2/2014 1:32 AM, Reindl Harald wrote:
>>>> ssl_cipher_list = HIGH:!RC4:!MD5:!SRP:!PSK:!aNULL:@STRENGTH
>>>> ssl_dh_parameters_length = 2048
>>>> ssl_parameters_regenerate = 0
>>>> ssl_protocols = !SSLv2 !SSLv3 TLSv1 TLSv1.1 TLSv1.2
>>>
>>> But why does ssl_protocols behave
2013 Aug 14
1
Patch to log the cipher suite used for TLS
Hello,
the attached patch for Dovecot 2.2.4 improves the logging to include
information about the cipher suite used for a TLS connection. Here is
an example log line:
Aug 13 21:49:55 colwyn dovecot: imap-login: Login: user=<tron>, method=CRAM-MD5, rip=2001:8b0:114:1::2, lip=2001:8b0:114:1::2, mpid=10567, TLS=<TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)>,
2014 Dec 02
2
disabling certain ciphers
On 12/2/2014 1:32 AM, Reindl Harald wrote:
>
> Am 02.12.2014 um 06:44 schrieb Will Yardley:
>> On Mon, Dec 01, 2014 at 09:27:48PM -0800, Darren Pilgrim wrote:
>>> On 12/1/2014 4:43 PM, Will Yardley wrote:
>>>> Can you use both ssl_protocols *and* ssl_cipher_list in the same config
>>>> (in a way that's sane)?
>>>
>>>> Is there a
2013 Sep 10
2
dovecot and PFS
Hi
Is there known advices on how to favor PFS with dovecot?
In Apache, I use the following directives, with cause all modern
browsers to adopt 256 bit PFS ciphers, while keeping backward
compatibility with older browsers and avoiding BEAST attack:
SSLProtocol all -SSLv2
SSLHonorCipherOrder On
SSLCipherSuite ECDHE at STRENGTH:ECDH at STRENGTH:DH at STRENGTH:HIGH:-SSLv3-SHA1:-TLSv10
2014 Dec 18
0
CentOS 6 - httpd 2.2.29
On Thu, December 18, 2014 00:31, Jake Shipton wrote:
>
> Hi Alex,
>
> In this situation 2.2.29 actually does offer an advantage over CentOS
> version 2.2.15.
>
> The version provided by CentOS does not support Forward Secrecy for SSL
> or TLS 1.2.
>
> Version 2.2.24+ of upstream Apache includes patches which enable both
> Forward Secrecy and TLS 1.2.
>
> Now
2018 Dec 19
1
How to configure Dovecot to disable NIST's curves and still rertain EECDH?
I am interested in configuring Dovecot's TLS so as to retain forward
secrecy, but eliminate all of NIST's elliptic curves.
Besides being subject to side channel attacks [1], in some quarters
there is a general distrust of NIST's curves and any of their other
cryptographic primitives after the Dual EC DRBG debacle.
>From what I can tell, the following will prevent the use of
2015 Oct 30
0
Webmail accessive Dovecot logins
"A. Schulze" writes:
> David Mehler:
>
>> Second question, in the doveconf -n there's reference to my ssl_cipher
>> am I using current tls ciphers that support pfs?
>
>> ssl_cipher_list = ALL:!LOW:!SSLv3:!SSLv2:!EXP:!aNULL
>
> some non pfs cipher would be still active. check yourself:
> # openssl ciphers -v
2015 Feb 06
2
TLS config check
Hi All
First the essentials:
dovecot --version: 2.2.15
/usr/local/etc/dovecot/conf.d/10-ssl.conf:
ssl = required
ssl_cert =
</usr/local/openssl/certs/mail.domain.com.chained.dovecot.ecdsa.crt
ssl_key = </usr/local/openssl/certs/mail.domain.com.ecdsa.key
ssl_protocols = !SSLv2 !SSLv3
ssl_cipher_list =
2015 Feb 06
0
TLS config check
Quoting SW <dovecot at bsdpanic.com>:
> Hi All
>
> First the essentials:
>
> dovecot --version: 2.2.15
>
> /usr/local/etc/dovecot/conf.d/10-ssl.conf:
>
> ssl = required
>
> ssl_cert =
> </usr/local/openssl/certs/mail.domain.com.chained.dovecot.ecdsa.crt
>
> ssl_key = </usr/local/openssl/certs/mail.domain.com.ecdsa.key
>
> ssl_protocols =
2014 Nov 02
2
Proposed openSSL usage improvements
Hi everyone,
Prompted by the fact that addressing some of the recent SSL problems
actually would benefit from also changing things on how openSSL is used
(not just updating the library), I started looking into some improvements.
The tracking ticket is:
https://trac.xiph.org/ticket/2070
To sum it up:
- hard disable SSLv3
- hard disable compression
- new default cipher list
- enable forward
2014 Jan 10
1
Possible to force cipher order?
Hi,
is it possible to force the server cipher order instead of the clients
preferences? When I connect with openssl using these ciphers:
'RC4-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384' -> RC4-SHA will be selected and with
'DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:RC4-SHA' -> DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
It seems to be recommended for webservers to override that due to bad
clients choices and
2013 Sep 24
3
2048-bit Diffie-Hellman parameters
Currently, dovecot generates two primes for Diffie-Hellman key
exchanges: a 512-bit one and a 1024-bit one. In light of recent
events, I think it would be wise to add support for 2048-bit primes as
well, or even better, add a configuration option that lets the user
select a file (or files) containing the DH parameters
In recent years, there has been increased interest in DH especially in
its
2008 Aug 28
1
Wishlist: TLS,SSL cipher in a variable.
Hello again.
Just thought I'd ask and see if it would be possible to get this
sometime in the future:
TLS and SSL connection information in a variable like %c today, but more
exhaustive.
For example I can from postfix get a log like:
postfix/smtpd[432]: Anonymous TLS connection established from xxxxxx:
TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)
This would be nice to see if you have
2017 Apr 14
0
several misc questions, public folders and sharing, quota, ssl
Please keep responses on the list. Thank you. =)
Without ACL plugin there is no way to restrict access, it's free for all.
my site is a very tiny few user site, but ...
auth_mechanisms = login plain
mail_attribute_dict = file:%h/Mail/dovecot-attributes
mail_location = sdbox:~/Mail
mail_plugins = stats quota fts fts_lucene
namespace inbox {
inbox = yes
list = yes
location =
mailbox
2015 Apr 28
1
Disable weak ciphers in vnc_tls
Dear libvirt team,
we a currently in a pci-dss certification process and our security
scanner found weak ciphers in the vlc_tls service on our centos6 box:
When I scan using sslscan I can see that sslv3 and rc4 is accepted:
inf0rmix@tardis:~$ sslscan myhost:16514 | grep Accepted
Accepted SSLv3 256 bits DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
Accepted SSLv3 256 bits AES256-SHA
Accepted SSLv3 128
2017 Apr 14
0
several misc questions, public folders and sharing, quota, ssl
Can you try turning mail_debug=yes and posting logs?
Also if possible, can you try telnetting to the server and issuing
a LOGIN username password
a SELECT public/TestFolder1
with debug turned on?
ACL plugin is needed *iff* you want to *restrict* access.
Aki
> On April 14, 2017 at 11:53 PM David Mehler <dave.mehler at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> Hi Aki,
>
> Thanks for
2017 Apr 27
0
confused with ssl settings and some error - need help
> On April 27, 2017 at 10:55 AM Poliman - Serwis <serwis at poliman.pl> wrote:
>
>
> Thank You for answers. But:
> 1. How should be properly configured ssl_cipher_list?
ssl_cipher_list = ALL:!kRSA:!SRP:!kDHd:!DSS:!aNULL:!eNULL:!EXPORT:!DES:!3DES:!MD5:!PSK:!RC4:!ADH:!LOW at STRENGTH
To disable non-EC DH, use:
ssl_cipher_list =
2009 Feb 26
1
OpenSSH with 'none' cipher (after reading bug #877)
Hi,
I'd like to argue in favor of bug #877 (
https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=877) from a new perspective.
Instead of performance, I wish to raise the issue of regulatory compliance
and auditing.
I read all of #877 and I understand the arguments for and against, but I
felt at the end the decisive comment by Damien was mostly based on 'We don't
want users to use