similar to: [Patch 0/4] Xen stack trace printing improvements

This series consists of improvements to Xen''s ability to print traces of its own stack, and specifically for the stack overflow case to be able to use frame pointers in a debug build. I have dev tested the series in debug and non-debug cases, with and without memory guards, and I believe that all the stack traces look correct (given the available information Xen has), and that the

This patch series implements SMP boot for arch/arm, as far as getting all CPUs up and running the idle loop. Changes from v1: - moved barriers out of loop in udelay() - dropped broken GIC change in favour of explanatory comment - made the increment of ready_cpus atomic (I couldn''t move the increment to before signalling the next CPU because the PT switch has to happen between

This set of patches converts the way frames gets created from using PUSHes/POPs to using MOVes, thus allowing (in certain cases) to avoid saving/restoring part of the register set. While the place where the (small) win from this comes from varies between CPUs, the net effect is a 1 to 2% reduction on a combined interruption entry and exit when the full state save can be avoided. 1: use MOV

FYI, I see the following build error with this patch... MRJ ---- new warnings/errors for xen ---- keyhandler.c: In function `__dump_execstate'': keyhandler.c:96: warning: asm operand 1 probably doesn''t match constraints gmake[5]: *** [keyhandler.o] Error 1 gmake[4]: *** [/tank/ws/xvm-3.4.3/xen.hg/xen/common/built_in.o] Error 2 gmake[3]: *** [/tank/ws/xvm-3.4.3/xen.hg/xen/xen]

First off, Apologies for the massive patch series... This series boots a 32-bit dom0 kernel to a command prompt on an ARMv8 (AArch64) model. The kernel is the same one as I am currently using with the 32 bit hypervisor I haven''t yet tried starting a guest or anything super advanced like that ;-). Also there is not real support for 64-bit domains at all, although in one or two places I

This round implements all of the review comments from V2 and all patches are now acked. Unless there are any objections I intend to apply later this morning. Ian.

Hi, This is the fifth version of this patch series. With the Versatile Express TC2, it''s possible to boot only with A7 or A15. If the user choose to boot with only A7, the CPU ID will start at 0x100. As Xen relies on it to set the logical ID and the GIC, it won''t be possible to use Xen with this use case. This patch series is divided in 3 parts: - Patch 1: prepare Xen

Hello everyone, this is the fourth version of the patch series that introduces ARMv7 with virtualization extensions support in Xen. The series allows Xen and Dom0 to boot on a Cortex-A15 based Versatile Express simulator. See the following announce email for more informations about what we are trying to achieve, as well as the original git history: See

Hello everyone, this is the very first version of the patch series that introduces ARMv7 with virtualization extensions support in Xen. The series allows Xen and Dom0 to boot on a Cortex-A15 based Versatile Express simulator. See the following announce email for more informations about what we are trying to achieve, as well as the original git history: See

Changes from v1 to v2: - Use a macro to replace the hardcode in patch 1/3. This patchset fixes issues about IA32_VMX_MISC MSR emulation, VMCS guest area synchronization about PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK/PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH, and CR0/CR4 emulation. Please help to review and pull. Thanks, Dongxiao Dongxiao Xu (3): nested vmx: emulate IA32_VMX_MISC MSR nested vmx: synchronize page

The self_nmi() code cause''s an NMI to be triggered by sending an APIC message to the local processor. However, NMIs are blocked by the VMEXIT, until the next iret or VMENTER. Volume 3 Chapter 27 Section 1 of the Intel SDM states: An NMI causes subsequent NMIs to be blocked, but only after the VM exit completes. As a result, as soon as the VMENTER happens, an immediate VMEXIT happens

We weren''t taking the guest mode (CPSR) into account and would always access the user version of the registers. Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> --- v2: Fix r8 vs r8_fiq thinko. --- xen/arch/arm/traps.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- xen/arch/arm/vgic.c | 4 +- xen/arch/arm/vpl011.c | 4 +- xen/arch/arm/vtimer.c

Do so by simply re-using _show_registers(). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> --- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c @@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ void double_fault(void); void do_double_fault(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) { unsigned int cpu; + unsigned long crs[8]; watchdog_disable(); @@ -235,22 +236,18 @@ void do_double_fault(struct

Changes from v1: - Define new struct hvm_trap to represent information of trap, include instruction length. - Renames hvm_inject_exception to hvm_inject_trap. Then define a couple of wrappers around that function for existing callers, so that their parameter lists actually *shrink*. This series of patches fix the mistake for debug exception(#DB), overflow exception(#OF) and INT3(#BP),

I last posted this back in April to critical acclaim (AKA near total silence). I''m not sure who looks after tools/include/xen-foreign. I had thought it was Jan but I think I was confused and was thinking of the semi-related xen/include/compat stuff. IOW I think nobody felt "responsible". Unless there''s any objection lets just treat this as coming under tools. The

Removes node identification functionality from host-browser.rb and adds a new script, host-register.rb, that takes over that functionality. The chief difference is that host-browser used a simple TCP server setup to get data from the node, while host-register uses the qpid bus to do so. Specifically, it communicates with the matahari qmf agent added to the node in two related patchsets to node

This series of patches fix the mistake for debug exception(#DB), overflow exception(#OF) and INT3(#BP), INTn instruction emulation. Introduce new function vmx_inject_sw_exception() which deliver the software excetion, software interrupt and privileged software exception. Split hardware exception as a seperate function(old function vmx_inject_hw_exception()). Also Passed down intruction length

xen/arch/x86/crash.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- xen/arch/x86/machine_kexec.c | 19 ++++++ xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S | 34 +++++++++++ xen/include/asm-x86/desc.h | 45 +++++++++++++++ xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h | 4 + 5 files changed, 203 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) Experimentally, certain crash kernels will triple fault very early

One could even debate whether reserved bit faults are always fatal (and should never be propagated to the guest)... Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Index: 2008-01-28/xen/arch/x86/traps.c =================================================================== --- 2008-01-28.orig/xen/arch/x86/traps.c 2008-01-28 11:31:44.000000000 +0100 +++ 2008-01-28/xen/arch/x86/traps.c

Moritz Muehlenhoff writes ("Re: Xen package security updates for jessie 4.4, XSA-213, XSA-214"): > On Thu, May 04, 2017 at 05:06:07PM +0100, Ian Jackson wrote: > > I have fixed these in stretch but the jessie package remains unfixed. > > I think I may be able to find some backports somewhere. Would that be > > useful ? Is anyone else working on this ? > >