similar to: RFC: encrypted hostkeys patch

Dear OpenSSH developers, I've worked this week on an alternative key exchange mechanism, in reaction to the whole NSA leaks and claims over cryptographic backdoors and/or cracking advances. The key exchange is in my opinion the most critical defense against passive eavesdropping attacks. I believe Curve25519 from DJB can give users a secure alternative to classical Diffie-Hellman (with fixed

--- sshd.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c index dda8d9b77..cbdced5db 100644 --- a/sshd.c +++ b/sshd.c @@ -1533,6 +1533,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) } else { do_log2(ll, "Unable to load host key: %s", options.host_key_files[i]); + sshkey_free(pubkey); + pubkey = NULL; sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;

Hello all, I recently found myself wanting to run sshd with passphrase-protected host keys rather than the usual unencrypted format, and was somewhat surprised to discover that sshd did not support this. I'm not sure if there's any particular reason for that, but I've developed the below patch (relative to current CVS at time of writing) that implements this. It prompts for the

Hi, experimenting with openssh_cvs on my SCO Unix 3.2v4.2 machine, I had sshd core dumping on me. Tracking this, I found that if a host key is specified in the sshd_config that does not exist (I used "./sshd -d -d -d -f sshd_config" with the shipped sshd_config file, to work around incompatibilities with the installed sshd.com's sshd_config, and I do not have ssh2 host keys on

Hello, I need to allow for some people to execute ssh with one shared private key for remote executing command on various machines. However, it is not possible to set group permissions for private keys and it is possible to have just one private key file for one user. Please, is it possible to add patches into openssh development tree like these, so that standard behavior of ssh is not changed,

Hello, There's a memory allocation for sensitive_data.keys in ssh.c:848 which uses size of Key instead of Key*. This is probably harmless but seems to be wrong. --- a/ssh.c +++ b/ssh.c @@ -846,7 +846,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) options.hostbased_authentication) { sensitive_data.nkeys = 7; sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys, -

Hello, Due to patent concerns, I compiled a version of openssl with the no-rsa, no-idea, no-rc5 options. I was able to then take this compile of openssl, with the standard openssh-2.1.0 rpms and run it on another machine. Most things seemed to work fine, except I was unable to ssh into the machine. After applying the following patch to the sshd code, a quick test with an ssh session worked:

Below is a patch against the current OpenBSD OpenSSH CVS to workaround a behavior I have observed when converting from SSH 1.2.27 to OpenSSH while using the same old RSA1 host key for protocol 1. In several cases I saw that old SSH sshd reported a host key size of 1024 bits when OpenSSH saw it as 1023 bits. Without the patch, when OpenSSH's ssh client connects to an old SSH sshd it warns

Hello, The following patch avoids a warnign message when using hostbased authentication as root and protocol v1 support has been disabled. The case for non-root users has already been addressed, but root follows a different code path. -- Iain Morgan diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c index cceb36e..e32aa0a 100644 --- a/ssh.c +++ b/ssh.c @@ -1242,8 +1242,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=304 Summary: ssh-keysign memory freeing bug Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: major Priority: P2 Component: Miscellaneous AssignedTo: openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ReportedBy: openssh

The problem I am seeing was introduced between 6.4p1 and 6.5p1 (and still exists in 6.6p1). With HostbasedAuthentication/EnableSSHKeysign turned on, I am seeing one of two sets of messages: no matching hostkey found ssh_keysign: no reply key_sign failed and not a valid request ssh_keysign: no reply key_sign failed Then in either case two password prompts: bowman at HOST.math.utah.edu's

Hi, Is there any way to store HostKey in hardware (and delegate the related processing)? I have been using Roumen Petrov's x509 patch for clients, which works via an OpenSSL engine, but it does not seem to support server HostKey: http://roumenpetrov.info/pipermail/ssh_x509_roumenpetrov.info/2012q4/000019.html For PKCS#11, I have found an email on this list from a year back suggesting this

It appears that /etc/ssh/ssh_config enforces policy on local users in addition to its documented role as provider of defaults. $ ssh -V OpenSSH_3.5p1, SSH protocols 1.5/2.0, OpenSSL 0x0090602f $ cat .ssh/config Host localhost HostbasedAuthentication yes PreferredAuthentications hostbased $ ssh localhost Hostbased authentication not enabled in /etc/ssh/ssh_config ssh_keysign: no reply

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1974 Zev Weiss <zev at bewilderbeest.net> changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CC| |zev at bewilderbeest.net Attachment #2125|0 |1 is obsolete|

hello.. i am running openssh-3.7.1p2. on linux.It is working successfully..and daemon is running &client also connecting.But the problem is with the mips architecture when i connecting this server from remote syytem.?i got an error of buufer_get:trying to get more bytes 1 than buffer0.And client is not connecting from remote system.My out is as follows on my server ?in sshd main before

hello.. i am running openssh-3.7.1p2. on linux.It is working successfully.and daemon is running &client also connecting.But the problem is with the mips architecture when i connecting this server from remote syytem. i got an error of buufer_get:trying to get more bytes 1 than buffer0.And client is not connecting from remote system.My out is as follows on my server in sshd main before

Hello Everyone, I am writing code to test derive_keys functionality. The function signature is: static u_char * derive_key(Kex *kex, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, BIGNUM *shared_secret) Now, the input which is provided to us is K(share_secret) as an array of characters. H(Hash) as an array of characters. Session_id as an array of characters Now, first I converted hash

I apologize, this patch should have been sent awhile ago. Between a lot of things that needed to be completed at work as a sysadmin for the Research Computing group at Purdue University and retiring from work after 38 years at the end of May (2012), I basically ignored it. This patch is from a clone of my workstation that I just activated at home. The patch was primarily written to fix the

In the current implementation, ssh always uses the hostname supplied by the user directly for the SSHFP DNS record lookup. This causes problems when using the domain search path, e.g. I have "search example.com" in my resolv.conf and then do a "ssh host", I will connect to host.example.com, but ssh will query the DNS for an SSHFP record of "host.", not

I'm seeing some extremely odd behavior with solaris. I have a suspicion it's me, but here's the story and maybe someone can suggest an avenue of investigation. This seems to be happening with any release of openssh since at least 2.5.2p1. 1) Problem #1: If SSH protocol 1 is enabled then sshd segfaults right off. This turns out to be because the call to arc4random_stir is