similar to: Support for "ssh-rsa-sha256" and "ssh-dss-sha256" ?

Displaying 20 results from an estimated 3000 matches similar to: "Support for "ssh-rsa-sha256" and "ssh-dss-sha256" ?"

2015 May 22
3
Weak DH primes and openssh
On Fri, May 22, 2015 at 12:27:01, Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au> wrote: > Note that PuTTY does do Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange, but until very > recently (ie after their 0.64 release) they didn't do the one that was > actually standardized in RFC4419. OpenSSH recently removed support for > that non-standard one and as a result we don't offer DHGEX to PuTTY >
2019 Feb 15
4
Can we disable diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 by default?
Also, how are default moduli shipped with OpenSSH for use in diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1/sha256 chosen? Are they chosen randomly by developers or are they chosen for security properties? If they are random, why not use moduli from RFC 7919 instead, like Mozilla recommends? On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 3:48 AM Mark D. Baushke <mdb at juniper.net> wrote: > > Yegor Ievlev <koops1997
2019 Feb 14
2
Can we disable diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 by default?
I ask because the removal of diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 happened accidently in 7.8 due to a mistake in a change to readconf.c. I noticed this and filed a bug about it along with a patch to fix readconf.c to use KEX_CLIENT_* like it used to: https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1b9dd4aa https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2967 Its clear the removal was unintentional
2015 Jun 02
1
[Bug 2302] with DH-GEX, ssh (and sshd) should not fall back to unconfigured DH groups or at least document this behaviour and use a stronger group
https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2302 --- Comment #13 from Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au> --- (In reply to Christoph Anton Mitterer from comment #10) [...] > Even though an attacker cannot (AFAIU??) for a connection to > downgrade to the weaker groups, The server's DH-GEX exchange hash includes the DH group sizes it received from the client. If these are
2019 Feb 14
2
Can we disable diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 by default?
Can we disable diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 too? On Thu, Feb 14, 2019 at 10:23 PM Mark D. Baushke <mdb at juniper.net> wrote: > > Hi John, > > The short answer is YES. > > Jon DeVree <nuxi at vault24.org> writes: > > > I ask because the removal of diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 happened > > accidently in 7.8 due to a mistake in a change to
2019 Feb 15
4
Can we disable diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 by default?
I'm not nearly knowledgeable enough in crypto to fully understand your answer, but I will try. I wonder why moduli are not automatically generated the first time sshd is started though. That would make much more sense than shipping a default moduli file but also asking everyone to replace it with their own. On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 5:50 AM Mark D. Baushke <mdb at juniper.net> wrote: >
2015 May 21
8
Weak DH primes and openssh
Hi, You will be aware of https://weakdh.org/ by now, I presume; the take-home seems to be that 1024-bit DH primes might well be too weak. I'm wondering what (if anything!) you propose to do about this issue, and what Debian might do for our users? openssh already prefers ECDH, which must reduce the impact somewhat, although the main Windows client (PuTTY) doesn't support ECDH yet. But
2015 Jul 24
2
DH_GRP_MIN is currently 1024, should it be bumped to 2048?
Greetings, Given the weakness with Diffie-Hellman modp groups less than 2048, is it time to bump the suggested 1024 bit minimum value from the RFC 4419 to a more current 2048 value for OpenSSH 7.0? If so, should this be just a compile-time change, or should there be a new client and server runtime option? Thanks, -- Mark
2015 Dec 11
16
[Bug 2515] New: Implement diffie-hellman-group{14,15,16)-sha256
https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2515 Bug ID: 2515 Summary: Implement diffie-hellman-group{14,15,16)-sha256 Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Hardware: All OS: All Status: ASSIGNED Severity: enhancement Priority: P3 Component: ssh Assignee: dtucker at
2014 Oct 28
22
[Bug 2302] New: ssh (and sshd) should not fall back to deselected KEX algos
https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2302 Bug ID: 2302 Summary: ssh (and sshd) should not fall back to deselected KEX algos Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 6.7p1 Hardware: All OS: All Status: NEW Severity: security Priority: P5 Component: ssh
2014 Oct 28
22
[Bug 2302] New: ssh (and sshd) should not fall back to deselected KEX algos
https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2302 Bug ID: 2302 Summary: ssh (and sshd) should not fall back to deselected KEX algos Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 6.7p1 Hardware: All OS: All Status: NEW Severity: security Priority: P5 Component: ssh
2013 May 28
9
[Bug 2109] New: Add support for ssh-rsa-sha256 and ssh-dsa-sha256 public key algorithms
https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2109 Bug ID: 2109 Summary: Add support for ssh-rsa-sha256 and ssh-dsa-sha256 public key algorithms Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 6.2p1 Hardware: All OS: FreeBSD Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5
2013 Jun 19
1
OpenSSH and RFC 5114
I apologize up-front if this is the wrong list for this question. Can OpenSSH be made to work with the MODP Groups in RFC 5114? ?The RFC itself makes a comment in section 3.4 that mentions that RFC 4419 extended the original SSH model to allow Diffie-Hellman parameters to be transmitted as part of the key exchange messages, but I'm not clear how that works with OpenSSH's moduli file. Do
2017 Sep 21
5
DH Group Exchange Fallback
Hi, I'm interested in requiring a minimum of 3072-bit DH moduli when using the "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256" kex, so I edited my /etc/ssh/moduli file such that only 3071+ moduli are left. However, when clients ask for a max of 2048-bit moduli, they actually get one (!). I poked around and found that a fallback mechanism exists (dh.c:185), which returns back the
2018 Nov 23
2
Debian Stretch 9.6: openssh-server and old dropbear client don't work togheter
Il giorno gio 22 nov 2018 alle ore 21:24 Stuart Henderson <stu at spacehopper.org> ha scritto: > > On 2018/11/22 19:55, owl700 at gmail.com wrote: > > Hi, I have compatibility issues with the latest version of > > openssh-server and an old dropbear client, the dopbear client stops at > > preauth > > > > ov 22 14:34:03 myhostname sshd[3905]: debug1: Client
2014 Mar 07
12
[Bug 2209] New: Problem logging into Cisco devices under 6.5p1 (kexgexc.c)
https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2209 Bug ID: 2209 Summary: Problem logging into Cisco devices under 6.5p1 (kexgexc.c) Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 6.5p1 Hardware: amd64 OS: FreeBSD Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P5 Component: ssh
2014 Jan 17
15
Call for testing: OpenSSH-6.5
Hi, OpenSSH 6.5 is almost ready for release, so we would appreciate testing on as many platforms and systems as possible. This release contains some substantial new features and a number of bugfixes. Snapshot releases for portable OpenSSH are available from http://www.mindrot.org/openssh_snap/ The OpenBSD version is available in CVS HEAD: http://www.openbsd.org/anoncvs.html Portable OpenSSH is
2013 May 15
2
Support for "ssh-rsa-sha256" and "ssh-dss-sha256" ?‏
Functionality request for supporting Digital Signatures for RSA and DSS Public Key Algorithms in alignment with NIST SP800-131A. I assume this has been asked before, but I could not find in the archives. Support of "ssh-rsa-sha256" and "ssh-dss-sha256" public key algorithms for OpenSSH? I know Suite B Algorithms and x509 SSH Extension Algorithms are supported, but not a
2016 Nov 08
4
one host only: ssh_dispatch_run_fatal
Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au> writes: > On Tue, Nov 8, 2016 at 2:43 PM, Harry Putnam <reader at newsguy.com> wrote: >> Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au> writes: >> >>> On Tue, Nov 8, 2016 at 1:02 PM, Harry Putnam <reader at newsguy.com> wrote: >>> [...] >>>> gv harry> ssh -vv 2x >>>> >>>>
2015 May 23
2
Weak DH primes and openssh
> Can this be addressed in ssh_config/sshd_config with the KexAlgorithms setting? weakdh.org/sysadmin.html recommends adding: KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256 at libssh.org But this thread makes it sound as if it's not necessary. Can anyone confirm? Personally I'm on openssh-6.7. - Grant > You will be aware of https://weakdh.org/ by now, I presume; the take-home seems to be