Displaying 20 results from an estimated 5000 matches similar to: "Audit of NMI and MCE paths"
2012 Dec 05
1
Recursive locking in Xen (in reference to NMI/MCE path audit)
Hello,
While auditing the NMI/MCE paths, I have encountered some issues with
recursive locking in Xen, discovered by the misuse of the console_lock
intermittently as a regular lock and as a recursive lock.
The comment in spinlock.h is unclear as to whether mixing recursive and
non recursive calls on the same spinlock is valid. If the calls are
genuinely not valid, then surely regular spinlocks
2012 Dec 12
7
[PATCH V5] x86/kexec: Change NMI and MCE handling on kexec path
xen/arch/x86/crash.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
xen/arch/x86/machine_kexec.c | 19 ++++++
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S | 34 +++++++++++
xen/include/asm-x86/desc.h | 45 +++++++++++++++
xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h | 4 +
5 files changed, 203 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
Experimentally, certain crash kernels will triple fault very early
2020 Jun 23
2
Should SEV-ES #VC use IST? (Re: [PATCH] Allow RDTSC and RDTSCP from userspace)
Hi Andy,
On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 10:37:41AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> 1. Use IST for #VC and deal with all the mess that entails.
With the removal of IST shifting I wonder what you would suggest on how
to best implement an NMI-safe IST handler with nesting support.
My current plan is to implement an IST handler which switches itself off
the IST stack as soon as possible, freeing it for
2012 Nov 22
41
[PATCH V3] vmx/nmi: Do not use self_nmi() in VMEXIT handler
The self_nmi() code cause''s an NMI to be triggered by sending an APIC
message to the local processor. However, NMIs are blocked by the
VMEXIT, until the next iret or VMENTER.
Volume 3 Chapter 27 Section 1 of the Intel SDM states:
An NMI causes subsequent NMIs to be blocked, but only after the VM exit
completes.
As a result, as soon as the VMENTER happens, an immediate VMEXIT
happens
2012 Sep 07
2
[PATCH] x86/hvm: don't give vector callback higher priority than NMI/MCE
Those two should always be delivered first imo.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c
@@ -395,16 +395,16 @@ struct hvm_intack hvm_vcpu_has_pending_i
struct hvm_domain *plat = &v->domain->arch.hvm_domain;
int vector;
- if ( (plat->irq.callback_via_type == HVMIRQ_callback_vector)
-
2013 Feb 08
3
NMI SERR interrupts in dom0
I have an Intel e1000e NIC which I put into passthrough for an HVM
domain under Xen 4.2. All the corresponding hardware protections are
enabled on my system (DMA + Interrupt remapping), however, once in a
while I get a SERR NMI in dom0 (NMI - PCI sys error (SERR) in xl dmesg).
I am wondering about its exact reason. I am thinking in the following way:
[+] Under Intel VT-x, interrupts are
2020 Jul 15
2
[PATCH v4 45/75] x86/sev-es: Adjust #VC IST Stack on entering NMI handler
On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 02:08:47PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> @@ -489,6 +490,9 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_nmi)
> this_cpu_write(nmi_cr2, read_cr2());
> nmi_restart:
>
> + /* Needs to happen before DR7 is accessed */
> + sev_es_ist_enter(regs);
> +
> this_cpu_write(nmi_dr7, local_db_save());
>
> nmi_enter();
> @@ -502,6 +506,8 @@
2020 Jul 15
2
[PATCH v4 45/75] x86/sev-es: Adjust #VC IST Stack on entering NMI handler
On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 02:08:47PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> @@ -489,6 +490,9 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_nmi)
> this_cpu_write(nmi_cr2, read_cr2());
> nmi_restart:
>
> + /* Needs to happen before DR7 is accessed */
> + sev_es_ist_enter(regs);
> +
> this_cpu_write(nmi_dr7, local_db_save());
>
> nmi_enter();
> @@ -502,6 +506,8 @@
2007 Jun 20
9
[Patch] Add NMI Injection and Pending Support in VMX
Currently, Xen does not support injecting an NMI to HVM guest OS. Adding
this
feature is necessary for those softwares which depend on NMI to function
correctly,
such as KDB and oprofile.
The attached patch allows NMI to be injected to guest OS in NMIP capable
platforms.
It also enables to queue an NMI and then inject it as soon as possible.
Signed-off-by: Haitao Shan
2020 Apr 25
2
[PATCH] Allow RDTSC and RDTSCP from userspace
On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 5:49 AM Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> wrote:
>
> Hi Dave,
>
> On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 03:53:09PM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> > Ahh, so any instruction that can have an instruction intercept set
> > potentially needs to be able to tolerate a #VC? Those instruction
> > intercepts are under the control of the (untrusted relative to the
2020 Apr 25
2
[PATCH] Allow RDTSC and RDTSCP from userspace
On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 5:49 AM Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> wrote:
>
> Hi Dave,
>
> On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 03:53:09PM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> > Ahh, so any instruction that can have an instruction intercept set
> > potentially needs to be able to tolerate a #VC? Those instruction
> > intercepts are under the control of the (untrusted relative to the
2020 Feb 11
1
[PATCH 62/62] x86/sev-es: Add NMI state tracking
On Tue, Feb 11, 2020 at 5:53 AM Joerg Roedel <joro at 8bytes.org> wrote:
>
> From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
>
> Keep NMI state in SEV-ES code so the kernel can re-enable NMIs for the
> vCPU when it reaches IRET.
This patch is overcomplicated IMO. Just do the magic incantation in C
from do_nmi or from here:
/*
* For ease of testing, unmask
2012 Mar 26
2
[PATCH DOCDAY] docs: wrap misc/xen-command-line.markdown to 80 columns
# HG changeset patch
# User Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
# Date 1332754018 -3600
# Node ID b3fc067f938da14fd8b0dce7b00c4876bbf99e8b
# Parent d8e15dc99bf307bd0ae0b042f1d50409b9f26386
docs: wrap misc/xen-command-line.markdown to 80 columns
Makes it more readable as a text document.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
diff -r d8e15dc99bf3 -r b3fc067f938d
2020 Apr 25
5
[PATCH] Allow RDTSC and RDTSCP from userspace
On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 1:23 PM Joerg Roedel <joro at 8bytes.org> wrote:
>
> On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 12:47:31PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > I assume the race you mean is:
> >
> > #VC
> > Immediate NMI before IST gets shifted
> > #VC
> >
> > Kaboom.
> >
> > How are you dealing with this? Ultimately, I think that NMI will need
2013 Sep 08
9
Re: IBM HS20 Xen 4.1 and 4.2 Critical Interrupt - Front panel NMI crash
Hello,
I have the same error, server is auto rebooted during every boot with
kernel XEN, HS20 with Debian Wheezy and XEN hang on and AMM managment show
same errors described in previous mails. With Debian wheezy wit non-xen
kernel boots correcte, it seems that problems is with xen kernel
Same Server HS20 with Debian Lenny+ XEN 3.2 or Debian Squeeze+XEN
4.0 working perfect
Upgraded to Debian
2020 Jun 23
6
Should SEV-ES #VC use IST? (Re: [PATCH] Allow RDTSC and RDTSCP from userspace)
On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 04:59:14PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 04:53:44PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > +noinstr void idtentry_validate_ist(struct pt_regs *regs)
> > +{
> > + if ((regs->sp & ~(EXCEPTION_STKSZ-1)) ==
> > + (_RET_IP_ & ~(EXCEPTION_STKSZ-1)))
> > + die("IST stack recursion", regs, 0);
> > +}
2020 Apr 25
2
[PATCH] Allow RDTSC and RDTSCP from userspace
> On Apr 25, 2020, at 12:10 PM, Joerg Roedel <joro at 8bytes.org> wrote:
>
> ?On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 11:15:35AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> shift_ist is gross. What's it for? If it's not needed, I'd rather
>> not use it, and I eventually want to get rid of it for #DB as well.
>
> The #VC handler needs to be able to nest, there is no way around
2020 Apr 25
2
[PATCH] Allow RDTSC and RDTSCP from userspace
> On Apr 25, 2020, at 12:10 PM, Joerg Roedel <joro at 8bytes.org> wrote:
>
> ?On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 11:15:35AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> shift_ist is gross. What's it for? If it's not needed, I'd rather
>> not use it, and I eventually want to get rid of it for #DB as well.
>
> The #VC handler needs to be able to nest, there is no way around
2004 Dec 20
7
NMI issues...
I have read thru what other users have tried in this list when they have
experienced seemingly similar issues to what I have, without success. I
suspect there might be an issue regarding both the X100P and TDM04b cards
being used in an Intel SE7525GP2 motherboard, as I had to even wait for a
BIOS update from Intel in order to utilize my 3ware 9500 SATA raid
controller on it (3ware Kb -->
2020 Jun 23
2
Should SEV-ES #VC use IST? (Re: [PATCH] Allow RDTSC and RDTSCP from userspace)
On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 03:03:22PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 02:12:37PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> > On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 01:50:14PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > > If SNP is the sole reason #VC needs to be IST, then I'd strongly urge
> > > you to only make it IST if/when you try and make SNP happen, not before.
> >
>