similar to: [RFC/PATCH v4] XENMEM_claim_pages (subop of existing) hypercall

This is patch 2of2 of an eighth cut of the patch of the proposed XENMEM_claim_pages hypercall/subop, taking into account feedback from Jan and Keir and IanC and Matthew Daley. As requested by Jan, this is a separate post of the tools part of the patch. NOTE: This patch must be applied after the hypervisor part of the patchset or otherwise may break the build! v5->v8: - no change in this

This patch adds a per-node bucket to the heap structure in Xen. During heap initialization the patch determines which bucket to place the memory. We reserve guard pages between node boundaries in the case that said boundary isn''t already guarded by the MAX_ORDER boundary to prevent the buddy allocator from merging pages between nodes. -- Ryan Harper Software Engineer; Linux Technology

# HG changeset patch # User yamahata@valinux.co.jp # Date 1188274001 -32400 # Node ID 2c9db26f1d0e0fdd4757d76a67f4b37ba0e40351 # Parent 58d131f1fb35977ff2d8682f553391c8a866d52c Make XEN_DOMCTL_destroydomain hypercall continuable. XEN_DOMCTL_destroydomain hypercall frees domain resources, especially it frees all pages of the domain. When domain memory is very large, it takes too long resulting in

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2013-4494 / XSA-73 version 3 Lock order reversal between page allocation and grant table locks UPDATES IN VERSION 3 ==================== The issue has been assigned CVE-2013-4494. NOTE REGARDING LACK OF EMBARGO ============================== While the response to this issue

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> --- 2009-01-27.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_map.c 2009-01-30 08:43:35.000000000 +0100 +++ 2009-01-27/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_map.c 2009-01-30 08:46:29.000000000 +0100 @@ -461,8 +461,8 @@ int amd_iommu_map_page(struct domain *d, iommu_l2e = iommu_l2e_from_pfn(hd->root_table, hd->paging_mode, gfn); if (

These two patches were originally part of the XSM series that I have posted, and remain prerequisites for that series. However, they are independent of the XSM changes and are a useful simplification regardless of the use of XSM. The Acked-bys on these patches were provided before rebasing them over the copyback changes in 26268:1b72138bddda, which had minor conflicts that I resolved. [PATCH

[PATCH 6/8] HVM save restore: guest memory handling Signed-off-by: Zhai Edwin <edwin.zhai@intel.com> add support for save/restore HVM guest memory diff -r bb1c450b2739 tools/libxc/xc_hvm_restore.c --- a/tools/libxc/xc_hvm_restore.c Thu Jan 11 21:03:11 2007 +0800 +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_hvm_restore.c Thu Jan 11 21:05:45 2007 +0800 @@ -31,6 +31,40 @@ #include <xen/hvm/ioreq.h>

This patch series includes a series of bugs related to p2m, ept, and PoD code which were found as part of our XenServer product testing. Each of these fixes actual bugs, and the 3.4-based version of the patch has been tested thoroughly. (There may be bugs in porting the patches, but most of them are simple enough as to make it unlikely.) Each patch is conceptually independent, so they can each

Hi All, I am not very familiar with xen details. Now I am thinking of building two privilged domain(domain 0 not driver domain) at boot time. The other question is that wether it is possible to create another domain 0 by domain-builder running in domain0? Does it make sense when domain 0 is shut down unexpectedly another domain 0 can run at once. Maybe it is absurd. I am looking forwards

This set of patches adds the support for acceleration plugins to the netfront/netback drivers. These plugins are intended to support virtualisable network hardware that can be directly accessed from the guest, bypassing dom0. This is in response to the RFC we posted to xen-devel with an outline of our approach at the end of September. To follow will be another set of patches to provide our

Please CC as I''m not subscribed to valgrind-developers. Under Xen the toolstack is responsible for managing the domains in the system, e.g. creating, destroying, and otherwise manipulating them. To do this it uses a number of ioctls on the /proc/xen/privcmd device. Most of these (the MMAPBATCH ones) simply set things up such that a subsequenct mmap call will map the desired guest

Hi, V6: The only change from V5 is in patch #6: - changed comment to reflect autoxlate - removed a redundant ASSERT - reworked logic a bit so that get_page_from_gfn() is called with NULL for p2m type as before. arm has ASSERT wanting it to be NULL. Tim: patch 4 needs your approval. Daniel: patch 5 needs your approval. These patches implement PVH dom0. Patches 1 and 2

I''ve addressed all (I think/hope) of the review comments. The main change is to expose the guest virtual platform (e.g. memory layout and interrupt usage etc) to the toolstack via the public interface. This is then used during FDT generation. I have just codified the current defacto standard layout, it''s probably not the best layout but any change can be a separate patch/series.

This patch series is a reworking of a series developed by Mukesh Rathor at Oracle. The entirety of the design and development was done by him; I have only reworked, reorganized, and simplified things in a way that I think makes more sense. The vast majority of the credit for this effort therefore goes to him. This version is labelled v13 because it is based on his most recent series, v11.

This patch set adds XSM security labels to useful debugging output locations, and fixes some assumptions that all interrupts behaved like GSI interrupts (which had useful non-dynamic IDs). It also cleans up the policy build process and adds an example of how to use the user field in the security context. Debug output: [PATCH 01/10] xsm: Add security labels to event-channel dump [PATCH 02/10] xsm:

Biggest change is to switch the new DTB node to /xen-core-devices instead of /xen at Stefano''s request. I also dropped the few patches title HACK etc which weren''t supposed to be there and fixed up some bits and pieces which folks commented on. George, WRT the freeze I think this is functionality which we cannot ship Xen 4.4 without. The impact is entirely constrained to the

The following series of patches fill in most of the gaps in the OCaml bindings to libxl, to make them useful for clients such as xapi/xenopsd (from XCP). There are a number of bugfixes to the existing bindings as well. I have an experimental version of xenopsd that successfully uses the new bindings. An earlier version of the first half of the series was submitted to the last by Ian Campbell on

What are the outstanding things to do before we think we can start on the 4.2 -rc''s? Does anyone have a timetable in mind? hypervisor: * ??? - Keir, Tim, Jan? tools: * libxl stable API -- we would like 4.2 to define a stable API which downstream''s can start to rely on not changing. Aspects of this are: * event handling (IanJ working