similar to: kerneld and module security

Displaying 20 results from an estimated 300 matches similar to: "kerneld and module security"

2008 Jun 25
1
confidence bounds using contour plot
Hello I'm trying to calculate 2d confindence bounds into a scatterplot using the function "kde2d" (package MASS) and a contour plot. I found a similar post providing a solution - unfortunatly I do not realy understand which data I have to use to calculated the named "quantile": Post URL: http://tolstoy.newcastle.edu.au/R/help/03b/5384.html > (...) > >> Is
1998 Jun 14
14
SSH w/ttysnoop
I was wondering if anyone here has or knows how to implement ttysnoop w/ssh ?
2006 Nov 11
2
Drives Not Recognized on Dell Poweredge 1550 CentOs4 install
I have a new (used)Dell Poweredge 1550 server with 2 scsi drives (dual 1ghz w/ 2048MB) that I'm attempting to install CentOs 4 onto and am having problems getting the darn thing to recognize the hard drives. (it's worth noting that it's running RAID 0 and the RAID bios recognizes both drives as being in "optimal" state). I start the installation process and all is going
2016 Mar 03
2
[cfe-dev] [3.8 Release] Please write release notes!
On Wed, Mar 02, 2016 at 11:34:27PM -0800, John McCall via llvm-dev wrote: > When that’s not practical, you can instead reduce the alignment requirements > of the pointer. If the pointer is to a struct that represents that layout of a > serialized structure, consider making that struct packed; this will remove any > implicit internal padding that the compiler might add to the struct
1998 Mar 17
0
Re: Linux Sound driver ("OSS free") vulnerability
Synopsis Applications can mmap sound driver DMA memory into their address space (see http://www.4front-tech.com for API documentation). When the application closes the audio fd, it still has the mapping to the DMA buffer. It can now interfere with other apps playing/recording audio. (i.e. the driver should prevent opening the sound driver again while another app holds mappings open to it) But
1997 Sep 23
1
C''t Article on Juggernaut
There is a recent article in the German magazine C''t that may be of interest to those on this list. It describes a cracker program, Juggernaut, which can hijack telnet sessions. The program is written specifically to run under Linux. An english translation of the article is available at: http://www.ix.de/ct/english/9710142/ It also mentions that they are working on a version of the
2016 Feb 26
2
[3.8 Release] Please write release notes!
If you were thinking about writing a note for 3.8 but didn't get around to it yet, this is the final reminder. (In particular, the notes for X86 and PowerPC could use some attention.) Thanks, Hans On Thu, Feb 11, 2016 at 4:16 PM, Hans Wennborg <hans at chromium.org> wrote: > Dear lots of people, > > The first comments on the 3.7 release expressed surprise that there > were
1998 Jun 16
2
masquerading
Following Situation: Having an intranet-application that needs to know the ip-Address of the clients before running. Clients anywere in the Internet with any ip-address. So I thought about using masquerading the opposite way than normal. But then anybody could use this application. Dos anybody know how to make it a little bit more secure, like proofing the mac-address of the client, or something
2004 Dec 20
2
[LLVMdev] Re: Compiling FreeType 2.1.9 with LLVM 1.4
On Sun, 2004-12-19 at 22:52, Adam Warner wrote: > Hi Reid Spencer, > > > CC=/path/to/llvmgcc CXX=/path/to/llvmg++ configure > > make > > > > and was able to reproduce the problem. Not sure what's up with that but > > as Misha pointed out, llvmgcc isn't any "particular" version of 3.4, its > > just 3.4ish. I also concur with him that you
1998 May 23
7
Re: Re: Re: Bind Overrun Bug and Linux (fwd)
> > systems which no longer seem to have this. This file contained an archive of > > the trojan''s that were inserted into the compromised system - does anybody know > > what is in these trojans? > > Check the Linux RootKit ... (LRK).. > > Typically LRK to use config-files.. (and typically LRK-users to place > files in /dev.. find /dev -type f | grep -v
1997 Oct 08
5
Malicious Linux modules
As halflife demonstrated in Phrack 50 with his linspy project, it is trivial to patch any system call under Linux from within a module. This means that once your system has been compromised at the root level, it is possible for an intruder to hide completely _without_ modifying any binaries or leaving any visible backdoors behind. Because such tools are likely to be in use within the hacker
1998 May 29
5
Configuration for binding to "secure" ports?
[Note to R. Wolff -- thanks for the pointers and the program. As I understand its workings, it would run as root and bind a listen port to a particular program -- with a list being supplied in /etc/portadmin or other file. Basically, a listen wrapper. Hopefully this message will address your cleanup concerns in my previous message. Thanks. Also, you may want to provide a moderator''s
2017 Jul 07
2
I/O error for one folder within the mountpoint
I guess you're right aboug gfid, I got that: [2017-07-07 07:35:15.197003] W [MSGID: 108008] [afr-self-heal-name.c:354:afr_selfheal_name_gfid_mismatch_check] 0-applicatif-replicate-0: GFID mismatch for <gfid:3fa785b5-4242-4816-a452-97da1a5e45c6>/snooper b9222041-72dd-43a3-b0ab-4169dbd9a87f on applicatif-client-1 and 60056f98-20f8-4949-a4ae-81cc1a139147 on applicatif-client-0 Can you
2017 Jul 07
0
I/O error for one folder within the mountpoint
On 07/07/2017 03:39 PM, Florian Leleu wrote: > > I guess you're right aboug gfid, I got that: > > [2017-07-07 07:35:15.197003] W [MSGID: 108008] > [afr-self-heal-name.c:354:afr_selfheal_name_gfid_mismatch_check] > 0-applicatif-replicate-0: GFID mismatch for > <gfid:3fa785b5-4242-4816-a452-97da1a5e45c6>/snooper > b9222041-72dd-43a3-b0ab-4169dbd9a87f on
2017 Jul 07
2
I/O error for one folder within the mountpoint
Hi Ravi, thanks for your answer, sure there you go: # gluster volume heal applicatif info Brick ipvr7.xxx:/mnt/gluster-applicatif/brick <gfid:e3b5ef36-a635-4e0e-bd97-d204a1f8e7ed> <gfid:f8030467-b7a3-4744-a945-ff0b532e9401> <gfid:def47b0b-b77e-4f0e-a402-b83c0f2d354b> <gfid:46f76502-b1d5-43af-8c42-3d833e86eb44> <gfid:d27a71d2-6d53-413d-b88c-33edea202cc2>
2007 Nov 19
1
everest doesn't work
When running it fails with the following errors from wine: fixme:reg:GetNativeSystemInfo (0x64615408) using GetSystemInfo() fixme:reg:GetNativeSystemInfo (0x64615408) using GetSystemInfo() wine: Call from 0x7b82f500 to unimplemented function ntoskrnl.exe.MmMapIoSpace, aborting wine: Unimplemented function ntoskrnl.exe.MmMapIoSpace called at address 0x7b82f500 (thread 0013), starting debugger...
1997 Jan 12
9
dos-attack on inetd.
Hi. I don''t know if this one is known, but I can''t recall seeing anything about it. If it is old news I apologize. I discovered a bug in the inetd that comes with NetKit-B-0-08 and older. If a single SYN is sent to port 13 of the server, inetd will die of Broken Pipe: write(3, "Sun Jan 12 21:50:35 1997\r\n", 26) = -1 EPIPE (Broken pipe) --- SIGPIPE (Broken pipe) ---
2017 Jul 07
0
I/O error for one folder within the mountpoint
What does the mount log say when you get the EIO error on snooper? Check if there is a gfid mismatch on snooper directory or the files under it for all 3 bricks. In any case the mount log or the glustershd.log of the 3 nodes for the gfids you listed below should give you some idea on why the files aren't healed. Thanks. On 07/07/2017 03:10 PM, Florian Leleu wrote: > > Hi Ravi, >
2004 Feb 13
1
PXELinux; Question regarding UNDI
I have already a running automated Deployment system using pxelinux and tftd and a 1,44 floppy image (memdisk) with ms-dos and 3-com undi drivers. The whole thing is working good, and i am not unhappy about it. But, the dos image solution has a few disadvanatages, because i cannot find a mtftp client for ms-dos to deploy a lot of system at the same time. Under linux such client exists, but i
2017 Jul 07
2
I/O error for one folder within the mountpoint
Hello everyone, first time on the ML so excuse me if I'm not following well the rules, I'll improve if I get comments. We got one volume "applicatif" on three nodes (2 and 1 arbiter), each following command was made on node ipvr8.xxx: # gluster volume info applicatif Volume Name: applicatif Type: Replicate Volume ID: ac222863-9210-4354-9636-2c822b332504 Status: Started